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Mauritius and Tunisia stand out as two remarkable exceptions to the African economic growth 
experience.  Since their respective independences in 1968 and 1956, both have achieved 
average real GDP per capita growth well in excess of three percent per year.  Export policies 
featured highly in the developmental strategies of both countries as they transitioned through 
a dependency on agriculture into manufacturing and then services.  What makes this 
comparison so interesting is that despite such similar success, Tunisia and Mauritius are 
fundamentally very different.  This study comprises the first ever in-depth comparison of these 
two countries, presenting a qualitative analysis and then augmenting it with a comprehensive 
set of econometric tests.  The focus is on the relationship between exports and economic 
growth, but the discussion explores the wider context in both countries.  Using the Granger-
causality approach, we find strong evidence for export-led growth in Mauritius, but no 
significant evidence of any causal relationship in Tunisia.  On the basis of a broader analysis we 
argue that exports were still important in both countries, but appear to have been more central 
to the growth process in Mauritius.  This broader analysis also highlights that other factors – 
such as a strong institutional environment – were important in facilitating or directly 







































First and foremost, I would like to thank my three supervisors, Mohammed Khaled, Mondher 
Sahli and John Singleton, for their guidance and support in the formation of this thesis.   
 
I would also like to thank my mother, Sara Carey, for her expert help in ironing out the creases 
near the end of the process, my wife Kristina for being so patient with me while I wrote this, 
and all those who so kindly assisted me in various data requests.  
  
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview ................................................................................... 6 
1.1  Research Questions .............................................................................................................. 7 
1.2  Background, Rationale and Motivation ............................................................................... 8 
1.3  Structure of the Thesis ....................................................................................................... 12 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................... 13 
2.1  Economic Growth and Development ................................................................................. 13 
2.2  Africa................................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3  Mauritius ............................................................................................................................ 21 
2.4  Tunisia ................................................................................................................................ 30 
2.5  Empirical Export-led Growth Literature ............................................................................. 37 
Chapter 3: The Mauritian and Tunisian Economies ............................................................... 47 
3.1  Mauritius ............................................................................................................................ 47 
3.2  Tunisia ................................................................................................................................ 63 
3.3  Key Similarities and Differences ......................................................................................... 81 
Chapter 4: Data and Methodology ....................................................................................... 86 
4.1  Data .................................................................................................................................... 86 
4.2  Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 92 
Chapter 5: Results ............................................................................................................. 107 
5.1  Results .............................................................................................................................. 107 
5.2  General Interpretation and Cross-Country Comparison .................................................. 116 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Applications ............................................................................ 120 
6.1  What Can We Conclude? .................................................................................................. 120 
6.2  Applications ...................................................................................................................... 125 
6.3  Future Research ............................................................................................................... 127 
Appendices ....................................................................................................................... 130 
Appendix I:  List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... 130 




List of Figures and Tables 
 
9 Figure 1.1  Mauritius and Tunisia 
11 Figure 1.2  African GDP Per Capita 2010 
55 Figure 3.1  Real GDP per capita in Mauritius 1961-2008 
57 Figure 3.2  Mauritian Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1968-2008 
58 Figure 3.3  Mauritian GDP by sector, 2009 
59 Figure 3.4  Mauritian Exports, 2008 
61 Figure 3.5  Mauritian Birth/Death Rates and Life Expectancy 1960-2008 
71 Figure 3.6  Real GDP per capita in Tunisia 1961-2008 
73 Figure 3.7  Tunisian Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1963-2008 
74 Figure 3.8  Tunisian GDP by sector, 2008 
75 Figure 3.9  Aggregate Real Exports of Goods and Services from Tunisia, 1961-2008 
76 Figure 3.10  Tunisian Exports, 2008 
77 Figure 3.11  Tunisian Goods Exports by Destination, 2009 
79 Figure 3.12  Tunisian Birth/Death Rates and Life Expectancy 1960-2008 
82  Figure 3.13  Real GDP Growth Indices for Mauritius and Tunisia, 1961-2008 
92 Figure 4.1  The relative importance of Tunisian export sectors 
 
82 Table 3.1  Key Economic Indicators 
106 Table 4.1  Summary of all 22 ELG Tests 
108 Table 5.1  Bivariate ELG Tests for Mauritius: 1961-2009 
109 Table 5.2  Bivariate ELG Tests for Tunisia: 1961-2008 
110 Table 5.3  Trivariate ELG Tests for Mauritius: 1961-2009 
111 Table 5.4  Trivariate ELG Tests for Tunisia: 1961-2008 
113 Table 5.5  Five-variable ELG Tests for Mauritius:  1972-2009 
114 Table 5.6  Five-variable ELG Tests for Tunisia:  1966-2008 
115 Table 5.7  Seven-variable ELG Tests for Tunisia:  1968-2008 
116 Table 5.8  Summary of ELG results for Mauritius 
118 Table 5.9  Summary of ELG results for Tunisia  




Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
Africa has long surprised and bewildered development economists.  A great number of scholars, 
advisors and political figures from a wide array of disciplines have endeavoured to bring us 
closer to an understanding of what can be done to raise the standard of living for the millions of 
impoverished people living in Africa.  This focus may well be justified:  questions that can be 
asked of Africa hold interest not only for professional economists, but also for the general 
globally-minded individual.  Although complete answers to such questions are far beyond the 
scope of this study, we may well wonder why such a resource-rich continent with so much 
international attention – ranging from aid money and advice to technological transfer and 
direct physical intervention – maintains such a high incidence of poverty.  Or why African living 
standards have stagnated for so long, while those in Asia – once so comparable – have 
experienced rapid improvement over the past few decades.  Recent evidence may indicate that 
economic growth is beginning to raise incomes in Africa (Sala-i-Martin & Pinkovskiy, 2010), but 
the fact is that millions still remain in life-threatening poverty. 
 
Of course, there are countries within Africa which have gone against the regional trend.  One 
only needs to look at countries like Mauritius and Tunisia to be reminded that poor economic 
performance need not be the benchmark for African economies; both of these countries 
experienced such rapid and consistent economic growth over the past few decades that their 
real per capita incomes far more than tripled (International Monetary Fund, 2010a).  These 
examples demonstrate that economic success is not unobtainable, despite such a dismal 
performance in the region generally.  For Mauritius and Tunisia in particular, outward-focussed 
policy initiatives seem to have played a large role in the structural transformation of their 
economies, and may have been a significant engine of growth.  As outward-focussed 
government policies are not necessarily predetermined by historic or inherent country-specific 
factors (such as colonial history, geographical endowments or development levels), the 
application of similar policies to other countries may well be viable.  This study will examine 
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Mauritius and Tunisia from this perspective;  analytically dissecting the economic growth in 
each of the respective countries in order to determine what causes lie behind it and the role 
that export policies – in particular – had to play. 
 
1.1  Research Questions 
Clearly, the unusual successes of Mauritius and Tunisia may hold insights into growth-
enhancing strategies that could be employed by other countries, in Africa or elsewhere.  In light 
of this, as well as the apparent centrality of export strategies in these two countries, the 
following questions are explored here: 
 
 Which underlying factors are responsible for the rapid economic growth that Mauritius 
and Tunisia have experienced since their respective independences?  Specifically; 
 What role did the promotion of exports play in this economic growth? 
 How has this experience differed across the two countries, and what can be understood 
from this? 
 
Although there has already been some discussion around the first question in relation to each 
of the countries separately, there exists no comparison of them both together.  An answer to 
the second question has been attempted in the literature – certainly for other countries and to 
some degree for Mauritius and Tunisia – but not comprehensively and with no robust 
conclusions for either country.  The last question in particular remains entirely unanswered in 
the existing literature – no one has made a thorough comparison of these two countries to 
date. 
 
It is surprising that there has not already been a comparison of these two nations, given the 
position of Mauritius and Tunisia as two of the most successful African countries in terms of 
consistent income growth over the past few decades.  If there was some common cause for this 
success, identifying it may well assist other still impoverished nations to follow in their 
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footsteps and achieve strong economic growth.  If the underlying causes of this growth are 
different in each country, then understanding the differences could help us to better 
comprehend the context behind the success of various growth policies.  Either way a 
comparison of these two success stories will help us to better understand the growth process.  
But why a particular focus on the export sector?  Exports have already been identified as a 
possible growth-driver in both of these countries, and export policies are suitably reproducible 
for their analysis to have wider application.  Export data is sufficiently obtainable to allow an in-
depth econometric analysis; adding weight to the more qualitative discussion.  Moreover, 
export policies may be particularly important for low-income countries, because of the growth-
restricting nature of small domestic markets.   
 
1.2  Background, Rationale and Motivation 
A short introduction to each country will serve us well at this point.  As Figure 1.1 shows, 
Mauritius sits in the Indian Ocean, five hundred miles off the coast of Madagascar, and consists 
of one small island and a number of even smaller ones.  The country is distinctly lacking in 
natural resources and its tropical climate makes it prone to (sometimes devastating) cyclones.  
English is the official language in Mauritius, but it has an ethnic makeup that says nothing about 
its rule and administration by various European powers over the years;  its population of almost 
1.3 million is predominantly Indo-Mauritian and Creole.  It is a strongly democratic society and 
has been ever since its independence from Britain in 1968 (CIA, 2011).  Years of successive 
governments pushed hard for ongoing economic development programmes in Mauritius – 
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Figure 1.1  Mauritius and Tunisia1 
 
 
In contrast to Mauritius, Tunisia occupies a very central location on the tip of Northern Africa 
and can in many ways associate with Africa, Europe or the Middle East (it is officially part of the 
Maghreb group of countries as well as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region).  It is 
prone to periodic droughts, but has a generally temperate climate and was fortunate enough to 
inherit substantial natural petroleum reserves.  Its official languages are Arabic and French – 
the latter a legacy of years as a French protectorate – and ethnically the population of well over 
10 million is almost entirely Arabic (CIA, 2011).  Since its independence from France in 1956, the 
country has been ruled by two long-lasting authoritarian regimes.  Despite this, it has 
developed a strong institutional framework and managed to carry out years of economic and 
social reform – focussing on social policy and structural transformation (of which exports played 
a large part).   
 
                                                     
1
 Figure constructed by the author, using a license-free image. 
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Recently, Tunisia has undergone a period of dramatic social and political change in the face of 
widespread rioting.  Ben Ali, the president for life-cum-authoritarian dictator since 1987, gave 
up office and fled the country on the 14th of January 2011 (BBC, 2011a).  The Jasmine 
Revolution – as it has been termed – has already led to a wave of similar protests across North 
Africa (and beyond), and is far from over.  It is presently unclear what the end result of this 
monumental change will be, and as such we focus on Tunisia’s history from 1956 to November 
2010 – just before the beginning of the protests.  We will make some mention of recent events, 
but the central discussion will be around Tunisia before this time.  This is appropriate, given the 
success of the country over the 54 year period following independence and the uncertainty 
surrounding current events.  Commentators may have been wrong in their assertion that 
Tunisians have always preferred “organised and regular government over personal liberty” 
(Julien, 1970), but this discussion is best left for another study. 
 
So Mauritius and Tunisia provide a fascinating comparison for two reasons:  firstly, they have 
both experienced remarkable rates of economic growth and development over the decades 
since independence; and secondly, their similar growth experiences took place despite 
remarkable differences in the countries themselves.  Both incomes and levels of human 
development improved rapidly in response to government policies, accentuating the difference 
between these two countries and most other African nations.  Figure 1.2 below gives an 
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Figure 1.2  African GDP Per Capita 2010, Current International Dollars2 
 
 
Mauritius and Tunisia stand out alongside Libya, Botswana, Gabon and South Africa.  What 
makes the income levels of the former two stand out from these six is the consistently high 
growth rates of the past few decades that underlie this.  Both Mauritius and Tunisia 
experienced relatively steady real per capita GDP growth rates that averaged around 3.4% from 
1962-2007, while rates were significantly smaller in Gabon and South Africa and much more 
volatile in Botswana and Libya.3  The dismal level of per capita GDP in most of Africa is also 
strikingly apparent in figure 1.2.  Authors such as Naudé (2010) put this incredibly poor 
performance down to a number of factors including:  adoption of poor growth policies, weak 
institutional environments, adverse historical (often colonial) legacies, widespread political 
instability and civil conflict, geographical limitations and a negative trade orientation in an 
increasingly globalised environment.  Whatever the cause, the potential for these countries to 
learn something from the experiences of Mauritius and Tunisia provides another key 
motivation for this study. 
 
                                                     
2
 IMF (2010b). These are Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted.  Note that we have only included nations with 
populations over 1 million. 
3
 Authors calculations using data from Heston et al. (2009). 
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Previous studies have tended to focus either on what these struggling nations have done 
wrong, or on what other developed countries outside Africa have done so well.  However a 
study of two such successful countries from within the continent has far more potential for 
relevant applications to these less-developed nations.  The trading environment in other parts 
of the world is quite different to that experienced by Africa, and the success of various export 
policies is likely to be related to this.  A similar argument can be made for other aspects of 
Mauritius’ and Tunisia’s growth and development strategies. 
 
1.3  Structure of the Thesis 
We set about exploring answers to these questions in the following way.  Chapter 2 first 
examines in detail the literature relating to this topic – including studies of economic growth, 
African development and Mauritius and Tunisia in particular.  A special section is dedicated to 
the extensive empirical literature on export-led growth.  In chapter 3 we progress to a more 
detailed examination of Mauritius and Tunisia; including a timeline of relevant economic and 
social events since their respective independences and a more formal look at various aspects of 
their economies.  This is followed by an explicit comparison of the two countries.  In chapter 4 
we outline our empirical approach to testing for export-led growth – examining the data and 
methodology in detail.  This highlights one of the key contributions of this study:  a 
comprehensive approach to testing for export-led growth, including a degree of sensitivity 
analysis not yet undertaken in the case of these two countries.  Chapter 5 presents the findings 
of this approach, and then in the final chapter we discuss the conclusions to be drawn and 
insights provided into future economic growth strategies.  Some discussion is also made as to 
where the research might feasibly and fruitfully be extended.  Overall, therefore, the study 
comprises a new contribution to the literature on African growth and development, based on a 
strong combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis.  In the words of Bhagwati (1998, 
p.36), we employ a “mix of analytical insights, casual empiricism, and econometric evidence” in 
order to better understand these two international success stories. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1  Economic Growth and Development 
2.1.1  General overview 
The study of economic growth is perhaps the most fundamental pursuit in all macroeconomics, 
since the achievement of sustained growth is undoubtedly the most vital underlying force for 
better living standards.  Although economic growth in the wider economy is not in itself 
sufficient to universally raise living standards, it provides the resources necessary to eliminate 
extreme poverty, increase education, improve health and provide the standard of living which 
many consider a basic human right.  In one respect it is difficult for macroeconomics not to 
contribute to the study of economic growth, but the centrality of economic growth in economic 
research has been far from consistent over the years.   
 
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) are responsible for the neoclassical form of the production 
function used in many modern economic growth models, although modern growth theory finds 
its roots in the seminal work of Ramsey (1928), who applied mathematical techniques to the 
study of consumer optimisation.  It wasn’t until the 1980s however, that authors such as Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988) gave wings to the idea of endogenous growth models, where the long-
run rate of growth is determined without reliance on factors exogenous to the model itself.  
Although we are not constructing an economic growth model for Mauritius or Tunisia per se, 
the foundations laid by this and subsequent economic growth research provide an important 
context for this study and are worth exploring. 
 
Since the late 1980s a number of possible determinants of growth have found their place within 
the framework of various economic growth models, which provide some legitimacy for their 
use in this research.  Capital and labour have long been included as the two fundamental inputs 
to the production process comprising the core of the original Solow-Swan model, along with 
technology.  The importance of human capital in the production process was highlighted as 
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early as Smith (1776), but it was Alfred Marshall (1920) in his volume on the Principles of 
Economics that prompted widespread acceptance of the view that human capital is a distinct 
input in the production process.  Economists such as Schultz (1961) argued strongly for the 
inclusion of human capital explicitly when modelling growth, and as such the exclusion of 
human capital from any comprehensive growth model would now be considered unusual.  An 
example of a neoclassical growth model augmented with human – as well as physical – capital 
is found in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  Numerous growth accounting exercises have 
demonstrated that human capital accounts for a significant proportion of what was previously 
considered on aggregate as total factor productivity (TFP).  Many models of economic growth 
were also adapted to account for an open economy, realising the importance of international 
trade and the world market in the growth process.  We shall discuss the role of trade, and 
specifically exports, in more detail later.  
 
Of course, there are many other possible determinants of long-run economic growth that have 
been included in these models.  Other factors which are believed to be highly important have 
proved very difficult to account for explicitly – a key example being institutional quality, which 
brings to the forefront the importance of governance and the institutional environment in the 
growth process.  The significance of institutions has been stressed by economists like Douglass 
North (1989) and the strong correlation between institutions and economic growth has been 
emphasised by major global development organisations such as the International Monetary 
Fundy (IMF; 2003).  However, the inclusion of an institutional variable in time-series economic 
growth models remains problematic due to its empirical intractability, and we are compelled to 
exclude it here.  This study makes use of estimation techniques that avoid the use of 
structurally defined growth models (the details of which will be described later), but it is clear 
that the variables used in these models have strong theoretical reasons for inclusion that are 
grounded in this expansive literature on economic growth theory. 
 
Moving away from theory for a moment, there is also a vast economic literature describing (and 
seeking to explain) the progression of economic growth since the industrial revolution of the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Far from the predictions of Malthus (1798), per capita 
GDP in many countries has achieved a steady increase in real terms – leading to higher living 
standards for a large portion of the world’s population.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) use data 
from the end of last century alongside estimates from a previous study to describe the key 
features of world economic development from 1970-2000.  Despite steady worldwide 
population growth, world real per capita GDP increased by approximately 70% across the 
period with most countries achieving growth in per capita incomes.  Although most countries 
have made improvements, Barro and Sala-i-Martin show that the gap between the richest and 
poorest countries has significantly widened.  Making regional generalisations, they note that 
over the period the countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) began the wealthiest, experienced slightly above average growth, and are now the 
wealthiest countries by a long way.  Most of Asia began poor, experienced rapid growth and 
ended up with medium to high incomes, while most of Latin America began with medium to 
high incomes, experienced below average growth and ended up with medium incomes.  Sub-
Saharan Africa – a region which includes Mauritius, though not Tunisia – began with low 
incomes, experienced very slow growth for the most part, and ended up the poorest by far.   
 
The authors emphasise the possibility that – due to a larger share of this increase in incomes 
going to the rich – this aggregate rise in income could still have occurred hand-in-hand with a 
rise in world poverty.  However, they find that this was not so:  using the $1 per day (1985 
USD)4 convention as a benchmark, they calculate that the proportion of people living in 
extreme poverty worldwide declined from 20% in 1970 to 7% in 2000, and that even despite 
the rapid increase in population over the period this still equated to a 280 million person 
reduction (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  Another important realisation is that even a rise in per 
capita incomes in a country does not necessarily equate to a rise in living standards.  A recent 
publication by the UK’s Overseas Development Institute (2010) noted the importance of 
economic growth in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but 
                                                     
4
 Equivalent to approximately $2.09 USD per day or $763 per year, as at February 2011 (McMahon, 2011).  
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argued that without effective government redistribution of the gains from growth – through 
the tax system and publically funded investments into health, education and social welfare – 
this may never equate to improvements in living standards for the majority of the population.  
We pick this notion up again in chapter 4.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin do note, however, that the 
regions with highest growth had the most successful reductions in poverty rates. 
 
On the whole we have seen an overall, yet regionally diverse, rise in per capita incomes.  In 
some cases this has led to a rise in living standards, but in others this has not been so.  
Mauritius and Tunisia stand out as high achieving non-OECD countries where the benefits of 
rising GDP per capita have been widely shared among the population. 
 
2.1.2  The role of trade, particularly exports 
Returning to the theory, it is worth exploring in more detail the ways in which exports – the 
main focus of this study – are believed to influence economic growth.  Of course, in one sense 
exports will always contribute to aggregate output since they are one component of it, but 
there is reason to believe that they stimulate growth in aggregate output beyond their own 
direct contribution.  One of the earliest comprehensive accounts of these possible externalities 
is Emery (1967), where the author separates the impacts of exports into primary and secondary 
effects.  One thing clear from this discussion is that there are strong reasons to believe that 
exports may have a strong positive impact on aggregate output.   
 
The first of these is the increased capacity to purchase imported goods that export earnings 
provide (often known as a loosening of the foreign exchange constraint).  In this sense, exports 
allow a country to make the most of the international division of labour to purchase imported 
goods using a lower input of labour and capital than they would otherwise be able to – and in 
some cases even purchase goods which aren’t available domestically.  The impact is even more 
pronounced where the imports are capital goods that directly impact on domestic production, 
and Krueger (1998) suggests that growth in developing countries may even be contingent upon 
greater access to these goods.  Secondly, productivity improves as a rise in exports allows the 
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economy to specialise in sectors where it enjoys a comparative advantage and trade for other 
goods it requires.  Thirdly, increased exports effectively enlarge the market in which domestic 
firms operate, allowing them to take advantage of economies of scale.  Again, Krueger proposes 
that the benefits of access to a larger market can be more pronounced in developing countries 
because of significantly lower domestic incomes.  Fourthly – relating to trade in general – 
increased exposure to foreign competition breeds efficiency in domestic firms as they strive to 
compete in world markets.  A fifth direct effect, which Emery excludes but can be found in 
Balassa (1977), is a contribution to increased employment in countries with surplus labour.  In 
themselves, these direct benefits can be significant.   
 
Emery also suggests that the less obvious secondary benefits are substantial.  The first of these 
is an increased investment in export industries as well as the ancillary and supporting industries 
that are closely associated with them.  This investment may be domestic or foreign, the latter 
being more likely with the presence of large multinational firms.  The second is increased 
consumption due to what Emery terms the demonstration effect.  Through increased trade, 
consumers are exposed to a world market with a greater variety (and possibly quality) of goods, 
which encourages them to consume more and consequently stimulates demand.  The final less 
direct effect is that as the export sector expands it encourages a flow of technological and 
market innovations, which eventually improve productivity and efficiency.  This final notion is 
not given much attention in Emery’s study, but was subsequently adopted in the literature by 
economists such as Paul Romer.  Romer (1993) coined the term idea gaps to describe the 
difference in technological knowledge between the developed and developing countries and 
emphasised that, through trade, knowledge spillovers can facilitate significant economic 
growth.  Overall, Balassa (1977) suggests that some of these effects – such as increased 
employment – will have a one-off impact on output, while others – such as technological 
improvements – can have an ongoing impact.  So the literature provides a strong theoretical 
basis for what has become known as the export-led-growth (ELG) hypothesis. 
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However, it is widely believed that there is a reciprocal relationship whereby output growth 
also causes export growth.  Bhagwati (1988) was quick to point out that unless economic 
growth leads to a reduction in the propensity to trade, economic growth from other factors will 
naturally lead to export growth in line with the growth in output.  Giles and Williams (2000) also 
note that economic growth may lead to export growth through improvements in skills and 
technology and the export-inclined comparative advantage this provides the economy.  This 
notion is now known as the growth-led-exports (GLE) hypothesis. 
 
The complex relationship between exports and economic growth has become the subject of a 
vast array of empirical studies, which will be reviewed later on in the chapter. 
 
2.1.3  Export processing zones 
Before moving on to a discussion of the country-specific literature, it is worth briefly 
introducing the concept of export processing zones (EPZs),5 which played a role in both 
Mauritian and Tunisian development.  The World Bank defines export processing zones as 
“fenced-in industrial estates specializing in manufacturing for exports that offer firms free trade 
conditions and a liberal regulatory environment” (Madani, 1999, p.5), but more generally they 
refer to groups of export oriented firms that are (geographically or just legislatively, as in the 
Mauritian case) separated from other domestic firms and subject to favourable government 
treatment.  They offer a way to promote export development while sheltering the rest of the 
economy from the same liberal treatment, and where successful have been recognised as 
promoting foreign direct investment (FDI; Kinunda-Rutashobya, 2003), lowering unemployment 
(Boyenge, 2007), and stimulating development of the domestic export sector (Johansson & 
Nilsson, 1997).  However, there is also a strong critique of EPZs in the literature, stemming from 
the failure of EPZ experiments in many developing countries in Africa and South America.  
Madani (1999) suggests that they are often far too enclave in nature, with foreign firms 
comprising most of the economic activity and with limited spillovers to the domestic economy.  
                                                     
5
 Also known as free trade zones or special economic zones. 
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Wiessman (1996) argues that special circumstances led to EPZ success in the East-Asian Tiger 
economies, and that the concept is largely dependent on immoral labour rights exemptions.  
Johansson and Nilsson (1997) even suggest that the presence of EPZs has allowed governments 
to delay the liberalisation of the rest of the economy.  The Mauritian EPZ features quite highly 
in the literature, but there still seems to be no consensus about its impact.  Kinunda-
Rutashobya (2003) hails it as a good example for other nations but questions its replicability 
and Sawkut, Vinesh and Sooraj (2009) undertake a cost-benefit analysis, concluding that overall 
the EPZ cost more to the government than it delivered to the economy in benefits.  The jury 
may still be out with regards to EPZs, but their importance for Mauritius and – to a lesser extent 
– Tunisia, remains apparent. 
 
 
2.2  Africa 
Placing Mauritius and Tunisia in their African context requires some discussion about the 
continent itself.  No matter how you define it, Africa has undoubtedly had the worst economic 
performance of any region since the industrial revolution.  Low, often negative, economic 
growth has meant rising poverty and a divergence between Africa and most other regions.  A 
testimony to the region’s poor aggregate development is its poor score on the UNDP’s human 
development index (HDI): in 2009 African nations constituted 29 of the 30 lowest ranked 
countries in the world for measures of standards of living, life expectancy and literacy.6  
Maddison’s (1995) estimates of per capita GDP suggest that even as far back as 1820 Africa was 
the least developed region in the world, which has continued until the present day.7  Moreover, 
the gap between Africa and the leading region grew from a factor of 2.9 in 1820 to a massive 
16.2 by 1992, showing a dramatic widening of the rich-poor gap (Maddison, 1995).  African 
nations were subject to colonial powers for many years, but even the widespread onset of 
independence in the mid 20th century – which initially seemed positive – didn’t bring about 
                                                     
6
 UNDP (2009).  Afghanistan was the only non-African country. 
7
 Aside from a short period around the 1950s when Africa briefly overtook the Asia & Oceania region (excluding 
Australia and New Zealand) 
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sustained growth.  Poverty, famine, disease, war and poor human development – all acutely 
linked to low economic development – have been more persistent in Africa than any other 
region.  Of course, among the 53 countries of Africa there have been some exceptions to this – 
two of which are the focus of this study.  Naudé (2010) includes Botswana, Ghana and South 
Africa alongside Mauritius in a comparison of what he terms Africa’s role models.  He argues 
that despite very different characteristics and poor initial conditions all these countries were 
able to achieve sustained growth through good governance and the establishment of strong 
institutions, coupled with the promotion of good macroeconomic and trade policies.  Similarly, 
Ndikumana et al. (2009) include Namibia and Botswana alongside both Mauritius and Tunisia in 
a study of competitiveness, finding that good governance and transparent public institutions 
have been key in maintaining long term development commitments. 
 
Relating this back to our brief discussion earlier, mainstream economic growth theory has 
struggled to explain the particularly poor performance of Africa.  A number of cross-country 
studies, such as Barro (1991), Easterly and Levine (1998) and Englebert (2000), have identified a 
puzzling phenomenon:  the presence of an unexplained dummy variable for the continent.  
Various justifications for this have been suggested and are worth examining to see how they 
relate to Mauritius and Tunisia.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that a 
combination of Africa’s largely tropical environment and the onset of colonialism led to the 
development of extractive institutions detrimental to growth.  Bloom and Sachs (1998) also 
mention the importance of Africa’s colonial legacy, along with other explanations:  a heavy 
dependence on a narrow range of primary exports which experienced declining and volatile 
terms of trade;  poor political and social institutions rife with corruption and instability;  inward 
looking economic policies and a large social sector;  rapid population growth and other 
demographic changes;  and social conditions such as deep ethnic divisions and low levels of 
health and education.  The authors argue, however, that a very important factor in African 
development is its “extraordinarily disadvantageous *tropical+ geography” (p.211), which they 
estimate has been a stronger hindrance to economic growth than poor economic policies.  
Collier (2007) further emphasises the unusual geographic features of Africa.  Collier and 
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Gunning (1999) also propose tropical geography and colonial heritage as issues inherent to the 
continent, along with low population density, a largely landlocked population and a lack of 
democracy in a context of extensive ethno-linguistic diversity.  Interestingly, they argue that 
although inherent geographic issues have hindered Africa historically, poor economic policies 
are the chief cause of slow growth more recently.  They also suggest the presence of so-called 
poverty traps, where poverty itself is a self-reinforcing process.  This interesting and somewhat 
compelling notion has been explored in a more general context by authors such as Azariadis 
and Stachurski (2005), who argue that institutional failure can lead to an endogenous 
mechanism of perpetual poverty.  Overall, the literature seems to suggest that historical and 
geographical conditions have led to the establishment of political and social institutions that are 
unconducive to economic development.  Where better institutions have developed, economic 
growth has been far more prevalent.  Given how difficult some of these factors are to quantify 
– as well as various endogeneity problems that arise in empirical applications – it is 
understandable that the African growth story has been poorly explained within the standard 
economic growth models. 
 
We now proceed to investigate in some detail the literature relating to Mauritius and Tunisia, 
exploring the main themes relating to economic growth and development.  We end each 




2.3  Mauritius 
Modern literature on Mauritian development starts with a report published by a British 
commission sent to Mauritius eight years before the country’s independence.  The Meade 
Report (1961) – as it is now known – famously predicted that Mauritian development was 
doomed by the rapid expansion of its population, which had grown at an annual rate as high as 
three percent during the 1950s (IMF, 2010a).  The report took a Malthusian tone, stressing the 
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need for Mauritius to tackle its population problem first and foremost before peaceful 
development would be possible.  Although the report has since been described by authors such 
as Subramanian and Roy (2003, p.4) as famously wrong, it highlighted the fact that the initial 
conditions in Mauritius at independence seemed all but conducive to growth.  Aside from rapid 
population growth, Meade et al. (1961) described the poor prospects brought about by scarce 
natural resources, an unpredictable tropical climate, low income levels, a very small and 
isolated domestic market, lack of technical and managerial expertise, a very diverse and 
ethnically fragmented population and the economy’s heavy dependence on sugar production.  
As we shall see it was later argued that some of these ‘unfavourable’ initial conditions were 
actually growth enhancing, but more recent authors such as Sacerdoti et al. (2005) and 
Subramanian and Roy (2003) have reiterated that overall Mauritius’ initial conditions were 
highly unfavourable, and possibly even worse than the average African economy.  It is hard to 
say that the Meade Report was entirely incorrect, because the post-independence government 
did eventually undertake the “great revolution in economic policies” (p.228) that the report had 
suggested – particularly with regard to diversifying the economy away from a reliance on sugar.  
Perhaps the failure to foresee what followed is a testimony to the unexpected nature of 
Mauritius’ success.  Different aspects of the Mauritian experience have been emphasised in the 
literature, but we will show that when consolidated they provide a reasonably cohesive 
argument for what drove such rapid growth.  
 
2.3.1  Openness and Trade 
Naturally, the literature has not failed to take note of the rapid expansion in exports that 
accompanied Mauritian economic growth.  Discussion around whether this was a key engine of 
economic growth overwhelmingly favours the notion that exports did in fact play a large part in 
driving the economy forward, and many studies even assert that this is the case without 
venturing into a discussion.  Lall and Wignaraja (1998) for example – in a study of export 
competitiveness – assert that “outward-oriented development has translated into a high per 
capita income with enviable living standards” (p.9).  Similarly, Frankel (2010, p.28) claims that 
Mauritius demonstrates that “trade is the key to growth”.  This reflects a seemingly common 
Chapter 2: Literature Review | 23 
 
feeling in the literature – that exports have been a clear driver of growth in the Mauritian 
economy. 
 
A number of studies look into the nature of Mauritian exports, to determine what it was about 
Mauritius’ export strategy – if anything – that made it so successful in stimulating growth.  As 
Subramanian and Roy (2003) emphasise, Mauritian export performance in terms of volume 
wasn’t that exceptional.  It was good compared to the rest of Africa, but Sacerdoti et al. (2005) 
suggest that it was well below the East Asian miracle economies and that trade protection 
remained high for much of the period post-independence.   They argue that on this basis, it 
can’t have been openness in itself that was so important, it must rather have been something 
unique about the Mauritian system of trade.  One suggestion is that it was the differential 
treatment of export firms and other domestic firms that allowed the government to 
simultaneously achieve two development objectives:  protecting domestic industries and 
promoting exports.  Rodrik (1999) describes how this facilitated the development of a vibrant 
export sector, while maintaining the incentives and protection for the import-competing 
industries critical to the country’s development.  The government was able to do this through 
the policy tool of the EPZ, which itself has received significant attention in the literature.  
Authors like Alter (1991) have argued that the EPZ was a clear engine of growth and 
development in Mauritius, and Woldekidan (1994) goes so far as to claim that the EPZ 
facilitated export-led growth primarily through foreign exchange earned by exports of clothing.  
Subramanian and Roy (2003) consider this heterodox opening phenomenon to be the most 
convincing explanation for the apparently strong impact of exports on economic growth, 
although Sacerdoti et al. (2005) argue that the explanation is incomplete, since the effective 
subsidy to firms with an EPZ certificate didn't fully offset the anti-export bias of trade 
protection. 
 
The other suggestion is that there was something particular about the nature of FDI into 
Mauritius that meant it was especially conducive to the transfer of ideas and technology – more 
so than FDI into other countries.  Romer (1992) has argued that Mauritian success was largely 
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based on the importation of ideas through foreign investment, and that this was a result of the 
attractive climate created by the EPZ.  Subramanian and Roy (2003) play down Romer’s 
argument, noting that as a result of high domestic savings the Mauritian EPZ had an unusually 
significant local presence, and that the policy of supporting an EPZ was not unique to Mauritius.  
However, their arguments are not complete either.  As Ancharaz (2003) argues, although the 
volume of FDI into Mauritius was relatively small, the nature of this FDI was such that it still had 
a significant impact on the international flow of ideas and technology.  Ancharaz emphasises 
that FDI into Mauritius was largely from east-Asian countries like Hong Kong, with the purpose 
of circumventing textile trade quotas that had been reached domestically.  As such, the 
investments were far from passive and brought with them a wealth of technical know-how, 
managerial skills, entrepreneurship and technology which were subsequently transmitted 
throughout the Mauritian economy.  Although there is some debate on this, it seems that since 
Mauritius was a developing country far from any production technology ‘frontier’, the 
improvements in technology and organisation brought about by increased foreign investment 
in the export sector could well have had a substantial impact on the overall economy.  
Certainly, the empirical literature on export-led growth has found support for the notion that 
increased openness caused increased growth.  Durbarry (2004) finds that exports seem to have 
caused growth – particularly tourism – and Mukungu (2008) also finds evidence that exports 
have caused growth (and vice versa).  This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.   
 
Ndikumana et al. (2009) and others have suggested that the structural transformation and 
diversification of the economy – largely through diversification of the export sector – was also 
crucial for Mauritian development.  Meade et al. (1961) noted the perils of remaining a 
monocrop economy and relying on exports of sugar to finance imports of goods as vital as food.  
Through incentivising the export of textiles and other manufactured goods, Mauritius was able 
to develop additional sectors and protect the economy from the instability inherent to a 
reliance on sugar.  Ancharaz (2003) is probably correct to assert that the narrow focus of FDI 
held back diversification for many years, and others – such as Lall and Wignaraja (1998) – have 
noted the need to continue diversification, but given the economy’s initial position Mauritius 
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has done remarkably well at diversifying over the years.  Sacerdoti et al. (2005) describe how 
the economy grew through a sequence of leading sectors to eventually become an economy 
based around five key sectors:  sugar, textiles, tourism, financial services and (more recently) 
ICT.  It is interesting to note that all five of these sectors are largely export-based, which 
demonstrates the important role that exports and trade had to play in the structural 
transformation of the Mauritian economy.  The authors suggest that this diversification in turn 
strengthened Mauritius’ external position, so the relationship between exports and 
diversification may well be reciprocal.   
 
However, even if Mauritius’ export strategies can be identified as the set of policies that led to 
rapid economic growth, is this enough to explain why Mauritius did so much better than other 
countries who attempted similar things?  Is there a deeper explanation as to why these policies 
seem to have been so successful?  It has been suggested by authors such as Kinunda-
Rutashobya (2003) that the socio economic and political environment was instrumental in the 
success of Mauritius’ openness strategy, and it is this wider context to which we now turn. 
 
2.3.2  Institutions 
There is a strong argument in the literature that institutional quality may be the underlying 
reason why the Mauritian development strategy was so successful, and as Subramanian and 
Roy (2003) suggest, the high quality of Mauritian institutions is indicative of the important role 
they played in economic growth.  Authors such as Ndikumana et al. (2009) have stressed the 
same.  They argue that the functioning of the market in Mauritius is underpinned by sound 
state institutions; highlighting the country’s strong and transparent public institutions, its 
judicial independence and its well protected property rights. 
 
The main argument in the literature is that the high quality of Mauritian institutions facilitated 
growth.  This is not to say that they caused growth, but rather they provided an environment 
that allowed for the successful implementation of growth-causing policies and ensured that 
gains from growth were not misspent.  According to Kiiza (2006), strong institutions provided a 
Chapter 2: Literature Review | 26 
 
context for successful developmental nationalism.  As in many other African countries this 
involved the heavy influence of the state in economic affairs, but while in most this led to 
corruption and cronyism, in Mauritius a strong institutional environment translated state 
involvement into what Kiiza terms durable developmental dividends (p.16).  Frankel (2010) and 
Sacerdoti et al. (2005) underline this, arguing that successful interventionism would not have 
been possible without such high quality institutions and political processes.  As an example, 
Sacerdoti et al. discuss the government’s wise use of sugar rents, noting that while many other 
African countries overexploited their most abundant resources, Mauritius protected and 
nurtured the sugar sector – protecting landowners’ rights, providing a relatively extensive crop 
insurance system and skilfully entering into favourable international trade agreements.  The 
EPZ is hailed by the authors as another example of institutional quality and effective 
management.   
 
Subramanian (2001) suggests that the stability of the Mauritian economy over the years has 
also been largely the result of the country’s strong institutions, finding evidence in the ability of 
successive (and politically different) governments to tackle domestic macroeconomic 
imbalances in the early 1980s.  He argues that an environment of participation and 
transparency created good early warning signals and feedback mechanisms that helped prevent 
further crises.  Similarly, the African Development Bank (ADB; 2009) has suggested that this is 
what put Mauritius in such a strong position in the wake of the more recent global financial 
crisis.  Of course the impact of high quality institutions is very closely linked to that of good 
governance and visionary leadership – which Mauritius has undoubtedly enjoyed over the 
years.  The literature acknowledges that the country’s political leaders have followed a long-
run, holistic view of development, and the fact that this has been constant during a number of 
governing parties is considered to be a testimony to the country’s strong economic and political 
institutions.  The origin of this strong institutional arrangement is not within the scope of this 
study, however Frankel (2010) provides some insight here.  He argues that good choices around 
the time of independence set the country into a virtuous circle of institutional development, 
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and that the lack of any indigenous ethnic group delivered the country from conflicts common 
to such countries. 
 
2.3.3  Exogenous Factors and ‘Luck’ 
Despite bleak initial conditions, it would certainly be wrong to ignore that Mauritius has greatly 
benefitted from positive exogenous influences over the years.8  Three positive exogenous 
influences feature in the literature, although the third only subtly.  The first is the preferential 
trade access to the sugar and textiles markets that Mauritius enjoyed for many years.  Sacerdoti 
et al. (2005) describe how in 1975 the Mauritian government secured sugar quotas into the 
European Union (EU; formerly the European Economic Community; EEC) at prices which, as it 
eventuated, were higher than the international market price for every subsequent year except 
one.  A number of other countries had the opportunity to undertake similar deals with the EEC 
but chose not to, which is a strong indication that the remarkably high sugar prices were not 
foreseeable and that Mauritius was in fact fortunate.  Sacerdoti et al. estimate that the 
additional revenue from this agreement amounted to an annual average of more than 6% of 
Mauritian GDP from 1975-2000.  They argue that this situation provided the much needed 
investment capital for Mauritius’ diversification.  Preferential access to the textiles market 
came through the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), which both Mauritius and Tunisia were a part 
of until 2005.  The benefits of the MFA are less obviously quantifiable – as the agreement led to 
increased direct investment in Mauritius from East Asia to circumvent the quotas – but 
according to Ndikumana et al. (2009) the benefits were substantial.  While these events were 
largely outside of Mauritian control, the authors underline the role played by the government 
in taking advantage of the opportunities presented to it.   
 
The second positive exogenous influence was ethnic diversity.  The Meade Report suggested 
that Mauritian diversity would be a hindrance to development, as it seems to have been in a 
number of African countries (consider the ethnic tensions in Rwanda, Somalia or Zimbabwe).  
                                                     
8
 By exogenous here I mean outside the direct control of the government. 
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However, Subramanian (2001; 2009), Frankel (2010) and Subramanian and Roy (2003) argue 
that quite the opposite was true – ethnic diversity was beneficial to Mauritius.  Subramanian 
(2009) goes as far as to suggest that the consequences of diversity largely explain the portion of 
growth that has previously been unexplained in typical cross-country growth regressions.  Each 
of Subramanian’s papers suggest that ethnic diversity had three particular benefits.  Firstly, as 
Mauritius had no truly ‘indigenous’ inhabitants, the diverse population provided good external 
business and social links – particularly to Asia – and these facilitated the flow of investment and 
ideas.  Secondly, diversity combined with other factors led to the preservation of the sugar 
industry, the country’s cash cow.  The separation of economic and political power – the former 
lay in the hands of the French minority for historical reasons while democracy gave the latter to 
the Indian majority – meant that the sugar industry was cultivated and not over-exploited.  A 
balance was struck whereby ownership rights stayed with the French, who allowed a small tax 
to be levied on sugar rents in return.  As we have already mentioned, tax revenues from this 
sector remained central to the government.  It is not clear how much of this can be attributed 
to ethnic diversity versus the institutional environment but Subramanian and Roy highlight the 
probable existence of a strong endogeneity between these two factors.  That ethnic diversity 
hasn't produced the same results in other countries does somewhat temper how much we 
attribute to this, however. 
 
Although it is not so overtly discussed in the literature, the timing of Mauritius’ development 
may be considered a third positive exogenous factor.  As Subramanian and Roy (2003) note, the 
trading environment early in the country’s development was much more favourable due to 
various international agreements and Mauritius was able to diversify its economy into new 
profitable sectors as they emerged.  To some extent this was not solely an exogenous factor, 
however, as the government made a conscious and focussed effort to promote and develop 
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2.3.4  A Consensus? 
Overall, the literature certainly seems to endorse Mauritius’ export development strategy as a 
key cause of its rapid and sustained economic growth.  It is clear however, that although the 
country’s export policies were effective, their successful implementation was  largely due to the 
context in which they were undertaken.  The most widely endorsed reason for this favourable 
environment is the strong social and economic institutional framework that existed in the 
country at the time, and which continued to develop alongside the economy.  But even the 
environment created by Mauritius’ institutions is not a complete picture of what took place.  It 
seems that historical and exogenous factors such as the country’s ethnic makeup and the 
trading arrangements it was offered played a significant role in the development of Mauritius.  
Translating these positive circumstances into sustained, equitable economic growth and 
development, however, clearly required a more complex combination of factors – foremost 
among them institutions and trade policies.  Overall the literature does attribute Mauritius’ 
rapid economic growth to its export and trade policies, but only once we take into account this 
exceptionally favourable environment.  This will be important to bear in mind in later chapters, 
when we empirically test the relationship between exports and growth. 
 
Health and education have received less attention in the literature over the years, and have 
certainly not been credited with driving Mauritian development to the same extent as exports.  
This is interesting given that, according to Ndikumana et al. (2009), education was one of the 
main determinants of TFP gains from 1960 to 1990, and the general level of both health and 
education among the population grew rapidly – as we shall see in the next chapter.  Frankel 
(2010) attributes some success to education, but this is overshadowed by the praise given to 
exports.  This may be because investments into these sectors were in fact made possible from 
the economic gains already being made, but it seems likely that even if health and education 
improvements didn't initiate Mauritian economic growth they may well have driven it forward 
in later years. 
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2.4  Tunisia 
Unlike Mauritius, the literature claims that aside from political instability, conditions in Tunisia 
at independence were relatively conducive to growth.  Morrison and Talbi (1996) argue that by 
the end of the 1950s Rostow’s famous preconditions for growth had all been met:  Tunisia had a 
relatively modern administration, there was an independent government and a sense of 
national identity, there was sufficient modern infrastructure and institutional framework and 
the agriculture sector was partially modernised and oriented towards exports.  This view is 
perhaps overly optimistic, given the political instability at the time of independence and the 
resulting difficulties.   
 
Although most of the literature focuses on the country’s rapid growth in per capita incomes, 
many authors stress that Tunisia’s development was far more than just economic – it included 
an equally remarkable social and cultural dimension.  Authors like Morrison and Talbi (1996) 
note that many of these great developmental achievements are not portrayed in income 
statistics; like the elimination of extreme poverty and widespread improvements in gender 
equality.  Despite such rapid economic and social development, the literature generally regards 
Tunisia’s development experience as far from perfect.  Boughzala (1995) notes that reforms 
were implemented far too slowly, and other authors highlight the burdensomeness of the 
government during the socialist period of the 1960s and periods of macroeconomic instability.  
Although these mistakes made Tunisian economic growth relatively less stable than in 
Mauritius, Morrison and Talbi (1996) argue that mistakes were consistently overcome and 
learnt from, so that the long-term impacts on growth were tempered over the years.  There are 
a number of explanations for the country’s success, but as with Mauritius we will demonstrate 
that when consolidated they put the success of export policies into context and provide a 
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2.4.1  Openness and Trade 
Trade and export policies feature highly in the literature on Tunisian economic development, 
and there is some suggestion that exports were more important for growth during particular 
periods.  Ghali and Mohnen (2004) argue that from 1971 to 1986 exports became a key driver 
of the Tunisian economy, initiated by the passing of new laws giving special advantages to 
exporting firms in 1972.  Interestingly, Bechri and Naccache (2003) suggest that this special 
export focus may have been inspired by Mauritius – where the EPZ initiative was just beginning 
to realise some success.  Morrison and Talbi (1996) claim that exports became even more 
important from the mid-1980s, demonstrating that exports outstripped domestic demand 
between 1986 and 1991 and positing this as clear evidence of “export led growth” (p.75) over 
this period.  There are a limited number of studies where the export-led growth hypothesis has 
explicitly and solely been tested for Tunisia, and these have tended to find evidence for a bi-
directional relationship:  exports cause economic growth, which simultaneously causes growth 
of the export sector.  This is the case in both Ghali (2000) and Hachicha (2003), which will be 
examined in more detail later in the chapter.   
 
Comprehensive explanations for this apparent relationship between exports and economic 
growth in Tunisia are less prevalent.  Morrison and Talbi (1996) find evidence that domestic 
total factor productivity was significantly associated with productivity increases in the most 
advanced economies, attributing this to Romer-type technology spillovers.  They run a series of 
regressions and find that the only significant means of technological transfer was through the 
importation of capital goods, which is to be expected given that Tunisia has typically relied on 
imports for almost all of its capital goods.  Although this may seem like evidence that openness 
in general affected growth, it was the foreign exchange earnings of the export sector that 
essentially made these imports possible.  The literature also highlights the relationship between 
exports and the diversification of the Tunisian economy because – as Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) 
notes – the government pursued export diversification as part of an overall strategy to diversify 
production.  Ghali and Mohnen (2004) argue that one of the government’s key priorities was 
the structural reform of the economy and that this was an important factor in enhancing the 
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economy’s competitiveness.  Baliamoune-Lutz (2008) examines the long-run relationships 
between these factors and finds a significant relationship between diversification, openness 
(trade as a percentage of GDP) and FDI, indicating the importance of the export sector in 
Tunisia’s diversification process. 
 
2.4.2  Investment 
Because of a lack of private domestic savings, the literature argues, a substantial level of 
investment in Tunisia came in the form of FDI.  Chemingui and Colton (2005) describe how the 
government provided investment incentives as early as the beginning of the 1970s, focussing 
on those firms whose investments were partially or entirely export oriented.  Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2009) suggests that the resulting FDI flows were significant, and supported and encouraged 
the country’s diversification largely through the export sector.  Ghali and Mohnen (2004) claim 
that the association agreement with the EU – primarily formed in order to increase trade in 
manufactured goods between Tunisia and the EU – led to a large investment into the Tunisian 
economy.  Exports, therefore, played an important role in promoting foreign investment in 
Tunisia. 
 
The other major contributor to domestic investment was the government; and the impact of 
government investments on Tunisian growth is prevalent in the literature.  Ghali and Mohnen 
(2004) claim that high growth in the socialist period of the 1960s was driven by public 
investments in basic infrastructure – setting the foundations for the economy (albeit at a cost 
of rising public debt).  They claim that this tended to take the form of specifically ‘public-
natured’ investments that would largely contribute to growth only in the longer-term, like basic 
infrastructure and the promotion of human capital.  In line with this, Morrison and Talbi (1996) 
argue that much of the government’s spending was into infrastructure and that this further 
contributed to growth by driving a rise in TFP and encouraging private investment.  They claim 
that approximately half of Tunisia’s growth from 1960 to 1996 can be attributed to capital 
accumulation, and that in some years more than half of this was due to public investment.  
Public investments were high even after the socialist period had ended, although authors like 
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Pfeifer (1999) argue that it was really in the earlier years after independence that Tunisia 
experienced public-investment led growth;  after the IMF-imposed structural reforms other 
factors became increasingly important.  Overall, Morrison and Talbi argue that investment was 
the principal factor of GDP growth up to at least 1996, primarily through a rapid expansion of 
the capital stock.   
 
2.4.3  Social Policy 
Although it has tended to take a backseat in the literature on Mauritius, the literature on 
Tunisian development features social policy as a fundamental driver of the country’s rapid 
economic growth.  Ghali and Mohnen (2004) discuss the specific measures introduced to 
combat poverty – including public works programmes, food subsidies, housing rehabilitation 
schemes and housing finance subsidies – and they argue that these have cut the poverty rate 
dramatically, from 21.9% in 1975 to 4.2% in 2000 (p.24).  Of all the social policies, education is 
particularly prominent in the literature.  Boughzala (1995) considers human capital 
accumulation to have been one of the key factors in achieving competitiveness and this is 
reinforced by Morrison & Talbi (1996), who find that education accounts for two-thirds of the 
increase in TFP from 1960-1995.  They state that education “had a direct, favourable impact on 
the efficiency of the economy” (p.52).  Ghali and Mohnen argue that education was one of the 
country’s most important areas of development, not just in the way it made the workforce 
more productive but also in terms of reducing poverty. 
 
A related aspect of Tunisia’s social policy which is particularly emphasised in the literature is the 
empowerment of women – partly through greater access to education but also through direct 
legislation to combat gender inequalities.  The main way this is thought to have contributed to 
economic growth is through population growth rates, which fell rapidly as a result.  
Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) claims that these falling growth rates explain much of the country’s 
exceptional growth in per capita income; higher incomes then reinforced the effect through 
even better access to education and increased female participation in the labour force.  Bechri 
and Naccache (2003) describe this phenomenon as a virtuous circle, which contributed greatly 
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to Tunisia’s economic growth.   According to Ghali and Mohnen (2004, pp.35-36) the lowering 
of population growth to 1.2 percent increased annual income per capita growth by 2 
percentage points, while also enhancing income equality and contributing to social stability. 
 
This emphasis on social policy has also had an impact on growth through other channels.  
Boughzala (1995) argues that it was largely public schooling and health improvements that led 
to a more equitable distribution of income and the establishment of a significant middle class.  
This demographic provided an important pool of skilled labour, entrepreneurs and managers, 
and according to the author was “obviously a major asset and a source of growth” (p.2).  Ghali 
and Mohnen (2004) also underline the importance of the middle class for Tunisian 
development.  Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) suggests that social policy played an important role in 
enabling the diversification of the export sector and overall economy, and that it also made the 
labour force more productive.  Ghali and Mohnen go so far as to claim that two of the four 
main factors behind the positive performance of the economy were the priority given to social 
policy and the slowdown in population growth, although it could be argued that the latter is a 
result of the former.  From existing literature it seems, therefore, that social policy played an 
important role in Tunisian development.   
 
2.4.4  Institutions and Governance 
As with Mauritius, the literature recognises the importance of institutions and governance in 
the Tunisian success story.  A relatively strong institutional framework is considered to have 
provided the favourable context for Tunisia’s growth-enhancing policy initiatives, although 
there is also an appreciable focus on the political will of the government to push forward a 
developmental agenda.   Morrison and Talbi (1996) note the importance of those such as the 
Banque Centrale de Tunisie (the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT), est. 1958) in semi-autonomously 
advising the government and providing a public check of the government’s decisions, as well as 
encouraging the financial development of the economy.  Boughzala (1995) asserts that the 
country’s institutions helped it undertake a smoother transition and integration into a new 
international environment, and were fundamental in helping to achieve competitiveness.  He 
Chapter 2: Literature Review | 35 
 
and others accept that while the Tunisian institutional arrangement was better than in many 
surrounding countries and certainly improved, it was never outstanding.  Ghali and Mohnen 
(2004) argue that although a number of institutions have been established or enhanced over 
the last few years, measures of institutional quality still rank Tunisia fairly modestly.  The Arab 
World Competitiveness Review (2010) of the World Economic Forum (WEF) is more positive – it 
claims that “the country’s efficient government institutions remain its main strength” (p.16), 
highlighting factors such as public trust of politicians and strong property rights.  This is 
interesting given that public distrust of politicians seems to have been at the heart of recent 
protests.  Governance, however, still features highly in the literature. 
 
In terms of what Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) calls ‘democratic institutions’ or ‘political institutional 
quality’ the author describes Tunisia as weak, but Ghali and Mohnen (2004) claim that 
authoritarianism was seen as necessary for the creation of a strong, independent state.  This is 
common to the MENA region according to Murphy (1999), and in fact the literature claims that 
strong governance played a major part in pushing forward the Tunisian development process.  
Baliamoune-Lutz (2004) suggests that it was due to a strong resolution that the Neo-Destour – 
the initial ruling party – was able to neutralise the competition between powerful interest 
groups that would have held back successful implementation of reforms; something which 
Boughzala (1995) also emphasises.  Similarly, Ghali and Mohnen (2004) argue that it was the 
political will to modernise and develop the country that allowed it to successfully carry out 
significant reforms in the face of challenges.  They suggest that the public sector’s management 
has been of central importance to the economy, aside from the direct effect it has had on 
employment.  The change of governance as part of the reforms in 1987, and the way in which 
economic growth subsequently picked up, is an indication of the importance of governance in 
Tunisia’s growth process.  The literature suggests that other policies – such as those around 
openness, diversification and social welfare – may not have succeeded without such strong 
governance.  This is interesting in light of recent events and the unknown impact they will have 
on the structure of the country’s government.  
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2.4.5  Exogenous Factors and ‘Luck’ 
Tunisia has also benefitted from factors outside of the government’s control.  Ghali and 
Mohnen (2004) suggest that although the country is not particularly resource-rich, it has 
benefitted from a significant oil output since independence, particularly during the 1970s and 
1980s.  Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) notes that the climate is especially good for tourism and 
agriculture.   She notes too that the country’s location has been an important enabler of trade 
and FDI with the EU, particularly France and Italy.  Ghali (2000) goes even further, highlighting 
the wealth of technical support and increased market access for agriculture and services that 
trade with the EU has facilitated.  Finally, the literature notes that the country has been the 
recipient of a significant amount of international assistance, not only from the EU but also in 
terms of loans and advice from the World Bank and IMF – much of which went directly into 
economic and social programmes.  On the whole, exogenous factors seem to have had a 
positive influence in Tunisia, although arguably less than they did in Mauritius. 
 
2.4.6  A Consensus? 
The literature emphasises the complexity and dynamism of the growth process in Tunisia.  
Exports certainly feature heavily and are often heralded as the cause for such rapid economic 
development through impacts on technology, competitiveness and diversification.  
Undoubtedly, investment has also been a crucial factor.  But the literature makes it clear that 
there was a strong two-way relationship between investment and the development of exports, 
and that public investment – particularly in basic infrastructure – was a key facilitator.  The 
social nature of Tunisia’s development has had important implications for Tunisian society.  
Aside from its direct contribution, it facilitated increases in productivity and efficiency and 
provided skilled workers for the newly developing export sectors.  As Ghali and Mohnen (2004) 
make clear, “while growth and poverty reduction in Tunisia were driven largely by the 
economic reforms of the late 1980s, they were augmented and reinforced by the pursuit of 
economic and social policies that focused on improving individual and collective welfare, 
especially in education, health, and social assistance” (p.2).  Institutions were developed 
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enough to allow for the smooth structural change and opening of the economy, but it seems 
that strong governance and visionary leadership – albeit authoritarian – was the key underlying 
factor in the success of development policies.  The country benefitted from a number of 
exogenous factors, which may have reinforced a dependence on the export sector.  Overall the 
literature suggests that although there is a good case for the export-led growth hypothesis in 
Tunisia, we must appreciate the context and acknowledge that there is a much stronger 
emphasis on social policy than there is in Mauritius.  This will be important to remember when 
we empirically test the relationship between exports and growth in later chapters. 
 
 
2.5  Empirical Export-led Growth Literature 
Earlier in the chapter, we discussed the theoretical reasons why exports might encourage 
economic growth.  In this section, we look at the empirical literature which has tested the 
validity of this claim.  The literature is extensive – hundreds of studies have tested the Export-
led Growth Hypothesis (ELGH) across different countries and time periods, using various data 
transformations, disaggregations and methodologies.  Only a concise overview is possible here, 
but after a brief background discussion we will look at some of the specific studies on Mauritius 
and Tunisia in more detail. 
 
The earliest empirical literature to explicitly test the relationship between exports and output 
used cross-sectional data and generally examined rank correlation coefficients.  It soon moved 
on to simple cross-sectional regressions, where export and output data were included for a 
multitude of countries.  The results of these early studies found overwhelming evidence in 
support of the ELGH even after various other factors were added as explanatory variables (such 
as capital formation and the size of the labour force).  There was a common misperception as to 
the ability of these studies to identify causal relationships, however, and even though they 
found evidence for nothing more than statistical association between the variables they 
typically claimed to support the notion that exports were causing growth.  From the early 
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1970s, the empirical literature began to appreciate the nature of time-series data in allowing 
for an examination of causality, rather than just association.  Granger’s (1969) work introduced 
a test for a notion of causality in time series data, by suggesting that because cause must 
necessarily come before effect, predictability and causality are very closely aligned.  Granger 
asserted that if one variable’s values in the previous period(s) could help predict the value of 
another variable in the current period, then this predictability could be interpreted as evidence 
of a causal relationship.  While there are obvious limitations to this approach – foremost among 
them the fact that although causality implies predictability, the reverse is not always true – 
Granger’s approach provided a way to very simply test for causality where all that had gone 
before had been limited to statistical association.   
 
The ELG literature jumped on the Granger-causality methods and the focus quickly shifted from 
cross-sectional to time-series studies.  Perhaps spurred on by the successful export-led 
development strategies of a number of East-Asian economies, the 80s and 90s became the 
‘golden years’ for export-led growth literature and studies of ELG began to fill journals.  Unlike 
their cross-country predecessors, these studies struck contrasting results – sometimes finding 
evidence of ELG, but just as often finding evidence for GLE, bi-directional causality or no 
causality at all. 
 
There were still major errors in much of the literature, as non-stationarity characteristics in the 
data series were often ignored.  As Nelson and Plosser (1982) argue, the presence of non-
stationary variables (commonly integrated of order 1, which is known as a unit root) in a 
regression context leads to non-standard asymptotic distributions of the resulting test statistics 
and renders normal hypothesis tests incorrect.  In order to test for the existence of unit roots in 
a VAR, Dickey and Fuller (1979) suggested the use of a now-popular pretesting method that 
became known as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  In the presence of unit roots, data 
series could then be converted to stationary series by means of first-differencing, which led to 
the use of vector-autoregression-with-differencing (VARD) models to test the relationship 
between exports and growth.  Engle and Granger (1987) subsequently argued that in situations 
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where two non-stationary variables exhibit a long-run – cointegrating – relationship, the use of 
VARD models is also inappropriate.  They provided a way to test for causality in this case, by 
explicitly including the long-run relationship in what became known as vector error-correction 
models (VECM).  A few years later, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lütkepohl 
(1996) developed another technique to allow for non-stationarity and cointegration.  They 
showed that augmenting a standard vector autoregression (VAR) of true order p with q 
additional lags – where q is the highest order of integration among the data series – and 
estimating a VAR(p+q) restores the standard asymptotic distributions of the test statistics and 
allows for normal testing.   This latter approach is much simpler, but comes at the cost of 
efficiency and reduces the power of such tests.9  The majority of modern ELG studies make use 
of one or the other of these two approaches in testing for Granger-causality (although not 
exclusively). 
 
The wide variety of outcomes in the time series literature is ultimately reflective of the wide 
variety of assumptions and methods that are involved in this area of study, and in order to 
provide the context for the test in this study, we will examine some of these now.  The first set 
of choices involves the form that the variables will take; which itself exhibits a wide range of 
variety in the literature.  The very definition of “exports” and “output” are important, and these 
differ widely.  While most use aggregate exports and GDP, GNP or some equivalent, many other 
papers use a more specific definition such as agricultural exports and agricultural output 
(Arnade & Vasavada, 1995) or aggregate output and a smaller sector of exports (Boltho ,1996).  
Generally the variables are included in real terms, as this controls for the possible impact of 
price changes on the causal outcomes.  Another relatively common approach is to control for 
the impact of population growth by including one or some of the variables in per capita terms 
(Ahmad & Harnhirun, 1996, for example), although when natural logs of each variable are used 
– which occurs in the overwhelming majority of studies – this amounts to using population as a 
regressor with restrictions on the coefficients and creates difficulties for interpretation.  Natural 
                                                     
9
 Studies have shown that in higher-order systems (where p, the order of the VAR, is larger) this loss of efficiency is 
relatively small.  See Giles and Williams (2000, pp.276-277). 
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logs make sense in a linear regression if we consider the relationship between unlogged 
variables to follow some multiplicative (e.g. Cobb Douglas), rather than linear, form.  Although 
in itself the choice of the form of the variables differs widely, there are a number of other 
differences between the studies.  Firstly, the time period and observation frequency vary 
widely – usually due to data availability.  Most studies tend to look at the longest range of data 
possible, but even small variations in time period can alter the conclusions of causality tests.  
While most studies tend to use annual data, the use of more frequent data – quarterly or even 
monthly – also takes place.  The latter encounters a new issue of seasonal adjustment,  which 
provides more potential for divergent results.  And while many papers include only exports and 
GDP, more recent studies tend to include other possible explanatory variables in multivariate 
regressions – which Lütkepohl (1982) argued can have significant impacts on causality 
outcomes.   
 
Moving beyond the initial choice of variables and the form that they take, there are still a wide 
variety of approaches employed to test for causality.  Of the different methods used to test for 
integration the ADF test is most common (which in itself involves decisions around the inclusion 
of deterministic trend terms and lag length), though when a structural break is present the test 
of Phillips and Perron (1988) is sometimes employed (Cheng & Chu, 1996, for example).  The 
choice of lag length in the time series studies is also important to the causality result.  Although 
some of the literature chooses lag length arbitrarily, the general method is to employ some sort 
of lag selection method – the most common being Akaike’s Final Prediction Error (FPE), the 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC), the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQ) and the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC).   Thirdly, the form of model used to test for causality is important, 
and exhibits wide variation in the literature.  Perhaps the most common approach in the 
presence of significant cointegration is to use the VECM, but there are a number of modern 
studies which make use of the Augmented Lags (Ozturk & Acaravci, 2010, for example) or other 
approaches.   
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So this (brief) discussion underlines the lack of consensus as to how best to test for the impact 
of exports on growth.  The wide variety of approaches and outcomes – many of which are 
documented in Giles and Williams (2000) – shows that these decisions are important, and yet 
most papers fail to adequately test for the robustness of their results.  The ease with which one 
can adjust these assumptions and methodologies in order to obtain a pre-specified causality 
result should warn critical readers of the fragility of ELG conclusions.  The literature 
demonstrates the importance of pre-determining the most appropriate methods, and then 
experimenting with changes to key assumptions in order to be transparent about the 
robustness of the results. 
 
Before we move on to some of the specific studies, it is worth briefly considering a number of 
newer or less widely applied approaches in the literature.  Sims (1972) took Granger’s notion of 
causality one step further, suggesting that for unidirectional causality to run from an exogenous 
variable (or variables) to an endogenous variable, a regression of the endogenous variable on 
past, current and future values of the exogenous variable must find zero coefficients on the 
future values.  The idea behind this is that future variation cannot impact on the past.  This 
approach has been used in some studies – such as Chow (1987) – but it is not nearly as 
common as the Granger approach which, according to Ahmad (2001), is known to perform 
slightly better.  Two other approaches are not to conduct formal coefficient tests to identify 
causality, but rather to examine forecast error variance decomposition or impulse response 
functions based on estimated models.  These methods can also be used to determine causal 
relationships, although Giles and Williams (2000) suggest that there are complications to the 
application of either approach.  A number of older cross-sectional studies – Ram (1987) for 
example – find that the impact of exports on growth may be subject to threshold effects.  
Although interesting, this notion does not find strong support in the literature despite the use 
of threshold regression techniques in newer studies such as Foster (2006).  Finally, there is a 
field of literature which examines the impact of imports on output growth (see Awokuse, 2007, 
for example).  While imports are an equally legitimate measure of an economy’s openness, 
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import-led growth is not as attractive a focus as export-led growth since governments have less 
direct influence over a country’s imports. 
 
2.5.1  Africa 
A number of studies over the years have examined the ELGH for the case of one or more 
African countries, and we will examine some of these briefly here.  Africa has been examined as 
a sub-set containing many of the world’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in a number of cross 
country studies, such as Fosu (1990).  In this study, the author uses pooled data in a cross-
sectional, rather than time series, fashion and concludes that although the 28 African countries 
seemed to benefit less from export growth than other LDCs from 1960-80, the difference is 
insignificant.  This methodology is common to a number of similar studies (see Mbaku, 1989, 
for example), but is somewhat redundant given the critiques of cross-country studies discussed 
earlier.  Amoateng and Amoako-Adu (1996) also undertake a study of African countries, arguing 
that external debt servicing may have a significant effect on the causality between exports and 
economic growth.  In light of this they conduct a trivariate analysis for 35 African countries and 
conclude that for sub-Saharan Africa, middle income Africa and low income Africa there is 
evidence for both ELG and GLE over the period 1971-90.  Unfortunately, although Granger-
causality tests are employed, the paper’s methodology is not entirely transparent. 
 
Of course, there have also been a number of single-country time-series studies undertaken for 
African countries, and these have found mixed results.  There are many ELG studies, but there 
are also some interesting ones which take a slightly different approach.  Nicita (2008) looks at 
the presence of export-led growth in Madagascar, with particular focus on the textile export 
sector and its impact in the reduction of poverty across the island.  Using data from household 
surveys in an econometric and micro-simulation exercise, the author finds that growth from the 
textile sector did reduce poverty but at the same time caused an increase in income inequality.  
Although the methods are different to those employed here, this demonstrates that other 
interesting and relevant approaches exist in the literature.   
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There are a small number of studies which have exclusively examined either Mauritius or 
Tunisia, and we will now look at these in some detail. 
 
2.5.2  Mauritius 
Formal tests of the ELGH are relatively scarce for Mauritius, despite its strong export-based 
growth strategy.  Perhaps the only directly comparable study is Mukungu (2008), where the 
causal relationship between real exports and GDP in Mauritius is examined using annual data 
from 1970 to 2004 and including – although with limited justification – three additional 
explanatory variables:  real terms of trade, gross fixed capital formation and the US index of 
industrial production as a proxy for foreign output shocks.  Data for this five-variable model 
comes from the IMF’s IFS database, but it is unclear where the associated price index or indices 
come from.  Although the author uses the Johansen and Juselius (1990) technique to identify 
the presence of cointegrating vectors between these variables, he does not proceed with a 
VECM framework.  Rather, after pre-testing for the maximum order of integration for these 
variables in natural logs using the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests and determining the 
appropriate lag-length of the associated VAR using the AIC, HQC and SIC, he then applies the 
augmented-VAR method of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to explore the Granger-causality 
results.  The tests for both a long-run relationship and short-run causality are inconclusive – 
they suggest that there is a bi-directional causal relationship between export growth and 
output growth.  The paper was published as part of the proceedings from a conference on 
African business and development, and lacks any practical or useful conclusions other than 
highlighting the need for more rigorous analysis. 
 
The only other study to take a similar approach also tests the impact of disaggregated export 
sectors, focussing on tourism.  Durbarry (2004) first examines the case for ELG in Mauritius over 
the period 1952-1999, undertaking all the necessary pre-tests for stationarity and cointegration 
and then estimating the bivariate relationship between the natural logs of output growth and 
export growth in a VECM framework.  Using Granger-causality techniques, he finds evidence for 
a one-way causal relationship from export growth to output growth, suggesting that “exports 
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have been the engine of growth over the past few decades” (p.398).  Following this, the author 
disaggregates exports into three sectors – sugar, EPZ exports and tourism – and explores the 
possibility of tourism-led growth (TLG) from 1970-99.  Although cointegrating relationships are 
found, Granger-causality tests are not performed due to the limited availability of 
disaggregated data.  Looking at the long-run relationships, however, Durbarry finds evidence 
consistent with a positive impact from all three export sectors on growth – estimating 
elasticities of 0.4, 0.5 and 0.8 for sugar, manufactured goods and tourism, respectively.  The 
paper’s conclusion is that although these findings cannot be generalised, they indicate the 
potential of tourism in enhancing economic growth.  
 
Aside from these studies Mauritius is also included in a number of multi-country studies, the 
results of which tend to vary.  An example of these is Love (1994), which examines twenty 
developing countries and finds no causality between exports and growth in Mauritius from 
1960-90.  Neither these exclusively Mauritius studies nor the multi-country studies include any 
comprehensive robustness checks, however. 
 
2.5.3  Tunisia 
There is a similar dearth of empirical ELG studies which focus exclusively on Tunisia.  The 
earliest such study is Ghali (2000), in which the author undertakes a bivariate analysis using 
real, natural-logged annual data on aggregate exports and GDP over the period 1963-1993.  
Both variables are pre-tested for unit roots using both the ADF and Phillips-Perron stationarity 
tests.  Using the VECM framework with lag lengths determined by the FPE and cointegration 
tested for using the Johansen Juselius method, the author tests for Granger-causality and finds 
bi-directional causality in the long-run error correction term – indicating a stable long-run 
relationship – but no causality in the short-run.   As this could be interpreted as evidence for 
either ELG or GLE, the author then undertakes a variance decomposition and finds that 
economic growth is more responsive to export growth than vice versa, indicating stronger 
evidence for the ELGH.  The author’s overall suggestion is that export promotion in Tunisia has 
been – and will continue to be – a successful policy towards achieving higher rates of economic 
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growth.  Although Ghali claims that the results are robust, there are no tests for the sensitivity 
of the results to the inclusion of additional variables, the form of the data or a number of other 
key assumptions.  
 
The other study which looks exclusively at export-led growth in Tunisia is Hachicha (2003).  In 
this case, the author uses a slightly longer dataset with annual data from 1961-1995 and 
undertakes a disaggregated analysis of the impact of different export sectors.  The three export 
sectors included are manufacturing (including textiles, clothing and leather, mechanical and 
electrical and fertilisers), food processing and tourism.  The methodology is more complex than 
the standard approach as the author constructs a series of VECMs based on an underlying neo-
classical export-augmented production function and export market equations.  All variables are 
logged and then pre-tested for unit roots using the ADF or Phillips-Perron tests, cointegrating 
vectors are determined by the Johansen-Juselius method and the order of each of the VECMs is 
determined by the AIC.  Hachicha finds a significant total export elasticity of growth of 0.32, and 
that the contributions of the disaggregated sectors are 0.37% for manufactured exports, 0.14% 
for tourism and only 0.03% for food exports.  The author concludes that the study finds support 
for the ELGH.  However, he also notes a significant impact of GDP growth on export growth that 
would be consistent with the GLE hypothesis.  The author’s methods are not entirely clear: 
Granger-causality has not been directly tested for in the short-term coefficients and the 
significance of the error-correction terms appears to be the only indication of any form of 
causality; the other results being limited to statistical association.  It is also unclear how robust 
the results are to various assumptions. 
 
A third study looks more specifically at the impact of international tourism on economic 
growth.  Cortés-Jiménez et al. (2011) – in a similar fashion to Durbarry (2004) for Mauritius – 
examine the case for TLG in Tunisia over the period 1975-2007.  In addition, they explicitly test 
for the TKIG hypothesis – which suggests that tourism causes capital good imports, which in 
turn causes economic growth.  Using Granger-causality analysis in a VECM framework, they 
isolate the long-run and short-run effects of each variable (a slightly different approach to the 
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one we take here).  They find evidence for a uni-directional relationship from economic growth 
to international tourism, as well as evidence to suggest that the TKIG dynamic is taking place 
only in the short-run.  The authors argue that the insignificant impact of international tourism 
directly on economic growth was due to the nature of Tunisian tourism.  Low-cost mass beach 
tourism, they suggest, is not differentiated enough from competing Mediterranean destinations 
to be an effective engine of economic growth.  Interestingly, they suggest that more niche 
tourism – presumably such as that found in Mauritius – offers far greater potential to 
contribute directly to growth.  
 
Aside from these three investigations, Tunisia is also included in a number of multi-country 
studies, the results of which tend to vary.  An example is found in Sharma and Dhakal (1994), 
which includes a time series study of 30 developing countries and finds evidence for GLE in 
Tunisia from 1960-1988.  Interestingly, this approach included labour and capital alongside 
exports and GDP.  As was the case with the Mauritian literature, both the exclusively Tunisian 
studies and the multi-country studies omit any comprehensive robustness checks, however, 
and it seems that there is real need of a broader empirical study of the relationship between 
exports and growth. 
  
Chapter 3: The Mauritian and Tunisian Economies | 47 
 
 
Chapter 3: The Mauritian and Tunisian Economies 
To set the scene for our empirical analysis, this chapter complements and deepens our 
comprehension of the existing literature by presenting our own qualitative examination of 
Mauritius and Tunisia.  This allows for better understanding of the processes which were taking 
place in these countries and sets the wider context – something highly important in any 
discussion of export-led growth.  We take each country in turn, presenting relevant events 
chronologically, then looking into certain aspects of their economies in more detail.  The 
chapter concludes with a direct comparison of the key similarities and differences.  
 
 
3.1  Mauritius 
Mauritius has what Toussaint (1978, p.1) describes as a “turbulent social and political 
background”.  Initially uninhabited, it was discovered by Arab or Swahili sailors in the 10th 
century A.D., before being scouted and mapped by the Portuguese and temporarily colonised 
by the Dutch (who named the island after their stadthouder Maurice of Nassau).  As a small, 
tropical island 500 miles off the coast of Madagascar – a perfect haven for ships in the Indian 
Ocean – Mauritius eventually found itself in the middle of a struggle for power between the 
French and British, both of whom left their legacy.  The French occupied Mauritius from 1715 to 
1810, during which time they established ports, built roads and buildings and introduced 
sugarcane as an industry, heavily reliant on Creole slave labour (Toussaint, 1978).  Ensuing 
control by the British lasted from 1810 until independence and led to even further 
development.  The banking sector was founded, the rupee began to circulate, the sugar 
industry expanded greatly in response to improved terms of trade with Britain and the island’s 
army of Creole slaves was replaced by an even larger pool of indentured labour from India.  
During the latter years of British rule social and medical conditions began to deteriorate, and 
eventually independence was peacefully granted by the British on March 12, 1968.  Despite 
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ending colonial ties after 150 years of British rule and with an ethnically diverse population, the 
newly independent Mauritius was distinctly French in culture.  British government was 
established, but the French custom, legal system and language were maintained (Toussaint, 
1978).   
 
3.1.1  Independent Mauritius (1968-2010) 
3.1.1.1  1968-1979 
Upon independence, Mauritius’ first Prime Minister was Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, a “quiet 
and unspectacular” (Ndikumana, 2009, p.141) politician who managed to establish 
independence in a peaceful manner  despite major social unrest around the country’s great 
racial, ethnic and religious diversity.  He pushed for universal health and education and a strong 
social security system, and began the process of modernisation.  The economy of the newly 
independent Mauritius relied on low productivity agricultural exports of sugar and molasses, 
which accounted for approximately 35% of GDP and 97% of the country’s total exports 
(Durbarry, 2004), and was an inheritance from its organisation as a colonial plantation.  Income 
and wealth were unequally distributed, domestic markets were small, there were no 
economically valuable natural resources on the island and it was struggling with high 
unemployment and falling living standards – which an import-substitution strategy in place 
since 1964 had failed to appease (Kinunda-Rutashobya, 2003).  High population growth 
threatened to undermine living standards and social stability even further unless something 
akin to Meade’s suggested “great revolution in economic policies” (Meade et al., 1961, p.228) 
took place.   
 
In order to deal with this, the government did undertake a series of economic reforms.  The 
reforms were based on partnership between private and public enterprises, with the aim of 
achieving capitalist economic growth and a modern welfare state.  One of the key development 
policy tools that this involved was the creation in 1970 of an island-wide EPZ – the first of its 
kind in Africa – and the adoption of a more liberal FDI policy.  According to Kinunda-Rutashobya 
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(2003), the EPZ was modelled after successful EPZ endeavours in the east-Asian miracle 
economies (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan), and eventually led to a significant increase in FDI, 
manufacturing exports and trade in general.  As the government’s reforms led to improvements 
in various areas of the economy, foreign investors were attracted to Mauritius by a number of 
factors: a cheap, literate, bilingual, reasonably productive and disciplined labour force; the 
favourable market access enjoyed by Mauritian exports;  a stable economic and political 
environment; limited bureaucracy; and a market-friendly atmosphere for business (Lall & 
Wignaraja, 1998).  The setup of the EPZ allowed the government to retain high protection in 
most of the economy while greatly sheltering the export sector from the negative effects of this 
protection and largely offsetting the anti-export bias through it.  Tax and employment rules 
differed between the EPZ sector and the rest of the economy, and the former employed a much 
larger proportion of female workers (at a lower minimum wage). This practical segmentation of 
the labour market cushioned the rest of the economy from rising wages in the EPZ, which 
would have disadvantaged the import-substituting industries that the government was 
simultaneously trying to promote (Subramanian & Roy, 2001).   
 
The EPZ – which made steady but relatively slow progress throughout the 1970s – primarily 
comprised manufacturing enterprises and facilitated a growth of manufacturing exports from 
almost nothing in 1970 to 24% of total exports by 1977 (Kinunda-Rutashobya, 2003, p.229).   
During this time the government also promoted investment in tourism – which benefitted from 
various incentives under the country’s first five-year development plan of 1971-1975 – and a 
thriving tourist sector began to emerge.  Particularly successful sugar production during the 
1970s coupled with a relatively small tax on sugar profits provided the government with the 
funds it needed to actively pursue its diversification and welfare priorities.  A public works 
programme funded by the government strongly contributed to the twin priorities of developing 
the island’s infrastructure and reducing unemployment, employing over five thousand people 
during the decade (Meisenhelder, 1997).  The government dedicated a large portion of its 
resources to improvements in education, and from 1976 free education was universally 
available at the primary and secondary level.  This contributed significantly to increased literacy 
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rates and an up-skilling of the Mauritian labour force, which was especially important given the 
increase in female participation.  The government simultaneously prioritised health and welfare 
spending, providing wider access to medical care and safe drinking water and driving 
improvements in indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality (Metz, 1994). 
 
Despite this success, the 1970s were far from stable in Mauritius.  The end of the decade 
brought a worldwide recession and falling sugar prices, and the island was hit hard by annual 
cyclones from 1979-1981.  Falling revenues from a slumping economy coupled with continued 
government spending and fuel price shocks made the economy increasingly unstable and by 
1979 the government’s deficit had reached 13 percent of GDP (Bräutigam, 1997).  The 
government adopted a World Bank and IMF structural adjustment package in 1979, which 
supplied loans to cover the state’s expenditures provided that more financially conservative 
economic policies were adopted.  These policies included reductions in welfare and 
infrastructure spending. 
 
3.1.1.2  The 1980s 
With the new policies of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) the government was able 
to rein in its deficits, but economic prosperity did not immediately follow.  By 1982 
unemployment was at 21% and inflation had soared to over 30% (Bräutigam, 1997, p.50).  A 
new government after 1982 continued adhering to these policies, however, and economic 
growth soon returned.  From 1983 to 1988 the EPZ boomed as new incentives attracted a large 
number of firms.  This was aided by the establishment of the Mauritius Export Development 
and Investment Authority (MEDIA) in 1983, which had as its chief aim the promotion of good 
and service exports from Mauritius (Joomun, 2006).  A major reason why exports so 
successfully contributed to the economy was that for many years Mauritius enjoyed 
preferential access to its two largest export markets – the EU and the US.  Since 1968 the 
country had been guaranteed a certain volume of sugar exports at inflated prices to the 
European Union, which generated gains estimated at an average 5.4% of GDP per year 
(Subramanian & Roy, 2001, p.20).  Alongside this, the Multi Fibre Agreement – which lasted 
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from 1982 to 2005 – imposed quotas on textile and clothing exports into the EU and US that 
were exhausted in other countries but not in Mauritius, providing it an advantage over 
countries which had lower production costs but had reached the ceiling for their exports.  Firms 
in countries like Hong Kong invested into Mauritius to circumvent the restrictions, which 
boosted the country’s exports further and brought rents estimated to have been over 3.5% of 
GDP by 1999 (Subramanian & Roy, 2001, p.21).  An additional benefit to the export sector was 
the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) characterisation of Mauritius as a developing country, 
which exempted it from having to remove its other protectionist policies.  
 
The extraction of enormous rents from these favourable external conditions led to high 
domestic savings, which financed domestic investment and turned what was initially FDI funded 
development into a largely Mauritian owned EPZ.  It has been suggested that it was because of 
this large domestic presence that the EPZ remained such a stable engine of growth, particularly 
during episodes when FDI may have been susceptible to capital flight.  Before long, a rapid 
economic and developmental transformation had kick-started productivity growth and a 
thriving manufacturing export sector had emerged, replacing sugar as the country’s main 
export earner (Lincoln, 2006).  The tourism sector also developed rapidly, its contribution rising 
from 1.6% to 2.5% of GDP over the decade as the government took advantage of the country’s 
tropical island appeal to promote it as an exclusive tourist destination (Sacerdoti et al., 2005, 
p.7).  As the economy grew, the unemployment rate fell steadily – down to under 2%.  Per 
capita incomes improved and so did the distribution of incomes, aided by a strong social 
welfare system (Meisenhelder, 1997, pp.290-291).  In 1989 the government established a stock 
exchange in Port Louis, and set up the framework for an offshore financial sector.  The 
country’s institutional framework had grown to feature a respected independent judiciary, 
efficient customs and port administration and other public institutions that were well-run by a 
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3.1.1.3  The 1990s 
Despite changes to the government in the 1990s, the country’s leaders consistently guided 
Mauritius down the path of stable development and GDP continued to grow at a sustained 
pace.  By 1990 the Mauritian EPZ had grown to incorporate nearly six hundred firms (primarily 
in the textile and garment industry) and employed almost one-third of the island’s total 
workforce.  Exports from EPZ firms accounted for 15% of the country’s entire GDP 
(Meisenhelder, 1997, p.290).  Over the decade the EPZ remained an important engine of the 
economy, although a decline in EPZ production took place as the cost of domestic labour 
eventually rose and Mauritian firms began investing abroad – particularly into sugar and textile 
manufacturing in Madagascar and Mozambique.  Although the sugar sector was waning in 
importance, it remained an important source of investment capital.  Investment was high 
throughout the decade, averaging 27.3% of GDP from 1990-2000 (Sacerdoti et al., 2005, p.7).   
 
Tourism continued to increase rapidly over the 1990s, and by 1998 more than half a million 
tourists were visiting the island annually (up from around 27,000 in 1970) – primarily from 
France and the French Island of Reunion.  Tourism grew faster than either agriculture or 
manufacturing over the decade, partly due to increased spending by tourists as the government 
promoted Mauritius as a destination for the more upmarket tourist (Durbarry, 2004, pp.863-
864).  Offshore banking services took off early in the decade, along with significant growth in 
the stock market.  By the end of the 1990s the Mauritian economy was built around the four 
‘pillars’ of sugar, EPZ, tourism and financial services (Sacerdoti et al., 2005).   Diversity was still 
moderate, however, as sugar dominated agriculture and textiles dominated manufacturing.  
The state’s emphasis on welfare improvements meant that even by the start of the period the 
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 Meisenhelder (1997, p.291).  It is now classified as a high development country (UNDP, 2010).  
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3.1.1.3  2000 onwards 
In 2000 the newly elected government announced that it would be driving forward a 
diversification of the economy into the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
sector, with the development of new Cyber Cities.  The country’s first completed complex – 
Ebene Cyber City – opened in 2004 and has successfully attracted investment from a number of 
international ICT companies.  Despite the shock to international tourism in 2001, Mauritian 
tourism has continued its steady growth (Sacerdoti et al., 2005).  Recent tax reforms have 
brought the overall rate of taxation to 18% of GDP – one of the lowest in the world – and 
contributed to Mauritius’ reputation as a low-tax gateway for investing into other countries 
(ADB, 2009).  On the whole, the service sector – principally comprising ICT, tourism and banking 
– has become the country’s largest sector, accounting for over 70% of GDP in 2008 (Ondiege, 
2010).  The government published a proactive plan to reduce sugar production and improve 
productivity and, as expected, the EU phased out all sugar preferences by the end of 2008.  
Despite accounting for 80% of all utilised land and a large portion of employment, the sugar 
industry now only contributes 3% of GDP (ADB, 2009, p.2).  The MFA was also terminated in 
2005, contributing to strongly negative growth rates in the EPZ sector in the first half of the 
decade (Joomun, 2006).  With government support the textile industry eventually adapted to 
this, and has moved into a higher value-added niche of the textile market.  In 2008 the textile 
industry employed 11% of the labour force and provided 19% of all foreign exchange earnings 
(ADB, 2009, p.2). 
 
The improvement in the economy during the second half of the decade is largely attributable to 
a series of reforms made by Ramgoolam’s new government in 2005, centred around improving 
public sector finances, enhancing competitiveness, improving the business and investment 
climate, increasing participation in the economy and reducing the incidence of poverty.  It 
reinvigorated economic growth, absorbed excess unemployment, increased investment, 
reduced the fiscal deficit and lowered the level of public debt (ADB, 2009).  Partly as a result of 
this, Mauritius did much better than most economies in the 2007/2008 global financial crisis.  
The economy was largely sheltered from the initial wave of financial collapses by a well 
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regulated and highly liquid banking system (Ndikumana, 2009), but once the world economy 
entered a recessionary phase economic growth began to slow in Mauritius – the effects of 
which were channelled through significantly lower international trade (such as tourism and 
textile exports).  In October 2008 the government rolled out an extensive stimulus package 
amounting to a fiscal input of almost 4% of GDP, as well as expansionary monetary policy 
measures.  This has successfully buffered the Mauritian economy so far, although both the 
government deficit and current account deficit have been steadily rising.  Through all this, the 
macroeconomy remains stable and the government has secured the option of financial support 
from the ADB and IMF if required (OECD, 2010).   
 
As a result of the generous social welfare system, levels of education and health are now high 
and the incidence of absolute poverty has declined remarkably.  The WEF’s most recent Global 
Competitiveness report (2010-2011) ranked Mauritius as the 55th most competitive country in 
the world, emphasizing the country’s strong and transparent institutions and efficient 
government (WEF, 2010).  To maintain competitiveness internationally, the government is now 
prioritising the negotiation of more favourable trading relations with the EU (under the 
Economic Partnership Agreement) and the US (under AGOA, the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act), and is actively involved in various other multilateral trading relations.11   
 
There are a number of issues facing Mauritius in the future if it is to remain competitive, 
including:  falling demand in the face of the global economic downturn; infrastructural 
bottlenecks; the need for further diversification of many sectors; the shortage of highly skilled 
workers associated with this; and the need for improved public sector efficiency in the light of 
lower tax revenues.  In addition, access to funds for firms, rising unemployment and a recent 
increase in the rate of poverty will continue to challenge the government as it implements its 
long-term development goals (OECD, 2010). As outlined in the government’s Vision 2020 
report, these are to retain a holistic approach to development – emphasising education, 
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 These include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Indian Ocean Commission (OIC).  African Development Bank (2009, p.8). 
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personal freedom, democracy and an outward looking economy – with the aim of expanding 
into high value-added, knowledge-based sectors (ADB, 2009). 
 
3.1.2  The overall situation in Mauritius since independence 
3.1.2.1  GDP 
Perhaps the most obvious indication of the rapid development of the Mauritian economy has 
been the remarkable rise in GDP per capita since independence.  Figure 3.1 charts the 
progression of GDP per capita since 1961 in real 2008 Mauritian rupees, based on data from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
 
Figure 3.1  Real GDP per capita in Mauritius 1961-2008 (IMF, 2010a) 
 
 
The outstanding rise in average income is immediately apparent.  Since independence real 
incomes have increased more than fourfold – from just under Rs 47,000 in 1968 to over Rs 
207,000 by 2008 (in constant 2008 rupees).12  Aggregate real GDP grew more than sevenfold – 
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 All figures for this section are based on the author’s own calculations, using data IMF (2010a), unless stated 
otherwise. 
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from just under 38 billion rupees at independence to 265 billion rupees by 2008 – the 
difference attributable to a 60% increase in population.  This amounts to an average annual per 
capita growth rate of 3.9% and aggregate GDP growth rate of 5.1%.  According to IMF 
estimates, Mauritius now has the 65th highest real per capita incomes in the world, in 
international dollars, which account for PPP (IMF, 2010b).  As figure 3.1 shows, per capita GDP 
growth was particularly steady over the period, aside from a sharp drop from 1979-1980 as a 
result of macroeconomic instability and the strict economic reform policies necessitated by the 
adoption of the SAP.  Beyond the timeframe displayed here, growth has slowed in response to 
declining world demand.  Mauritian GDP was resilient to the first wave of the financial crisis, 
but in 2009 GDP growth is estimated to have fallen to 2.8% (down from 5.1% the previous 
year).  This is estimated to have picked up again in 2010 (OECD, 2010a). 
 
3.1.2.2  The Economy 
The remarkable macroeconomic stability that Mauritius maintained for most of the period 
strengthened investor confidence and prevented harmful episodes of capital flight.  The one 
main episode of instability at the end of the 1970s involved substantial increases in the money 
supply to cover the government’s deficits, which led to inflation as high as 42% in 1980 and had 
the potential to undermine the successes of previous years (World Bank, 2010).  Figure 3.2 
shows that this was successfully reined in and inflation generally remained under 10% 
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Figure 3.2  Mauritian Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1968-2008 (World Bank, 2010) 
 
 
Although recent events have again threatened the stability of the Mauritian economy, the 
government has some room to move given increases in tax revenues in recent years, inflation 
at its lowest rate for 20 years (2.5%), and growth forecast to pick up again in the near future 
(OECD, 2010a).  
 
The most significant aspect of this stability is that it has allowed the government to focus 
efforts on a remarkable policy of structural transformation.  The move from agriculture to 
manufacturing, tourism, financial services and ICT, respectively, has been one of the most 
defining characteristics of the Mauritian development story.  Figure 3.3 below shows the 
current structure of the economy.  Service industries now comprise the dominant pillar of the 
economy, but manufacturing is still important – particularly with the government’s recent 
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Figure 3.3  Mauritian GDP by sector, 2009 (OECD, 2010a) 
 
 
This structural transformation was very closely related to the export sector.  The government 
effectively channelled the gains from successful sectors into the promotion of new ones, each 
of which had a largely export-focussed nature and was aided by the adoption of policies 
conducive to increased FDI.  It has been argued that this increased foreign input was crucial in 
the structural transformation of the economy, particularly in the early days of the Mauritian 
export drive when it brought not only capital but also technology and technical knowledge 
(Ancharaz, 2003). 
 
3.1.2.3  International Trade 
The centrality of international trade has already been highlighted.  What is interesting, 
however, is that the government’s trade policies didn't promote free trade, but rather 
constituted what Rodrik (1999) termed heterodox opening – returns to the export sector were 
kept high through subsidies and the absence of restrictions while the rest of the economy 
remained relatively closed.  The first and most obvious fruit of the government’s export 
strategy was the EPZ, which by the turn of the millennium accounted for 66% of the country’s 
total exports (Subramanian & Roy, 2001, p.23).  Although successful, EPZ performance has been 
far outshone by those in Malaysia, Taiwan and Hong Kong where, unlike in Mauritius, 
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production quickly moved onto more technologically intensive sectors such as electronics.  
Overall, the amount of trade undertaken by the country has been average – not as exceptional 
as in East-Asia – but as the literature review suggested, it still seems to have played a crucial 
role.  Mauritius’ main trade partners reflect its historical and ethnic identity: its main trading 
partner is the EU, which accounts for 38.6% of total trade (27.2% of imports but 64.3% of 
exports); followed by India with 17.4% of total trade (24.8% of imports but only 0.6% of 
exports; European Commission, 2006).  Figure 3.4 reflects the importance of services in the 
composition of current exports.  Tourism and other service exports are followed by the 
declining sectors of textiles and clothing and sugar, and then the rising sector of processed fish 
products. 
 
Figure 3.4  Mauritian Exports, 200813 
 
 
3.1.2.4  Finance and Investment 
The country’s financial system was well established at the time of independence, having 
developed in order to smooth seasonal fluctuations in accessible credit (Sacerdoti et al., 2005).  
The economy and financial system complemented one another over the years, with the 
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 African Development Bank (2009, p.2);  data from the Bank of Mauritius (BOM) and the Central Statistics Office 
of Mauritius. 
Chapter 3: The Mauritian and Tunisian Economies | 60 
 
diversification of the economy facilitated by a well established and sophisticated system of 
borrowing and lending.  The recent move to diversify the economy into offshore financial 
services is a testimony to the strength of Mauritius’ financial regulations.  Domestic savings 
played a key role in the country’s development, and the gross national savings rate remained 
well above 25% from 1986-2003 (World Bank, 2010).  This was aided by rents from preferential 
access and meant that capital accumulation was primarily financed domestically.  Investment 
has remained high, but the proportion attributable to FDI has stayed relatively low (Ancharaz, 
2003).  Despite this, the Board of Investment (BoI) has worked since 2001 to actively promote 
foreign investment into what the government considers its key priority sectors. 
 
Sustained economic growth has allowed the government to pursue an ambitious programme of 
spending without ever resorting to high taxes.  A small tax on sugar – introduced by the newly 
independent government – initially allowed it to pursue its health and welfare and 
infrastructure programmes.  Reforms to further lower taxes on trade in 1994 and 1995 were 
accompanied by the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) in 1998.  Corporate and personal 
income tax rates are very low compared with countries at a similar level of development 
internationally, which is part of the attraction for foreign enterprises to operate there 
(Sacerdoti et al., 2005).  Early government spending focussed on the funding of social services – 
health, education and food subsidies – and core efficiency enhancing infrastructure such as 
rural electrification.  It was then spent designing, subsidising and guiding the establishment of 
the EPZ, which required a great deal of infrastructure, including good ports, roads, utility supply 
and structures (Meisenhelder, 1997).  Public expenditure has continually been poured into 
health, education and social security, as well as key areas of infrastructure.  Since 2009, public 
finances have been focussed on the provision of the large anti-recessionary stimulus package, 
but significant amounts are also going into increased infrastructure for tourism – including a 1 
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3.1.2.5  Social Welfare 
This steady investment by the government has reaped significant societal rewards through a 
considerable rise in levels of human development.  General health has improved, problematic 
tropical diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis have been controlled, access to safe drinking 
water has been universal since 1993, and the majority of the population get more than their 
daily nutritional requirements (Metz, 1994).  In light of this, life expectancy rose steadily from 
just under 62 years at independence to almost 73 years by 2008 – as figure 3.5 below 
demonstrates.  
 
Figure 3.5  Mauritian Birth/Death Rates and Life Expectancy 1960-2008 (World Bank, 2010) 
 
 
Population growth – which primarily reflects the difference between the crude birth and death 
rates – fell from over 2% per year just prior to independence to 0.65% in 2008 – proving 
Meade’s prediction of Malthusian stagnation incorrect.  The unusually rapid decline in birth 
rates reflects improvements in education and gender equality.  Not surprisingly, infant 
mortality has also improved – from 6.2% at independence to 1.5% in 2008 (World Bank, 2010).   
The Gini coefficient declined from 0.5 in 1962 to 0.42 in 1975 and had dropped to 0.37 by 1987, 
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showing a strong improvement in income equality (Subramanian & Roy, 2001, p.7).  This was 
largely due to the dispersal of economic benefits to the population by means of an extensive 
social security system, which included free healthcare and education, a universal non-
contributory pension scheme, the unemployment benefit, an extensive national savings 
scheme, government subsidies on basic foods (rice, flour) and state housing provisions (ADB, 
2009).  Overall the rate of human development is the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa according to 
the latest UNDP rankings (OECD, 2009).  Fewer than 1% of the population live with less than the 
US$1 a day absolute poverty line, and the few remaining pockets of poverty are targeted by the 
government’s Eradication of Absolute Poverty (EAP) program (ADB, 2009).   
 
As a result of resources being ploughed into the education system, education has improved 
markedly since independence.  By providing free universal primary and then secondary 
education, gross primary enrolment rates went from 96% in 1970 to almost universal coverage 
by 2008 and gross secondary enrolment rates rose from 30.7% to 87.6% across the same 
period.  By 2008 the adult literacy rate had reached 87.5% (World Bank, 2010).  Although this is 
good by regional standards, the WEF ranks Mauritius’ educational system poorly – based largely 
on enrolment rates and teaching quality – and there are still limited tertiary education options 
(WEF, 2010).  Unemployment at independence was very high, and even by the beginning of the 
1980s the unemployment rate sat at around 21%.  This fell rapidly across the 1980s to almost 
3%, but then began to gently climb again from the early 1990s – leading to a U-shaped 
unemployment curve (Sacerdoti et al., 2005).  This is believed to have been due to labour 
market rigidities and structural changes in the economy.  As knowledge-intensive sectors have 
grown so has the demand for higher qualified workers, but the educational system has 
struggled to keep up.  Educational reforms have been underway for some years to rectify this, 
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3.1.2.6  Institutions 
Many scholars believe that institutional development has been one of the key catalysts for 
economic growth and macroeconomic stability in Mauritius.14  The country’s institutions 
steadily improved despite ongoing changes of government, contributing to a culture of 
transparency and participation and the continuity of policy priorities.  Mauritius’ institutions 
rank far higher than the African average in terms of a number of indices:  voice and 
accountability; political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory burden; and rule of law.  
The legal and judicial system is independent of the political system and there is significant 
public confidence in the rule of law (Sacerdoti et al., 2005).    As the literature review revealed, 
it seems that this institutional environment may have been the result of a combination of good 
early policy decisions and a particular type of ethnic fragmentation.  Government policies which 
promoted growth and diversification in such a vulnerable open economy may only have been 
possible due to the high quality of public institutions, and confidence in the country’s 
institutional arrangements certainly aided the EPZ’s development – assuring investors of 
predictable treatment and limited rent seeking by the Mauritian government (Sacerdoti et al., 
2005).  The institutional environment has followed an ongoing process of improvement over 
the years, and  the government’s recent endeavour to position Mauritius as the regional centre 
for international arbitration is a testimony to how high the level of institutional quality now is. 
 
 
3.2  Tunisia 
Tunisia has quite a different history to Mauritius, which is largely a result of its rather more 
central position at the top of Africa – very near to the Middle East, Europe and the rest of 
Africa.  Originally inhabited by the Berber people, the area was subject to a myriad of different  
occupants and regimes – starting with the Romans, Vandals and Byzantines.  The 7th century 
conquest of Tunisia by the Arabs lasted until the 16th century and left possibly the largest and 
most enduring legacy of any of the occupancies, deeply transplanting the Arabic way of life into 
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Chapter 3: The Mauritian and Tunisian Economies | 64 
 
Tunisia, including the language, faith and culture (Julien, 1970).  Tunisia eventually came under 
the rule of the Turks, but as vying European powers – particularly France, Italy and Britain – 
began to exert themselves in the country in various ways, the Turks soon ceded control of 
Tunisia to the French in the form of a protectorate.  French rule was not smooth sailing, but 
although French interests were prioritised in various ways the financial situation improved, 
exports (to France) grew rapidly, and infrastructure was developed.  Increased education in 
French led to the widespread dissemination of the language and associated western ideas.  In 
the wake of increasing poverty and hardship at the end of the first world war, political activist 
Habib Bourguiba began to rally support for the country’s independence, but it wasn’t until 
political violence at the end of the second world war sufficiently undermined French control 
that independence was made possible.  Bourguiba – supported by his Neo-Destour party – 
became Tunisia’s first president in 1956; inheriting a politically fragmented country rife with 
inequality and continuing violent unrest (Perkins, 2004).   
 
3.2.1  Independent Tunisia (1956-2010) 
3.2.1.1  1956-1960 
From 1956-1960 Tunisia began to work through the new experience of independence.  
Bourguiba’s government was still relatively fragile and was influenced by the main trade union 
of the modern-sector working class, who pushed for socialist measures in reaction to lingering 
French control in many of the country’s key sectors (including rail transport, utilities, mining 
and banking).  This meant the Tunisification (the establishment of Tunisian ownership) of these 
sectors and many others as the government obtained direct control, including the re-
acquisition of prime agricultural land from the French government.  An important move for the 
development of Tunisian industrial production was the cessation of a customs union with 
France during this period, which was serving primarily French interests and hampering other 
international trading relations.  Almost all the French civil servants were dismissed from their 
positions by the new regime, and the combination of political and economic changes led to 
mass capital flight from Tunisia and a period of economic stagnation, until good weather 
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sparked the resumption of growth in 1958.  The greatest direct contribution to economic 
growth during this period came from agriculture and food processing, and the manufacturing 
sector remained weak.  The national saving rate was relatively high at independence at 16% of 
GDP – exceeding the investment rate – but soon declined in the face of uncertain political 
circumstances and capital flight (Morrison & Talbi, 1996). 
 
3.2.1.2  1961-1970 
The steadily increasing influence of key union member Ahmed Ben Salah largely contributed to 
a move into full-fledged socialism, which lasted from 1961-1970.   Appointed head of the new 
Secretariat of State for Planning and Finance in 1961, Ben Salah sought to develop Tunisia 
through a focus on the industrial sector, increased investment and the collectivisation, 
monopolisation  and central planning of most of the economy (including measures such as fixed 
wages). This was not a popular move, especially among the peasant farmers being forced into 
collectivisation.  New institutional structures were set up to allow for the increased state 
involvement, and the government undertook significant investment into the country’s 
infrastructure (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004). 
 
The government’s budget rose significantly, and public savings largely replaced private savings.  
With the massive increase in costs of the civil service, however, public savings could not keep 
up with public investment and as a result public debt more than doubled.  Capital accumulation 
was largely based on foreign investment and an import substitution strategy constrained export 
growth, so from 1961 to 1967 debt servicing rose from 1.6% to 26.1% of exports and the 
country began to experience difficulties with international borrowing (Morrison & Talbi, 1996, 
p.40).  Interest rates were kept artificially low by budget subsidies, the exchange rate was kept 
artificially high, and an extensive tariff system allowed domestic enterprises to remain 
uncompetitive.  The two key aspects of central planning that cost the economy the most in 
efficiency terms were the collectivisation of land and the development of capital-intensive state 
industries.  The collectivised farms were poorly managed by a central ministry, worked by 
peasants with little or no incentives to work hard, inadequately financed and artificially forced 
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to adopt new technologies; which meant the stagnation of agricultural production – then key 
for the Tunisian economy.  State manufacturing enterprises received too much capital 
investment, which was one of the reasons for a sharp fall in productivity over this period.  
However, many of the government’s large infrastructure investments had medium-term 
impacts on production, so positive benefits spilled over into the following period (Morrison & 
Talbi, 1996).   
 
On the social side, there were certainly benefits from the increase in government spending.  
Social policies enacted to protect the poor aimed to provide for a guaranteed minimum income 
(Ghali & Mohnen, 2004).  Education spending rose, reaching 8% of GDP by 1969 and surpassing 
many of the developed countries at the time (Morrison & Talbi, 1996, p.88).  Health spending 
also rose, and the government targeted reproductive health and population control as part of a 
program of extremely progressive reforms related to women’s rights – prompting hostility from 
many other Arab nations (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009).   As a result of these measures the 
proportion of the population living in absolute poverty declined dramatically and the economic 
involvement of women began to increase.  By 1969 the situation was comparable to that in the 
communist bloc in terms of state control and involvement (Morrison & Talbi, 1996). Despite 
social improvements, economic problems meant that President Bourguiba was forced to 
dismiss Ben Salah and begin undoing the extensive collectivisation that had taken place.  The 
decade certainly had a mixture of positive and negative impacts on the economy – real per 
capita incomes were more than 25% higher in 1969 compared with 1961 (IMF, 2010a) – but 
overall it is estimated that the economic mismanagement of the socialist period constrained 
the Tunisian economy to at most 80% of its full potential by 1969 (Morrison & Talbi, 1996). 
 
3.2.1.3  1971-1986 
With the removal of Ben Salah from the civil service and the subsequent appointment of Prime 
Minister Hédi Nouira, the country moved into a mixed economy period which lasted from 1971 
to 1986.  The focus was on balancing market mechanisms alongside the state control of basic 
sectors, while encouraging agricultural development, entry into foreign markets and foreign 
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investment.  The economy was decollectivised and small and medium enterprises were actively 
promoted (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004).  This never went as far as a complete return to a market 
economy as the state retained ownership of many sectors, control of the financial sector, a 
system of fixed prices and high protection over imports.  The influence of relatively socialist 
France, the retention of officials from the socialist period and the security brought about by 
fixed prices all hindered liberalisation from being wholly pursued.  This meant that incentives 
were still distorted towards collusion and inefficiency and away from innovation and quality 
improvement (Morrison & Talbi, 1996).  Tunisia’s position as a net oil exporter meant that the 
two oil shocks of the 1970s (in 1973 and 1979) financed significant Tunisian investment and 
domestic subsidisation of certain goods.  Oil production increased significantly over the period, 
constituting more than half of all exports by 1981 (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004, p.7).  This – along 
with good rainfall and a steadily up-skilling labour force – allowed the Tunisian economy to 
perform well during the 1970s.  From the 1980s this turned less favourable with a reversal of 
the country’s good fortunes, including droughts, a drop in oil prices and a decrease in 
remittances. 
 
Productivity in the industrial sector remained low during most of this period, as the continually 
heavy involvement of the state meant overstaffing and mismanagement.  The level of taxes and 
public spending was similar to developed countries by the end of the period, making them 
significantly higher than in countries at a comparable level of development.  However, rather 
than finances being dedicated to military pursuits this was focussed on education, 
infrastructure and economic intervention.  The poor were not forgotten – investment in poorer 
regions was encouraged, public investment into social welfare remained high and prices for 
basic foods were kept low.  Interestingly, public expenditure only briefly declined at the end of 
the socialist period, then quickly surpassed its 1960s level – going from 24% of GDP in 1969 to 
almost 40% after the oil shocks, which was highly unsustainable (Morrison & Talbi, 1996, p.81). 
 
During this period of liberalisation, exports began to find a place in the country’s development 
strategy, although protection remained high.  Import substitution policies were replaced with 
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an incentive system which gave special privileges to export firms and encouraged private 
investment in the manufacturing sector (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004).  With the removal of strong 
socialist policies came the restoration of domestic savings, which rose to over 20% from the 
early 1970s onwards, although primarily through increased public savings (Morrison & Talbi, 
1996, p.39).  In the early 1970s this was accompanied by a similar and stable investment rate, 
but the two oil shocks caused a public enterprise propelled increase of the investment rate to 
an average of around 30% of GDP and pushed the gap between savings and investment to 
twelve percentage points by 1982.  This led to an increase in the burden of foreign debt service 
– up to 32% of exports by 1986 – and threatened the economy with financial crisis  (Morrison & 
Talbi, 1996, pp.40-45).  The government budget was in poor shape as it tried to cope with a 
large administrative burden, inflation began to increase, growth in the real economy fell sharply 
and both exports and imports actually decreased (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004).  Measures to 
counter this did not come early enough and in 1986 Tunisia signed up to an IMF structural 
adjustment programme to avert a crisis.    
 
3.2.1.4  1987-2010 
From 1987 onwards the country pursued a process of true economic liberalisation, abruptly 
initiated by the strict measures demanded by the SAP, including measures to steady the 
macroeconomy, lower the tax burden and allow greater freedom to the market.  This meant 
stripping away much of the remaining state control – investment authorisation, price controls, 
fixed interest rates, predetermined wage rates, direct state control of certain industries and 
trade barriers – which brought about increased competition through a greater foreign 
presence.  Tax reforms kept public debt high, which crowded out private borrowing and 
investment.  Greater openness to world markets brought about more than just increased 
competitiveness; it also contributed to technological gains through capital improvements and 
the reallocation of investment to more productive sectors and generated economies of scale 
for Tunisia’s relatively small domestic market  (Morrison & Talbi, 1996).  The political situation 
changed abruptly in 1987, when Ben Ali ousted longstanding president Habib Bourguiba on the 
basis (or pretence) of his medical condition.  While this swift transfer of power was bloodless, it 
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certainly contributed to a time of significant change.  The state remained large and pervasive, 
but made progress towards a much more competitive market environment.  Exports were 
actively encouraged as the exchange rate was allowed to devalue significantly, export licences 
and taxes were largely eliminated and export facilities were improved.  Exports had continued 
to grow at roughly the same rate as domestic demand in the early 1980s (as they had in the 
70s), but after the SAP they outgrew domestic demand  (Morrison & Talbi, 1996). 
 
Despite the global economic downturn, key sectors in the Tunisian economy have continued to 
perform successfully in recent years.  The service sector grew by 5.5% in 2009, largely driven by 
growth in the financial and ICT sectors, which have benefitted from large investments in 
projects such as the Tunis Financial Harbour (the first offshore financial services centre in North 
Africa), and various cyber parks (OECD, 2010b).  In recent years the ICT sector has acquired a 
large portion of the offshore French-language call centre market, but although the sector is 
growing, its potential contribution to the economy and capacity to export remains limited by 
high government involvement (OECD, 2009b).  Tourism has benefitted from similarly large 
investments and weathered the crisis remarkably well, with an increase in Maghreb visitors 
offsetting the recent decline in European visitors (ADB, 2009b).  National savings remain 
significant as a result of large remittances from expatriate Tunisians – 600,000 of whom live in 
France (OECD, 2009b).  Liberalisation continues with privatisation of state enterprises and 
progression by the BCT towards a free floating exchange rate.  The resulting depreciation in the 
dinar has made exports more competitive in recent years (OECD, 2010b). 
 
It is obvious from this discussion that although the road has been far from smooth, Tunisia has 
experienced remarkable economic development since independence.  Consistently, state 
investment has been high, education has received substantial resources, tourism has been 
promoted, and the rights of women have been advanced.  Moreover, this has been achieved in 
the absence of a democratic system of government, but has taken place through two 
authoritarian regimes.  This had been interpreted as evidence that authoritarianism could work 
at least as well as democracy for economic development, but recent events cast doubt upon 
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the sustainability of such a regime.  Nevertheless, Tunisia was able to achieve national solidarity 
after a long period of foreign rule and establish a strong institutional framework with one of the 
most attractive business environments in the region.  The WEF’s most recent Global 
Competitiveness report (2010-2011) ranked Tunisia as the 32nd most competitive country in the 
world – 23 places above Mauritius (WEF, 2010).  Tunisia’s long-term development goals are 
clearly outlined in a series of five-year plans (the latest covering 2007-2011).  These goals aim 
particularly at economic growth and job creation, and are anchored around the three pillars of 
strengthening macroeconomic policies and accelerating reforms, modernising the country’s 
infrastructure and reinforcing the public sector, and consolidating human capital (ADB, 2009b).   
 
As with Mauritius, however, there are a number of issues facing Tunisia if it is to retain 
competitiveness and strong economic growth into the future.   The most pressing issue is the 
current political crisis.  It is hoped that this will lead to the establishment of a government with 
greater national support and public trust but, even if it does, it is likely to cause a number of 
immediate and short-term issues.  Even before the “Jasmine Revolution” the country was facing 
lower foreign demand as a result of the global economic downturn and there was a major need 
to revitalise the financial sector and diversify trading partners.  The government’s budget was 
under pressure, and there was a major and ongoing unemployment problem – particularly 
among the most highly educated.  These factors were a driving force behind the popular 
uprising, but it certainly hasn't helped to improve the situation in the short-term.  Early news 
reports suggest that tourism has already been significantly affected, the country’s credit rating 
has worsened (Afrol News, 2011), stock market values have fallen, and there is suggestion that 
the events may lead to a decline in economic activity of around 4.5% of GDP in the coming year 
(IMF, 2011).  Tunisia now faces the difficult task of appointing a new government who can 
maintain the confidence of the people while addressing these – and other – ongoing issues.  
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3.2.2  The overall situation in Tunisia since independence 
3.2.2.1  GDP 
Across these varied periods of development, what has happened to GDP on aggregate?  While 
incomes certainly underwent periods of stagnation, the overall growth in per capita GDP has 
been equally as remarkable as in Mauritius.  Figure 3.6 charts the progression of incomes since 
1961 in real 2008 Tunisian dinar, based on data from the IMF’s IFS database.   
 
Figure 3.6  Real GDP per capita in Tunisia 1961-2008 (IMF, 2010a) 
 
 
The upward trend is immediately apparent.  Since the beginning of the socialist period real 
incomes have grown more than fourfold – from just over 1100 dinar in 1961 to almost 5000 
dinar by 2008 (in constant 2008 dinars).15  Over the same period, aggregate real GDP grew 
more than tenfold – from just under 5 billion dinar to over 50 billion dinar – with the difference 
coming from an enormous 137% increase in the country’s population.  This amounts to an 
average annual per capita growth rate of 3.3% and aggregate GDP growth rate of 5.2%.  The 
IMF estimates that Tunisia now has the 89th highest real per capital incomes in the world, in 
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 All figures for this section are based on the author’s own calculations, using data from IMF (2010a). 
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PPP adjusted international dollars (IMF, 2010b), 24 places behind Mauritius.  As figure 3.6 
shows, growth was consistently positive aside from two notable periods – one at the end of the 
socialist period, and one during the macroeconomic instability of the late 1980s.  More 
recently, growth has slowed in response to falling world demand – particularly in the European 
market.  In 2009 GDP growth is estimated to have fallen to 3.1% (down from 4.6% the previous 
year).  This was forecast to increase again from 2010 onwards (OECD, 2010b), but is now highly 
uncertain. 
 
3.2.2.2  The Economy 
Tunisia’s economic growth did not take place in the context of a consistently stable 
macroeconomy.  Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) notes that macroeconomic stability was important in 
the Tunisian development experience, although the two distinct periods of macroeconomic 
instability did threaten to undermine the country’s success.  The macroeconomic crisis at the 
end of the 1960s socialist period was largely a result of public mismanagement of the economy 
– high public debt and current account deficits – but was made worse by difficulties in the 
agricultural sector after sustained periods of drought (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009).  The preference 
for expansionary fiscal and monetary policy during the mixed economy phase of the 1980s 
again raised the level of public debt and the current account deficit (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004).  
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Figure 3.7  Tunisian Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1963-2008 (World Bank, 2010) 
 
 
Structural transformation took place throughout this entire period, sometimes even 
contributing to the economy’s instability.  Socialist development was characterised by 
significant public investment into agricultural production, and during the mixed economy phase 
the manufacturing industry was encouraged and grew rapidly, along with Tunisian exports.  
Mass beach tourism had been suggested as part of a development plan as early as 1962, but it 
wasn't until the 1970s that the government began to make significant investments and 
promote international investment into the tourism sector (Poirer, 1995).  The stability achieved 
after the SAP allowed the government to actively promote much broader diversification of the 
economy, through direct investments and various schemes to attract both domestic and foreign 
private investment into priority sectors (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009).  Before long, tourism and 
other service industries replaced manufacturing as the cornerstone of the Tunisian economy.  
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Figure 3.8  Tunisian GDP by sector, 2008 (OECD, 2010b) 
 
 
The largest disaggregated sector graphed is a combination of service-based sectors – including 
the public administration – which indicates the importance of services in the modern Tunisian 
economy.  Manufacturing and agriculture remain important, but their importance is waning in 
comparison to the service sector,  particularly as the government encourages further 
development of the flourishing ICT and offshore financial services sectors and as tourism 
continues to expand even in light of the world recession (OECD 2010b).  Energy primarily 
constitutes crude oil production, and this is likely to increase over the next few years in light of 
increased investment and prospecting (OECD, 2009b). 
 
3.2.2.3  International Trade 
This discussion has highlighted the importance of trade – particularly the export sector – in 
Tunisian development.  Import-substitution policies were replaced by an emphasis on export 
production, encouraged by a law passed in 1972 which gave special privileges to export firms 
(including duty free imports and tax exemptions).  Structural adjustment after 1986 aimed to 
further liberalise the economy and establish an open export-oriented economy – which 
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included the deregulation of imports and further promotion of Tunisian exports (Boughzala, 
1995).  Figure 3.9 shows the remarkable growth in real exports that occurred as a result.   
 
Figure 3.9  Aggregate Real Exports of Goods & Services from Tunisia, 1961-2008 (IMF, 2010a) 
 
 
The composition of exports has progressed over the years, reflecting changes in the wider 
economy.  At independence exports almost entirely comprised agricultural products and 
phosphates, but high oil prices and increased production meant that by 1981 oil products made 
up 54% of total exports (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004, p.7).  Manufactured exports of textiles, leather 
and electronics steadily increased; so much so that aggregate real exports grew more than 
450% between 1986 and 2008 despite waning oil exports (IMF, 2010a).  This was reinforced by 
the steady increase of service exports, such as tourism and ICT.  As figure 3.10 shows, goods still 
make up the majority of Tunisia’s exports, followed by petrol and minerals, tourism and food 
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Figure 3.10  Tunisian Exports, 2008 (IMF, 2010a) 
 
 
Exports were not well diversified for many years, but from the late 1980s new manufacturing 
industries appeared – including chemical and electrical production – which were driven largely 
by significant FDI inflows.  Tourism – undoubtedly one of the key service exports – also 
expanded after the reforms and has been an important source of foreign currency and both 
direct and indirect employment (Hachicha, 2003). 
 
While the diversity of exports has been improving, the diversity of export markets remains an 
issue.  Various trading agreements have aided exports over the years, but they have also served 
to deepen a narrow range of trading relationships.  The MFA encouraged trade with Europe, as 
did the more recent free-trade agreement (FTA) with the EU.  Figure 3.11 demonstrates 
Tunisia’s heavy reliance on the European market for most of its goods exports.  We know the 
same to be true for a large portion of service exports, as tourism mainly consists of mass beach 
tourism from the European continent and other services such as French call centre operations 
also naturally gravitate that way.  Efforts are underway to diversify markets through new 
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Figure 3.11  Tunisian Goods Exports by Destination, 2009 (INS, 2010) 
 
 
3.2.2.4  Finance and Investment 
Upon independence the government sought to Tunisify the financial sector and encourage 
increased domestic financial savings, but as much of the existing savings belonged to foreigners 
Tunisification led instead to capital flight.  From the 1970s there was rapid growth in the 
country’s liquidity, as the banking sector grew and private domestic savings increased.  The 
government actively promoted national saving, but this was limited by negative real interest 
rates from 1974-1984 (Morrison & Talbi, 1996).  Financial liberalisation under the SAP had a 
positive impact on savings, and savings now stand at around 23.4% of gross national disposable 
income and only 1.5 percentage points below investment.16  Investment, on the other hand, 
has been consistently high in Tunisia since shortly after independence – reaching a high of 34% 
of GDP in 1982 when the savings rate was around 20% (Morrison & Talbi, 1996, pp.12-13).  As a 
result of this remarkably high level of investment the capital stock has grown at an astonishing 
pace over the years, so much so that some – such as Ghali & Mohnen (2004) have argued that 
Tunisia overinvested in capital at various times since independence.  Investment levels have 
been kept roughly in line with savings since the late 1980s, but the majority of domestic 
investment is now foreign (OECD, 2010b).   
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 As at 2008, African Development Bank (2009b), Annex II. 
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The public sector played a major role in domestic investment – more so than in many other 
countries according to Morrison and Talbi (1996).  Encouraged by socialist policies in the 1960s 
and very high revenues from the 1970s oil shocks, the state’s revenue and expenditure as  a 
percentage of GDP increased consistently after independence and didn’t decline until after 
1990.  The most significant area of public spending has consistently been economic 
expenditure, including subsidies on key consumer goods and infrastructure spending.  The 
latter has been particularly important and has included major investments in agriculture (such 
as dams), telecommunications, roads, port and airport facilities and key industries, which has 
enhanced the efficiency of private capital and encouraged foreign investment.  After economic 
expenditure, the government’s main spending priority has been education, followed by health 
and social/cultural affairs.  Spending on civilian sovereignty (including justice, foreign affairs 
etc) and the military has always been modest in comparison to these other spending priorities 
(Morrison & Talbi, 1996).  As we have discussed already, at various times since independence 
government expenditures outpaced revenues.  Recent Tunisian fiscal policy has been much 
more prudent, and although the current economic downturn has reduced tax revenue and led 
to an increase in the budget deficit, the overall level of public debt remains manageably below 
50% of GDP (OECD, 2010b). 
 
3.2.2.5  Social Welfare 
As in Mauritius, rapid growth in incomes has occurred alongside a significant rise in the overall 
level of human development in Tunisia.  Free access to basic healthcare is now available to 
almost the entire population and indicators portray a rapid improvement in general health 
since independence:  from 1960 to 2000, the number of physicians, dentists, pharmacists and 
nurses per million Tunisians increased by a staggering 646%, 800%, 138% and 745%, 
respectively (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004, p.24).  As figure 3.12 shows, life expectancy also rose 
dramatically, from just under 49 years in 1960 to over 74 years by 2008. 
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Figure 3.12  Tunisian Birth/Death Rates and Life Expectancy 1960-2008 (World Bank, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 3.12 also shows a decline in both the crude birth and death rates over the period.  As the 
gap narrowed, the population growth rate also declined – from over 2% per year in the mid-
1960s to under 1% in recent years (World Bank, 2010).  The marked decline in the birth rate is a 
strong indication of the priority given to family planning initiatives and the promotion of 
women’s rights (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009).  Although near universal access to healthcare 
benefitted the poor in many ways, the government also directly targeted poverty by 
implementing initiatives designed to reduce the adverse effects of liberalisation on the poor.  
Periods of drought have worsened poverty a number of times over the years, but overall the 
poverty rate fell from 21.9% in 1975 to 4.2% in 2000 and extreme poverty has been largely 
eliminated.  The GINI coefficient measure of inequality fell slightly, from 0.44 in 1975 to 0.409 
in 2000, indicating a modest improvement in income equality (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004, pp.27-
28). 
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Although the government dedicated significant resources to health, even more were dedicated 
to education.  Real education spending increased by a factor of 6.5 from 1960-1988 – 
particularly during the socialist period of the 1960s (Morrison & Talbi, 1996, p.53) – and is still 
the largest item of government spending, accounting for 28% of central government 
expenditure (OECD, 2009b).  As a result, primary school enrolment increased rapidly, 
particularly as young girls began attending school.  From 1956 to 1991 the secondary school 
enrolment rate increased 14-fold, and this was accompanied by a rise in female enrolment from 
20% to 47% – near perfect gender equality – in which private schools played a significant role.  
The average level of education of the labour force rose from 1.5 years of schooling in 1960 to 6 
years by 1989 – increasing in quality at the same time – and this contributed significantly to an 
increase in productivity (Morrison & Talbi, 1996, pp.54-56).  A major reform of the education 
system took place in 1989, when the age of free and compulsory education was raised to 16, 
more qualified teachers were recruited and the education system modernised.  Tertiary 
enrolment continues to expand rapidly, although the quality of Tunisian universities remains 
low.  Unfortunately, factors such as highly protective labour regulations and skills mismatches 
mean that unemployment is persistently high – particularly among the most highly qualified.  
The authorities have rolled out a new policy to tackle this unemployment with public sector 
hiring, but more needs to be done at a structural level to properly resolve the issue in the 
longer term (OECD, 2010b).  Overall, these policies around health and education (and other 
social policies) are credited with much of Tunisia’s developmental success (Ghali & Mohnen, 
2004).  They resulted in the establishment of a large middle class, expanding the market for 
goods and services and providing a supply of capable managers for public and private 
enterprises (Boughzala, 1995). 
 
3.2.2.6  Institutions 
Tunisian government has so far evaded democracy  – the Economist’s Economic Intelligence 
Unit’s (2008) Democracy Index placed Tunisia at 141st out of the 167 included countries and 
categorised it as an “authoritarian regime” (p.7), a sentiment which has been echoed loudly 
during public demonstrations in 2011.  This ranking is low even for Africa and, by comparison, 
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Mauritius ranks at 26th as a “full democracy”.  Perhaps surprisingly, perceptions of corruption 
have generally been lower than in countries with similarly authoritarian governments, possibly 
because the government went to great efforts to establish (the perception of) social consensus 
and public support for its actions.  While its institutional framework is similarly undemocratic 
(Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009),  it is nevertheless still very strong and has undoubtedly contributed to 
the country’s great economic and social success.  Tunisia’s experience thus demonstrates the 
prospect for strong institutions to develop even under the rule of a deep-rooted dictatorship.  
The initial constitution guaranteed fundamental rights and clearly distinguished between 
executive and judicial powers (Morrison & Talbi, 1996), and institutional reform continued to 
be prioritised early in Tunisia’s development.  Women were given more equitable legal status 
from the outset – including the right to vote and stand for election – and the legal system in 
general was modernised.   
 
The most recent Global Competitiveness Report of the WEF (2010) suggests that the country’s 
institutions are comparatively far better than similar nations – particularly in measures of public 
efficiency.  The country’s institutional quality and strength of leadership – rather than the 
particular style of government – has been credited with the success of the major economic 
reforms that took place in Tunisia, as well as its smooth transition and integration into 
international markets.17  Institutional reform is clearly still needed, however, as a number of 
institutional failures have contributed to the recent social uprising. 
 
 
3.3  Key Similarities and Differences 
This discussion has brought to light a number of similarities and differences in the growth and 
development experiences of Mauritius and Tunisia, and it is worth explicitly highlighting some 
of these before we move on.  It is apparent that despite their common African roots, their 
historical backgrounds are quite different.  Both governments had distinct issues to address 
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 See, for example: Boughzala (1995); Ghali & Mohnen (2004). 
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upon independence, yet both were able to achieve remarkable economic growth and 
development over the following decades.  As the literature clearly shows, both made a strong 
impression on the international scene in terms of their overall success.  Table 3.1 and figure 
3.13, below, help to put these two countries in perspective. 
 













3.06% 3.25% - - - 
Real GDP per capita (2007, $USD)
b 
11,296 7,520 2,729 9,972 32,647 
Rate of natural population increase (%)
c
 0.7 1.0 2.3 1.2 0.4 
Urbanisation proportion (%)
c
 42.6 67.3 4.6 2.6 76.8 
Openness (trade as a % of GDP)
d
 132.27 114.82 83.25 100.14 - 
Sources:  a) Calculated using data from the IMF (2010a).   b) As at 2007. UNDP (2009).   c) For 2005-2010. UNDP 
(2009)   d) As at 2007. Heston et al. (2009). Some values not included in the datasets. 
 
Figure 3.13  Real GDP Growth Indices for Mauritius and Tunisia, 1961-2008 (IMF, 2010a) 
 
 
As this demonstrates, both nations experienced rapid growth in real per capita incomes.  
Tunisia started from a significantly lower position than Mauritius, but slightly faster growth 
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overall reduced the gap somewhat (although post-independence, growth was slightly faster in 
Mauritius).  Income growth experienced some volatility in both countries over the period, but 
was relatively more stable in Mauritius.  In general, this reflects the macroeconomic situation as 
well.  Tunisia had a bumpy road to success, while the Mauritian economy managed to avoid 
major macroeconomic imbalances barring the one period during the late 1970s.  Overall growth 
rates were very similar in both countries, though slightly more steady in Mauritius.  
 
Health and welfare certainly featured highly on the agendas of both governments over the 
years, although social policy in general seems to have been more central to the Tunisian 
development strategy.  This may have reflected the lower socio-economic position from which 
Tunisia was coming, given that Tunisia’s life expectancy at independence was less than 49, 
compared to 62 in Mauritius (World Bank, 2010).  Given the likely presence of decreasing 
returns to investment in health and welfare, Tunisia seems to have had more to gain from these 
investments.  Similarly, education was central to the development strategies of both countries, 
but it seems it was more important in the Tunisian experience.  Significant resources were put 
into the education systems of both, but Tunisia had additional ground to gain due to its initially 
incredibly low female participation rates.  Marginal returns from increased female participation 
rates were much higher in Tunisia than Mauritius.  Overall therefore, social policy appeared to 
be more valuable in Tunisia due to the country’s relative catch-up potential.  Undoubtedly both 
countries benefitted greatly from health, welfare and educational development, but it seems 
that investment in social policy simply had higher marginal returns in Tunisia. 
 
Structural transformation was remarkably similar in both countries – each was based largely on 
agriculture at independence, but soon moved into manufacturing (with an emphasis on textiles) 
followed by services (with an emphasis on tourism and growing focus on ICT).  There were 
differences, but overall both countries gradually diversified their economies into emerging 
sectors through the successful re-investment of gains.  The public sector played an important 
facilitating role in both countries, but had a much more direct role in investments in Tunisia 
than in Mauritius because private savings and investment were relatively more important.  The 
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benefits of foreign investment have been emphasised more for Mauritius, and the country 
seemed to shift its focus to key sectors slightly ahead of Tunisia.  It is not clear why this is the 
case, although in the early years the government’s attempt to appease its more socialist 
stakeholders certainly impeded the pursuit of more liberal development policies. 
 
Thankfully – given that it is the focus of this study – trade seems to have played a very 
important role in the economic growth and development of both countries.  As table 3.1 shows, 
the relative volume of trade is much higher in Mauritius, something which we would expect 
given the above discussion.  It seems obvious that the export sectors of both countries 
contributed increasingly to the structural diversification, growth and development of the 
countries, directly or indirectly, but exports appear to have played a more central role in 
Mauritius.  Tunisia did not really encourage development of the export sector until into the 
1970s, by which time the Mauritian EPZ had already started to gain some momentum.  Trade 
was in some respects easier for centrally-located Tunisia, but, as we have described, it seemed 
to be one aspect of an overall development strategy where more funding and focus was given 
to other areas – particularly in the earlier years following independence.  Although not 
exceptional in terms of trade volume, the export and import sectors in Mauritius were key from 
the outset and remained the central aspect of its developmental strategy.  The relatively much 
smaller size of the Mauritian economy may have driven this reliance on foreign trade, and 
certainly just before independence the country depended on foreign exchange earnings for 
some very basic commodities (Meade et al., 1961). 
 
Finally, a comparison of the governance and institutional arrangements in each country is 
particularly interesting.  In both cases it is apparent that a strong institutional environment was 
central to long-term success, but the overarching governmental framework could not have 
been more different.  Tunisia developed strong institutions in the face of authoritarianism, 
Mauritius did it in parallel with democracy, yet the Global Competitiveness Report ranks 
Tunisia’s institutional quality as 23rd out of 139 countries while Mauritius comes in at 43rd (WEF, 
2010).  Institutions have clearly been important for both countries, and while we are not able to 
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test directly for the impact of institutions and governance in our empirical section, this context 
is critical to an understanding of the true nature of the exports-growth relationship. 
 
Where does this leave us as we move into the empirical section of the paper?  Both the 
literature review and this detailed discussion of the two economies have illustrated the 
centrality of exports in the development strategies of Mauritius and Tunisia.  However, this 
chapter has underlined that while export policies are credited with much of the economic 
success of these two countries, it is important to understand the wider context in which they 
were implemented.  No export strategy is an island, as it were.  Export policies were only 
successful given the favourable environment in which they were initiated and developed, and 
they seem to have been more central to the Mauritian experience than in Tunisia, where other 
policies – such as those relating to the inclusion of women – had greater scope to contribute to 
growth.  As we turn to the empirical tests, therefore, we have good reason to expect a positive 
and significant relationship between exports and growth, particularly in Mauritius.  Although 
our econometric analysis is more narrow in scope and will not shed any more light on the 
importance of these other factors (such as institutions and governance) it is important that we 













Chapter 4: Data and Methodology | 86 
 
Chapter 4: Data and Methodology 
In order to examine the true impact of exports on economic growth in Mauritius and Tunisia, 
we undertake a sequence of different ELG tests for each country.  This constitutes the core 
empirical contribution of the study, which is to provide a more in-depth analysis of the 
relationship between exports and output growth than has been previously undertaken.   
 
To keep the analysis tractable, we focus on the relationship between exports and growth.  We 
do include a wider number of possibly influential variables in many of our models, but 
incorporate them as control variables in order to better identify the true relationship between 
exports and output.  While our preference would be to explore the entire set of possible 
relationships between all inputs to the growth process in-depth, this is not possible given the 
data available.  We choose instead to prioritise robustness, and use additional variables to help 
shed light on the exports-growth relationship.  It is important to note that this limits the scope 
of the econometric analysis – it does not provide any additional insights into the importance of 
institutions or governance, for example.  This is why the qualitative analysis of earlier chapters 
provides such an important background and context to the results of this analysis.  The 
structure of this chapter is as follows.  After introducing the data to be used in the analysis, we 
then discuss the methodology and outline the specific tests employed. 
 
4.1  Data 
In order to keep the analyses as comparable as possible, key data for both countries come 
primarily from one source – the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database.  This database is a standard source of international statistics, kept and 
maintained by the IMF’s Statistics Department.  It includes time series data on various key 
economic and financial series for most countries, including some as far back as 1948.  For the 
most part, these statistics are drawn directly from the governments and statistical agencies of 
the subject countries themselves, and this is the case for both Mauritius and Tunisia.  The key 
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series that form the basis of the following tests – output, exports and capital – all come from 
this dataset, and the following descriptions of these series apply to both countries.  Discussion 
of why each variable is included will be left for the methodology section. 
 
Output 
The variable used to measure output and economic growth is gross domestic product (GDP).  
Although authors like Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2010) argue that often this does not adequately 
capture welfare or living standards as such – excluding, for example any measure of greater 
freedom or equality – the discussion in previous chapters has demonstrated that in these two 
cases economic growth and development were in fact highly correlated.  For Mauritius, GDP is 
measured as the aggregate money value of all final goods and services produced within the 
country, before any provision for the consumption of fixed capital.  Similarly, for Tunisia GDP is 
measured as the aggregate money value of final consumption plus gross capital formation and 
net exports (the expenditure approach). 
 
Exports 
In order to measure exports, we use an aggregate measure of the exports of both goods and 
services.  This measure includes commodities such as food or manufactured products, but also 
items such as international tourism.  According to the official definition used by the IMF, this 
follows the concept of goods and service exports followed in national accounts and includes all 
transactions in goods and services between residents and non-residents (regardless of where 
they are living at the time). 
 
Capital 
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is used as a proxy for capital in the model and is our 
primary control variable.  GFCF in the IFS dataset is measured by the total value of acquisitions 
of fixed assets minus disposals of fixed assets over the accounting period (in this case the 
calendar year).  A certain specified expenditure on services that add to the value of these assets 
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is also included (European Commission et al., 2009, pp.198-211).  Fixed assets, consequently, 
are defined as goods and services that are used in production for more than a year.  In this 
sense, GFCF is a flow – not a stock – variable.  It is gross in the sense that it does not account for 
the ‘consumption’ of fixed capital – chiefly depreciation.  Although countries produce using 
their stock of productive capital, this is still meaningful as a measure of the change in 
productive capital in the economy, which is expected to have a significant impact on 
production.  Data on net fixed capital – which takes into account depreciation and other factors 
lowering the stock of fixed capital – was not available, but if GFCF remains approximately 
proportionate to the capital stock then it remains a good proxy for the capital input. 
 
Each of these three key variables is measured by value, in nominal domestic currency.  In order 
to take account of the possible impact of price changes (inflation or deflation), each series has 
been deflated using a price index.  Although the best technique is to apply a specific deflator 
series to each of the variables – in order to account for the impact of divergent prices in each 
series – the limited availability of price deflator series meant that each series has instead been 
deflated using an aggregate GDP deflator series.  Although not ideal, this transforms GDP into 
real GDP and generates something very close to real exports and real gross fixed capital 
formation.  Using the two GDP deflator series we obtain real values of GDP, exports and capital 
in 2005 Mauritian rupees and 2005 Tunisian dinars, respectively. 
 
As with most studies, the timeframe is restricted by the availability of the data.  This data, 
including the deflator series, are available as far back as 1953 for Mauritius, although 
unfortunately there is an obvious and well-known error in the data for the years prior to 1960.   
Similarly, Morrisson and Talbi (1996, p.33) argue that it is meaningless to include Tunisian data 
before 1960 as during that time the reliability of the data is questionable; and, since we only 
have these data in real terms from 1961 anyway, we choose to include data from 1961 
onwards.  So for the bivariate and trivariate tests using these series, we keep the analysis 
comparable by examining the period 1961-2008 for Tunisia (48 observations) and the 
fractionally longer period 1961-2009 for Mauritius (49 observations) due to more up-to-date 
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figures for this country.  Again, data availability has limited us to the use of annual series, but 
the advantage is that this compels us to avoid the difficulties inherent in testing for causal 
relationships using seasonal data. 
 
Employment and Education 
In order to broaden the scope of our tests, we include two other control variables into our 
models.  A justification for this inclusion will be given in the methodology section, and as these 
two variables differ slightly for each country we will consider each in turn. 
 
For Mauritius, we include the variables employment and education.  Employment is a count of 
all full-time equivalent employees in Mauritius over the period, and is used as a proxy for the 
labour input to the production process.  Data comes directly from the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO) of Mauritius and is unpublished prior to 1983.   Education measures the percentage of 
the working age population (those aged 15 or above and not attending school) who have 
secondary or tertiary education each period.  It is used to proxy the human capital input to the 
production process, and its construction is a little more problematic.  Values come from census 
data, so it is not available on an annual basis over any period and we have had to interpolate 
this data in order to make it usable in our econometrics.  This is far from ideal, however the 
decision is defensible.  Firstly, an examination of the actual data points confirms that they 
appear to follow a linear trend; making linear interpolation most appropriate.  Secondly, as 
these data do not exist anywhere, interpolation is our only option if we are to include a 
measure of human capital in our models, and it is deemed better to include estimated data 
than to exclude the series altogether.  Again, owing to data limitations, our tests involving these 
two variables are limited to the time period 1972-2009 (38 observations). 
 
For Tunisia we also include the variables employment and education – although they have a 
slightly different interpretation due to inconsistencies in data collection across the two 
countries.  Unfortunately, in the earlier years both variables have had to be interpolated in 
order for the data to be usable in the models.  Again this is far from ideal, however the more 
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recent periods, where the data are actually available on an annual basis, verify that the trend 
for both series is approximately linear.  Employment is a count of the active labour force in each 
year – a very similar statistic to that used in the Mauritian case – and is compiled from online 
and hardcopy reports obtained from the Tunisian Institute of Statistics (INS).  Education is 
directly related to employment in this case, as it measures the percentage of the active labour 
force with secondary or tertiary education.  This is slightly different to the Mauritian measure, 
and more accurately proxies the true human capital input to the production process since the 
sample includes only those who are presently employed.  Data for this series is compiled from 
printed reports and special data requests from the INS. 
 
4.1.1  Disaggregated Tunisian Data 
In addition to the aggregate data discussed above, we also include disaggregated Tunisian 
export data for two supplementary tests.  This data also comes from the INS, however as it is 
not available in digital form it had to be physically located and then entered manually based on 
hardcopy INS reports from Tunis.  The INS summarises goods exports according to fifteen key 
classifications, and these were combined with a series on international tourism receipts in 
order to construct five different export series. Each of these is detailed below. 
 
Tourism exports is the entry “tourism” in the balance of payments.  This includes any tourism 
related spending by foreign residents during the period – such as flights, accommodation and 
meals.  
 
Manufactured exports includes five INS goods exports categories: textiles; fertiliser; inorganic 
chemicals; hides, leather, articles of leather and shoes; and machinery and electrical 
equipment.18  
 
                                                     
18
 Officially these are:  textiles; engrais (superphosphates); produits chimiques inorganiques; peaux, cuir, ouvrages 
en cuir et chassures; and machines et appareils electriques. 
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Food exports includes six INS goods export categories: olive oil; fruit, dried fruit, citrus fruits and 
melons; sugars and sugar confectionary; fish, crustaceans and molluscs; vegetables living plants 
and flowers; and drinks, alcohol and vinegars.19 
 
Petrol and mineral exports includes just three INS goods export categories: petrol and derived 
products; phosphates and other minerals; and lead.20 
 
Other exports includes all other goods exports, and any other service exports which are not 
considered tourism.  This series is constructed by subtracting the above four series from the  
aggregate export series in the IFS database discussed earlier. 
 
Each of these series is then transformed into approximately real (2005) values using the same 
Tunisian deflator series discussed above.  As the collated data is relatively extensive, we are 
able to include these disaggregated series for the period 1968-2008 (41 observations in total).  












                                                     
19
 Officially these are: huile d'olives; fruits, fruits secs, agrumes et melons; sucres et sucreries; poissons, crustaces 
et mollusques; legumes, plantes potageres plants vivantes et fleurs; and boissons, alcool et vinaigres. 
20
 Officially these are: petrol et derives; phosphates et autres mineraux; and plomb. 
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Figure 4.1  The relative importance of Tunisian export sectors (proportion of total exports) 
  
 
It is apparent that these four export categories (excluding other) account for over 70% of total 
goods and services exports over most of the period.  Notably, food and petrol and mineral 
exports declined in importance, international tourism remained relatively constant, and 
manufactured exports became substantially more important over the period.  Having detailed 
the data to be used in the empirical tests, we will now outline the testing methods in detail. 
 
 
4.2  Methodology 
As the literature review highlights, the fragility of typical tests for export-led growth make it 
easy to manufacture any desired Granger-causality results by simply adjusting the assumptions 
to suit.  Changing assumptions such as the dimensions of the model, the variables which are 
included or the form that those variables take – just to name a few – can lead to entirely 
different Granger-causality outcomes.  To prevent this, we firstly pre-determine the testing 
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procedure based on what seems to be the most appropriate methods for the task at hand.  This 
is an important step in ensuring that results are not manufactured to fit a desired outcome, and 
are instead genuinely the outcome of the most suitable approach.  The previous chapters have 
demonstrated that we expect the data to find that exports have had a significant impact on 
economic growth in both Mauritius and Tunisia, but letting the data speak for itself is important 
in shaping our understanding of the true mechanisms behind each country’s growth.  Secondly, 
we do not rely solely on one test – incorporating just one set of assumptions and methods – to 
determine the results.  This is a common mistake in much of the literature, as it leads to 
conclusions that are potentially fragile, not transparent, and difficult to base concrete 
conclusions on.  In order to overcome this we undertake an array of tests for each country, 
varying a number of the key underlying assumptions and aspects of the tests.  Although it is not 
practical to alter every aspect of the tests, the variation of certain characteristics provides a 
greater understanding of the sensitivity of Granger-causality results to testing methods.  Final 
conclusions will not be based on one test alone; they will take into account the overall picture 
that this range of tests – each with their own shortcomings – portrays.  The result is more 
transparent and, hopefully, reliable results.  All estimation is undertaken using the econometric 
programme Eviews 6. 
 
In order to model the relationship between our variables, we make use of the vector 
autoregression (VAR).  This is common in the literature, and has the advantage of allowing each 
variable to have a simultaneous impact on the other variables in the system.  This approach was 
pioneered by Sims (1980), who argued that the VAR method avoided the often unnecessary 
complications of an underlying structural model and the unreasonable restrictions that such 
models require for identification.  The basic VAR model allows for the inclusion of any number 
of variables, which are regressed on a pre-determined number of lags of each variable in the 
system.  The general VAR in matrix form is as follows: 
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 Where:    is a k x 1 random vector (containing k variables) 
     is a k x 1 vector of constant terms 
      is a k x k matrix of coefficients      
      is a k x 1 vector of white noise error terms 
     is the order of the VAR (the lag length) 
 
If we expand out this general form and apply it to the simple bivariate case with one lag, our 
VAR consists of the following balanced system of k=2 equations: 
 
                             (1) 
 
                            (2) 
 
You can see that in this framework both variables – which we could think of as GDP and exports 
– are allowed to impact each other simultaneously.  If we assume stationarity of the data series, 
then in this simple form estimation can easily take place using equation-by-equation ordinary 
least-squares (OLS).   
 
4.2.1  Lag length selection 
A natural question arises – what is the appropriate order of the VAR (i.e. how many lags should 
be included) in order to most accurately model the true relationship between the variables?  
This is a very important aspect of such tests, and authors such as Thornton and Batten (1985) 
have argued that because the order of the true VAR is unknown, it is usually possible to obtain 
entirely contrasting Granger-causality results by altering the order of the estimated VAR.  They 
assert that in order to legitimise the resulting Granger-causality findings the choice of lag length 
needs to be justifiably identified, rather than exogenously determined or chosen in an ad hoc 
manner.  Many studies do make the decision in an arbitrary fashion, but there are a number of 
different information criteria that can be employed in order to base the choice of lag-length on 
empirical foundations.  The most common among these include three of those introduced 
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earlier: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwartz Information Criterion (SC) and the 
Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQ), each of which use the log-likelihood functions of the 
model at each possible lag-length but apply different weights in the bias/efficiency trade-off.  
Unfortunately this weighting is subjective, and there is no consensus as to which criterion 
performs best at choosing the correct lag length.  Liew (2004) performs a Monte Carlo 
simulation and finds that the AIC generally performs best in small samples of 30 or 60,  while in 
larger samples the HQ performs better.  Ultimately though, as Ivanov & Kilian (2005) assert, 
researchers will have to choose a lag length and take a stand on the plausibility of their results.  
In light of this, we decide the appropriate lag length of each model based on reports of all three 
information criterion, giving slightly more emphasis to the AIC as our sample sizes are relatively 
small.  This is as scientific as it is possible to be given the aforementioned difficulties.  
 
4.2.2  Stationarity 
As already noted, inference based on coefficient estimates from a VAR model are only 
meaningful if the order of integration of each of the series has been properly accounted for.  In 
the unchecked presence of variables containing unit roots (denoted I(1) variables) or higher 
order integration the standard asymptotic distributions of the estimates are no longer valid for 
straightforward testing.  For this reason, it is crucial that each of the series included in the VAR 
model are examined for stationarity using an appropriate pre-test.  The standard tests used in 
the literature are the ADF test of Dickey and Fuller (1979) and the test of Phillips and Perron 
(1988).  The Phillips-Perron test is mainly used where heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation are 
believed to be present, but considerable evidence suggests that this test performs poorly 
compared to the ADF test in finite samples (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2004, p.623), so we use the 
ADF test as our primary method for all stationarity checks and resort to the Phillips-Perron only 
when the ADF strikes difficulties. 
 
The ADF test regresses a variable on its own lagged value, testing the coefficient on the lagged 
term to determine whether it could be equal to one.  It does this in a roundabout way, 
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transforming the model such that the first difference of the variable is regressed on the level of 
its lagged value, and the coefficient on the lagged value is equal to zero in the case of a unit 
root.  Intercept and time-trend terms, as well as an indefinite number of differenced lags, are 
included as necessary so that the error term becomes a white noise process.  A general form of 
the ADF test with a quadratic time-trend is as follows: 
 
                
                                  (3) 
 
 Where: Additional trend terms may be added as necessary 
   Additional differenced lags may be added as necessary 
 
The coefficient    is equal to      , where   is the coefficient on the lagged variable in a 
simple autoregression.  Therefore, a test of      is equivalent to a test of    .  Dickey and 
Fuller (1979) demonstrate that the coefficients of the ADF tests do not follow the standard t-
distribution and must be compared to critical values from an appropriate distribution.  
Estimates of this distribution are available, and Eviews 6 is able to calculate p-values based on 
simulated critical values.  As with VARs, the choice of how many lags to include is important for 
the test results to be valid.  Again, rather than rely on an arbitrary lag choice we use an 
information criterion to determine the appropriate order of the equation.  In this case the SC is 
used, as this is the default criterion used by Eviews 6. 
 
As most of our included series are indeed non-stationary, we have to adjust our VAR model in 
order to take account of this.  The literature review highlighted two main approaches to doing 
this: using the framework of the VECM, or conducting tests within an augmented-VAR.  The 
VECM makes explicit provision for any long-run relationships between the variables and keeps 
the addition of lagged terms to a minimum, which makes it an efficient approach for testing 
causal relationships.  However, in larger systems (involving more variables) identification issues 
can arise if the model is not estimated using a two-step method.  The augmented-VAR does not 
strike such difficulties, although it is less efficient than the VECM.  So while most papers rely on 
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one or other of these approaches, we use both frameworks where possible.  This is another 
important dimension in helping us evaluate the robustness of the results. 
 
4.2.3  Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) 
A common approach to correcting for the presence of unit roots in the data series – particularly 
in earlier studies – has been to include the variables in first-differences and run a differenced-
VAR (VARD) model.  This exploits the property that I(1) variables are stationary (or I(0)) in their 
first differences, but in many cases it is not appropriate as it does not allow for any long-run 
relationship that may exist between the variables.  Engle and Granger (1987) showed that when 
two or more variables are integrated of order 1 there may exist a linear combination of them 
that is stationary.  This linear combination is known as a cointegrating equation, and may be 
interpreted as a long-run relationship between the variables that has implications on their 
short-run movements.  Referring to what Engle and Granger call Granger Representation 
Theorem,21 they show that the cointegrating equation can be incorporated into a meaningful 
model – the VECM.  We will now outline the process that we follow in constructing VECMs for 
this empirical study. 
 
After determining that at least two variables are integrated of order 1, we test for cointegrating 
relationships – where there may be more than one in a multivariate setting – using the method 
described by Johansen (1991).  This involves estimating the coefficient matrix of a rearranged 
but unrestricted VAR model and then examining the rank of the matrix.  According to the 
Granger Representation Theorem, the rank of the coefficient matrix is equal to the number of 
cointegrating relations present in the system.  We make the standard assumption of a linear 
deterministic trend in the data and an intercept but no trend in the cointegrating equation and 
choose the lag length according to the criteria discussed previously.  We use two tests to 
determine the significance of any cointegrating relationship(s) – the trace test and the 
maximum eigenvalue test – both of which are derived from the eigenvalues of the coefficient 
                                                     
21
 This is based on the work of Granger (1981) 
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matrix.  These two tests can cause conflicting results, and where this occurs we have to make a 
judgement as to the likely number of relations based on what is theoretically feasible.  
Cointegrating relations are not uniquely identified without some arbitrary form of 
normalisation, so in the bivariate case we restrict the coefficient on GDP to unity.  The default 
approach in EViews is to estimate such models using a two-step approach; first estimating the 
cointegrating relation(s) by least squares and then estimating the VECM equations one by one 
with the cointegrating relations predetermined.  However, this does not allow us to test for 
Granger-causality in our desired manner, so in order to be able to test all the coefficients in the 
system together we conduct an iterative maximum likelihood procedure without pre-fitting the 
cointegrating relations (it can easily be demonstrated that this provides identical coefficient 
estimates for the relevant parameters to the two-step approach).  In the bivariate case with 
evidence for one cointegrating relation and a lag length of two in levels, we therefore estimate 
the following VECM: 
  
                                             (4) 
 
                                             (5) 
 
Where the intercept terms are actually composite terms comprising both the standard 
intercepts and the intercepts from the respective cointegration terms.  In the trivariate case – 
the largest case to which we apply this model – there are a number of possible forms 
depending on the number of cointegrating relations and the normalisations chosen, but it is 
important to note that the results are unaffected by the choice of normalisation.  The iterative 
procedure used to estimate these VECM systems is inherently fragile to initial parameter values 
and can take a few attempts before they accurately match the correct values found in the two-
step procedure.  We will discuss how Granger-causality is tested for in these models after first 
introducing the augmented-VAR approach in more detail. 
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4.2.4  Augmented-VAR Models 
Unfortunately, in larger systems we strike difficulties in the application of VEC models, which 
could not be identified using the simultaneous maximum-likelihood procedure discussed above.  
In order to successfully conduct Granger-causality tests in these larger systems including labour 
and education – as well as supplement the results of the bivariate and trivariate VECMs – we 
make use of the well-known augmented-VAR approach of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and 
Dolado & Lütkepohl (1996).   
 
Although Toda and Yamamoto put forward their methodology as a way of avoiding pre-test 
biases associated with tests like the ADF, realistically this approach still begins with tests for the 
order of integration of each of our data series, which we conduct in the standard fashion using 
the ADF test.  Following the use of the previously discussed information criterion to determine 
the true lag length of the balanced VAR model made up of these variables, the augmented-VAR 
(or augmented lags) approach then requires estimation of a VAR(p+q) model; where p is the 
true order of the VAR and q is the highest order of integration in the data series.  This amounts 
to intentionally over-fitting the VAR.  A requirement for the success of this method is that q 
does not exceed p.  In a simple bivariate system with a true lag length of 2 and a maximum 
order of integration of 1, this involves estimation of the following levels model: 
 
                                                          (6) 
 
                                                          (7) 
 
Which can be estimated on an equation-by-equation basis using simple OLS estimation.  This is 
easily extended to multivariate models, where we include an additional equation for each extra 
variable and all variables are included as regressors for p+q lags in each equation. 
 
Toda and Yamamoto show that the Wald test for joint significance of the lagged coefficient 
terms is valid in this model – even in the presence of integrated data series and cointegration – 
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as long as the order of integration of the process doesn’t exceed the true lag length of the VAR.  
They show that the asymptotic distribution of the Wald test statistic follows the standard chi-
square properties within this augmented framework.  However, it is important to note that 
both the addition of redundant lag terms and the exclusion of any explicit cointegrating 
relations serve to reduce the efficiency – and therefore power – of these tests.  Toda and 
Yamamoto note that because of this they should be used in conjunction with VECM tests where 
possible, but Dolado and Lütkepohl find that the loss in power is small when the true order p is 
large and the number of included variables is relatively small. 
 
4.2.5  Testing for Granger-causality 
We have already talked about the concept behind Granger-causality – which determines 
something more akin to predictability than causality, albeit possibly the best we can do 
statistically – and have discussed the extensive use of Granger-causality in the literature on 
exports and growth.  We now turn to the specific ways in which we test for Granger-causality in 
the models just described. 
 
Rather than testing for Granger-causality, what we really examine is Granger non-causality.  In 
order to do this we employ formal tests of restrictions, rather than other slightly less common 
approaches involving impulse response functions or forecast error variance decompositions.  
This involves testing the significance of coefficients of appropriate lagged terms of one variable 
on another variable – determining, for example, the ability of previous values of exports to 
statistically explain the value of GDP in the following period.  This is not undertaken in a 
uniform way across the literature – particularly where VEC models are concerned – because 
decisions have to be made around which lagged terms should be tested.  As Toda and Phillips 
(1994) make clear; in the VECM case, significance of the coefficient on the cointegrating 
relation (   and    in equation 4) implies long-run Granger-causality in the sense that the 
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‘endogenous’22 variable is adjusting in line with the longer-term disequilibrium between it and 
the other variables in the system.  But similarly, significance of the coefficients on the lags of 
the other variables (just     in equation 4) implies short-run Granger-causality in the sense that 
the ‘endogenous’ variable is responding to previous values of the other variables.  In order to 
reconcile these two approaches – and in line with discussions in Giles and Williams (2000b) and 
Ghali (2000) – we test for both long and short-run Granger-causality concurrently by testing the 
significance of all coefficients on the lags of the supposed causal variable.  This is tantamount to 
a test for the complete exclusion of one variable in the equation for another.  For example, in 
the VECM model depicted by equations 4 and 5 above, we would test for Granger non-causality 
by the following exclusions under the null hypothesis: 
 
                  To test the non-causality of y on x, and: 
 
                 To test the non-causality of x on y 
 
This is tested using the aforementioned Wald test statistic, which is another common approach 
to take.  This effectively tests how close the estimates of the unrestricted model come to 
satisfying the restrictions under the null hypothesis,23 and does so by comparing maximum 
likelihood estimates of the restricted and unrestricted models – assuming independently and 
identically normally distributed errors.  For either linear or non-linear restrictions the Wald 
statistic can then be compared to the chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of restrictions imposed (2 in both of the above null hypotheses).  Since the null 
implies Granger non-causality, rejection of the null is interpreted as evidence for causality in the 
Granger sense.   
 
                                                     
22
 By ‘endogenous’ what we mean is the variable on the left-hand side of the particular equation.  In VAR terms it 
would not be appropriate to think of it as endogenous in the common meaning of the word. 
23
 For details of the specific mathematical calculation involved, see:  Quantitative Micro Software (2007, p.145). 
Chapter 4: Data and Methodology | 102 
 
Testing for Granger non-causality is even simpler in the augmented lags model, as it only ever 
comprises a number of linear restrictions.  The fundamental thing to remember with the 
augmented model is that the additional q lags should be excluded from any formal coefficient 
tests; they have been included in the system of equations purely to allow the coefficients to 
follow the standard asymptotics, and are in themselves not meaningful.  Using equations 6 and 
7 as our example, and remembering that the third lag represents the additional lagged term, 
our null hypotheses of Granger non-causality are: 
 
                  To test the non-causality of y on x, and: 
 
                  To test the non-causality of x on y 
 
These restrictions are again tested using the Wald test statistic.  In the case of tests which 
contain more variables than just GDP and exports, we also examine the other causal 
relationships in the system only in order to determine whether there may be indirect effects on 
GDP or exports through the other variables.  As discussing these findings can be quite lengthy – 
particularly in the larger models – we only present these results where they are consequential 
to our final conclusions. 
 
4.2.6  Model Selection 
A major contribution of this study is the variety of assumptions and methodologies involved in 
the econometric tests – which provides a far greater insight into the true relationship between 
exports and growth in Mauritius and Tunisia.  The examination of robustness involved in 
varying the framework of the models has been a common omission in most ELG literature, and 
to date all ELG papers on these two countries have focussed around just one key model with 
one set of assumptions.  The neoclassical model of the production function serves as a loose 
basis for the inclusion of our variables, so it warrants a brief introduction here.  The neoclassical 
model depicts output as a non-linear function of a number of variables: capital and labour in its 
most basic form, but exports and human capital have also been put forward as likely 
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determinants.  A very simple neoclassical production function including all five of these 
variables would appear something like this24: 
 
          
   
 
  
   
      (8) 
 
  Where:   represents the labour input 
      represents the physical capital input 
      represents the human capital input 
      represents some measure of exports 
    A is a technology or productivity term 
      represents unexpected shocks to the system 
            are the respective elasticity terms 
 
In natural-logged terms, therefore, this neoclassical production function is: 
 
                                                     (9) 
 
Which is clearly linear in terms, and allows for far simpler estimation.  Although this is not a 
great mathematical depiction of economic growth – falling into the category of exogenous 
growth models – its popularity has continued because it captures much of what growth experts 
believe to be the key determinants to economic growth.  We don't base our tests on this 
model, however it helps inform the decision of which variables could justifiably be included. 
 
As a starting point, our first set of tests are based on bivariate data:  using real GDP and real 
aggregate exports.  As described in the data section these are annual values from 1961 to 2008 
and 2009 (for Tunisia and Mauritius, respectively), and we include them both in their natural-
logged form.  As a general rule, including the variables in their natural logs implies that we 
                                                     
24
 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for a background discussion of this type of model. 
Chapter 4: Data and Methodology | 104 
 
believe there to be a non-linear relationship between the variables in question and – as the 
literature review demonstrated – this is a common approach.  It is also in line with the 
neoclassical-style production function that we have just introduced.  This bivariate approach is 
applied to both countries using the VECM methodology initially, and then the augmented-lags 
model; so there are four regressions in total (two for each country). 
 
We then move on to a set of tests based on trivariate data – including GFCF as a third variable.  
The basis for this is that capital is an obvious input into the production function, as machinery 
and infrastructure is vital for the production process (including the production not only of 
physical goods but also services to a large degree).  Along with labour, capital is one of the two 
fundamental inputs in the most basic neoclassical production function model.  Unlike the 
labour input, however, its inclusion as a control variable is relatively easy for this study given 
that for both countries GFCF data is available for the full time period.   We apply this trivariate 
approach to both countries – again using the VECM methodology initially and then reinforcing it 
with the augmented lags model.  This produces another four regressions  (two for each 
country). 
 
Finally, we move on to a set of larger – five-variable – models; adding both employment and 
education to the trivariate dataset as control variables.  This is intended to capture the effects 
of the other major input to the production process:  labour.  As described earlier, employment 
is a measure of the total labour force at work in each country and education is included in an 
attempt to account for the productiveness of these employees.  This is not usually included in 
such studies, but certainly warrants inclusion given the widespread consensus that labour is a 
(if not the) major contributor to total output.  Unfortunately, due to the limited availability of 
this data, the test could only be applied to the shorter 1972-2009 period for Mauritius (38 
observations, rather than the full 49) and the 1966-2008 period for Tunisia (43 observations, 
rather than the full 48).  As noted, we were not able to apply the VECM framework to this five-
variable model, as the estimation approach necessary for our particular Granger-causality tests 
leads to identification issues that are not reconcilable.  An increased number of coefficients and 
Chapter 4: Data and Methodology | 105 
 
cointegration relations puts too much demand on our (smaller) sample size.  Instead, we rely 
solely on the augmented-lags approach for these tests. 
 
So the contribution of this study is to provide a wide array of tests, varying the timeframe, 
model framework, and the variables that are included.  This involves ten tests in total – five for 
each country.  To reinforce these robustness checks even further, we undertake each of these 
ten tests again, this time assuming a linear – rather than log-linear – relationship between the 
variables.  Because we have no strong conviction that the relationship is non-linear, a linear 
relationship could also be feasible and this is still in-line with some of the literature.  This leads 
to ten additional tests with the variables included in their unlogged levels (doubling the number 
of tests). 
 
Finally – for reasons that will become clear once the results are presented – we then undertake 
one last pair of tests for Tunisia which includes GDP, GFCF (as a control) and the five 
disaggregated export sectors introduced in the previous section.  This attempts to determine 
the specific impact of key export sectors and to provide deeper understanding of the 
relationship between exports and output growth in Tunisia.  The seven-variable test is 
estimated using the augmented-lags model and is applied to both the logged and unlogged 
cases – adding an additional two tests.  Overall therefore, we conduct a total of 22 key tests of 
the export-led growth hypothesis – 10 for Mauritius and 12 for Tunisia – and a smaller number 
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Table 4.1  Summary of all 22 ELG Tests 
Mauritius 
 Included Variables Transformations Range Methodology 
1 2: GDP, Exports Logged 1961-2009 (49) VECM 
2 2: GDP, Exports Logged 1961-2009 (49) Augmented Lags 
3 2: GDP, Exports Unlogged 1961-2009 (49) VECM 
4 2: GDP, Exports Unlogged 1961-2009 (49) Augmented Lags 
5 3: GDP, Exports, GFCF Logged 1961-2009 (49) VECM 
6 3: GDP, Exports, GFCF Logged 1961-2009 (49) Augmented Lags 
7 3: GDP, Exports, GFCF Unlogged 1961-2009 (49) VECM 
8 3: GDP, Exports, GFCF Unlogged 1961-2009 (49) Augmented Lags 
9 5: GDP, Exports, GFCF, Labour, 
Employ 
Logged 1972-2009 (38) Augmented Lags 
10 5: GDP, Exports, GFCF, Labour, 
Employ 
Unlogged 1972-2009 (38) Augmented Lags 
Tunisia 
 Included Variables Transformations Range Methodology 
1 2: GDP, Exports Logged 1961-2008 (48) VECM 
2 2: GDP, Exports Logged 1961-2008 (48) Augmented Lags 
3 2: GDP, Exports Unlogged 1961-2008 (48) VECM 
4 2: GDP, Exports Unlogged 1961-2008 (48) Augmented Lags 
5 3: GDP, Exports, GFCF Logged 1961-2008 (48) VECM 
6 3: GDP, Exports, GFCF Logged 1961-2008 (48) Augmented Lags 
7 3: GDP, Exports, GFCF Unlogged 1961-2008 (48) VECM 
8 3: GDP, Exports, GFCF Unlogged 1961-2008 (48) Augmented Lags 
9 5: GDP, Exports, GFCF, Labour, 
Employ 
Logged 1966-2008 (43) Augmented Lags 
10 5: GDP, Exports, GFCF, Labour, 
Employ 
Unlogged 1966-2008 (43) Augmented Lags 
11 7: GDP, GFCF, Exports (x5) Logged 1968-2008 (41) Augmented Lags 
12 7: GDP, GFCF, Exports (x5) Unlogged 1968-2008 (41) Augmented Lags 
 
The next chapter will present the results of these tests and provide some preliminary 
interpretations.  
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1  Results 
Following the econometric methodology described in the previous chapter, we now present the 
results of our twenty-two econometric tests.  We will present the results step-by-step, starting 
with the smaller-order tests and then gradually adding the additional explanatory variables as 
discussed in the previous chapter.  The focus is on the relationship between exports and output 
growth, but where appropriate there is some mention of other causality results in the larger 
models.   
 
5.1.1  Bivariate Tests 
We start with our bivariate tests.  Testing the order of integration of the natural-logged 
bivariate data for Mauritius, we find that both GDP and exports are I(1) and tests for 
cointegration suggest a significant cointegrating relationship.  All three information critera 
estimate that the true order of the VAR is three, which means that we include two lag lengths 
in our VECM.  Granger causality tests of this VECM indicate that exports Granger-cause GDP at a 
95% confidence level, but that GDP does not Granger-cause exports (where we consider 
anything less than 90% to be insignificant given the small size of the sample).  We interpret this 
as evidence for export-led growth.  Tests on the corresponding augmented-VAR indicate that 
exports Granger-causes GDP at a 99.99% level, but that GDP also Granger-causes exports at a 
99% level.  This is evidence for a bi-directional relationship between the two variables, although 
it provides stronger support for ELG than GLE. 
 
For the analogous unlogged tests, we find that GDP and exports are still both I(1) and that again 
there is evidence of a significant cointegrating relationship.  Both the SC and HQ information 
criteria suggest the true order of the VAR is now two, which means that we include one lag in 
our VECM.  Granger causality tests indicate that exports Granger-cause GDP at a 99.99% 
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confidence level, but that GDP does not Granger-cause exports.  Again this is strong evidence 
for export-led growth.  Tests on the augmented-VAR confirm this, finding that exports Granger-
cause GDP at a marginally lower 99.9% level and that there is no reverse causality.  Table 5.1 
below summarises the findings of these four bivariate tests for Mauritius. 
 
Table 5.1  Bivariate ELG Tests for Mauritius:  GDP, Exports;  1961-2009 
Transformation Order of integration VAR order Model Granger-causality result 
Logged 
GDP:  1 
Exports:  1 
3 
VEC ELG (95%) 
AL BDC (99%) 
Unlogged 
GDP:  1 
Exports:  1  
2 
VEC ELG (99.99%) 
AL ELG (99.9%) 
Key: ELG = export-led growth; GLE = growth-led exports; BDC = bi-directional causality; NC = no causality. 
 
Moving on to the bivariate tests for Tunisia, we find that the natural-logged series of exports is 
integrated of order one, but the natural-logged series of GDP is stationary.  This rules out the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship between the two variables, so the VEC model cannot 
be used and we instead rely solely on the augmented-VAR approach.  Information criteria 
suggest that the true order of the VAR is one, so we fit a VAR of order two, in line with the 
augmented-VAR technique.  Granger causality tests indicate that there is no Granger-causality 
between GDP and exports. 
 
However, in the corresponding unlogged tests we find that both GDP and exports are I(1), and 
that there exists a significant cointegrating relation between them – so a VECM can now be 
applied.  Information criterion suggest the true order of this VAR to be two.  Granger causality 
tests find that exports Granger-cause GDP at the 90% level, while GDP Granger-causes exports 
at the 95% level – indicating support for a bi-directional relationship but stronger evidence for 
GLE than ELG.  The augmented lags approach also finds evidence for bi-directional causality at 
the 90% level, but in this case there is stronger evidence for ELG than GLE (the p-values of the 
chi-squared statistics are 0.057 and 0.092, respectively).  Table 5.2 below summarises the 
findings of these four bivariate tests for Tunisia. 




Table 5.2  Bivariate ELG Tests for Tunisia:  GDP, Exports;  1961-2008 
Transformation Order of integration VAR order Model Granger-causality result 
Logged 
GDP:  0 





GDP:  1 
Exports:  1 
2 
VEC BDC (90%) 
AL BDC (90%) 
 
Overall, therefore, the bivariate tests find strong evidence for ELG in Mauritius over the period, 
but much weaker evidence for Tunisia, where we find some inconclusive evidence for BDC 
between exports and growth. 
 
5.1.2  Trivariate Tests 
Next we undertake an analogous set of tests, starting again with Mauritius and this time 
including GFCF as the first of our control variables.  We have already determined that our 
logged series of GDP and exports are I(1) over this time period, but the ADF test finds that 
logged GFCF is stationary.  In this trivariate model the true order of the VAR again appears to be 
three according to our information criteria.  We find strong evidence of one cointegrating 
relationship in this system but, interestingly, Granger causality tests now find no significant 
causal relations between any of the three variables.  The augmented-lags approach, however, 
finds a completely different set of causal relationships.  There is strong evidence for Granger-
causality from exports to GDP (a 99% confidence level), and weak evidence for Granger-
causality from GDP to exports (90% level), which is technically BDC but again favours an ELG 
relationship. 
 
The analogous unlogged tests find that GFCF is I(1) along with GDP and exports.  The order of 
the VAR is estimated to be two, and there is evidence of one significant cointegrating 
relationship.  Interestingly, this test supports its logged counterpart in finding no evidence of 
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any causal relationships within the three-variable system.  The augmented-lags approach again 
contradicts these findings, estimating that exports Granger-causes GDP at a 99% confidence 
level and that there is no reciprocal causality.  This is strong evidence for export-led growth.  
Interestingly, exports also Granger-causes GFCF at a 90% level.  Table 5.3 below summarises the 
findings of these four trivariate tests for Mauritius. 
 
Table 5.3  Trivariate ELG Tests for Mauritius:  GDP, Exports, GFCF;  1961-2009 




GDP:  1 
Exports:  1 
GFCF:  0 
3 
VEC NC 
AL BDC (90%) 
Unlogged 
GDP:  1 
Exports:  1 
GFCF:  1 
2 
VEC NC 
AL ELG (99%) 
a 
For the bivariate relationship between exports and GDP. 
 
The same trivariate tests are repeated for Tunisia, beginning with the logged regressions.  In 
this instance GFCF is I(1) so, although GDP is stationary, searching for a cointegrating relation is 
now appropriate.  The true lag-order of the VAR is estimated to be two, and we find strong 
evidence of one cointegrating relationship.  Based on this, we find no evidence of any causal 
relationship between GDP and exports, although there is significant evidence for Granger-
causality from both GDP and exports to GFCF.  The augmented-lags approach confirms this 
result, not rejecting either of the Granger non-causality hypotheses between GDP and exports.  
The only significant finding in this case is Granger-causality from exports to GFCF. 
 
In the equivalent unlogged tests, we find that GFCF is I(1) – along with GDP and exports – and 
we estimate the true order of the VAR to be two.  In this case we find conflicting results from 
our cointegration tests.  The trace test indicates the presence of two cointegrating relations, 
while the max-eigenvalue test indicates the presence of just one.  As either arrangement is 
feasible in this three-variable system and we have no way of knowing which test is correct, we 
allow just one cointegrating relation and then check the robustness of the results to this 
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assumption by comparing them to the findings of a VECM with two cointegration relations.  
Tests of the first VECM indicate no Granger-causality between any of the variables, and this 
result is confirmed by the VECM with two cointegrating relations.  The second robustness check 
– the augmented-VAR – also confirms the absence of any significant Granger-causality 
relationships between these three variables in Tunisia.  Table 5.4 below summarises the 
findings of these four trivariate tests for Tunisia. 
 
Table 5.4  Trivariate ELG Tests for Tunisia:  GDP, Exports, GFCF;  1961-2008 
Transformation Order of integration VAR order Model Granger-causality result 
Logged 
GDP:  0 
Exports:  1 





GDP:  1 
Exports:  1 





On the whole, including just GFCF as an additional explanatory variable significantly reduces the 
incidence of significant Granger-causality findings.  The evidence is mixed for Mauritius – some 
of it supports an ELG hypothesis – but for Tunisia the results clearly give no support to either 
ELG or GLE over this period. 
 
5.1.3  Five-variable Tests 
We then move on to our five variable tests, and include employment (employ) and education 
(educ) as two additional regressors alongside GDP, exports and GFCF.  As discussed in the 
methodology section, identification issues now mean that we have to rely on the augmented-
VAR for our tests.  It should also be highlighted that including these additional control variables 
necessitates a reduction in the time-periods examined, and as a result we need to re-test each 
of the five variables for stationarity. 
 
We begin again with the natural-logged test for Mauritius, which covers the period 1972-2009.  
In this case each of GDP, exports, employ and educ are found to be I(1), while GFCF is 
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stationary.  The true VAR is estimated to contain two lags of each variable, so once we include 
the augmented lag necessary for standard asymptotics to apply we are required to estimate an 
80-coefficient system of five equations.  Within this system there are twenty possible bilateral 
Granger-causality relationships to test, so we present only the ones relevant to GDP or exports.  
Significant Granger-causality results are found from exports to GDP (at the 95% level), from 
exports to GFCF (90%) and from exports to educ (90%).  No significant Granger-causality 
relationship exists from GDP to exports in this case, so this is reasonably strong evidence for 
ELG. 
 
In our unlogged five-variable test for Mauritius, we find that each of GDP, exports, GFCF and 
employ are I(1), but the new series educ is I(2), so our highest order of integration is now two.  
Combined with an estimated true VAR order of two, this means estimation of a four-lag 
augmented-VAR, with a combined total of 105 coefficients to estimate (made possible only 
because each of the system’s five equations are estimated sequentially and independently).  
Within this enormous system, we find evidence that exports Granger-causes GDP at a 95% 
confidence level, but that GDP simultaneously Granger-causes exports at a 95% level.   This is 
reasonably strong evidence for bi-directional causality between exports and GDP.  In addition, 
educ Granger-causes GDP and exports at 90% and 99.9% confidence levels, respectively.  As a 
further robustness check to this, however, we assume instead that educ is only I(1) – given that 
we were forced to interpolate the underlying data and that this may be interfering with the 
stationarity tests.  In this instance we find no significant causal relationships, although we are 
0.23% away from concluding ELG at the 90% confidence level.  Table 5.5 below summarises the 
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Table 5.5  Five-variable ELG Tests for Mauritius:  1972-2009 
Transformation Order of integration VAR order Model Granger-causality result 
Logged 
GDP:  1  Employ:  1 
Exports:  1 Educ:  1 
GFCF:  0 
2 AL ELG (95%) 
Unlogged 
GDP:  1   Employ:  1 
Exports:  1 Educ:  2 
GFCF:  1 
2 AL BDC (95%) 
 
We also need to re-examine all five of the Tunisian variables for stationarity, given the reduced 
time period (1966-2008).  In our logged five-variable model the ADF test finds that GDP, exports 
and GFCF are all I(1), while educ is I(2) and employ is stationary.  Information criteria suggest 
that the true order of the VAR is now one.  Unfortunately, because the highest order of 
integration exceeds the order of the VAR (i.e. q > p) we cannot proceed with the test under the 
current assumptions.  We re-examine educ using the Phillips-Perron test and find that with a 
quadratic trend the series is now I(1), and this allows application of the augmented lags model.  
Estimating this 55-coefficient VAR(2) model, we find no significant Granger-causal relationships 
between exports and GDP.  The only significant causality result is from exports to GFCF at the 
95% confidence level. 
 
In the equivalent unlogged tests, we find that each of GDP, exports, GFCF and educ are I(1), 
while employ is now I(2).  The consensus among information criteria is that the true order of 
the VAR is now two, so we allow for four lags and estimate a larger 105-coefficient model.  The 
results support the logged five-variable test: there is no evidence for the existence of any 
Granger-causality between exports and GDP.   Educ is found to Granger-cause GDP and employ 
(both at a 95% level), and GFCF is found to Granger-cause educ at a 90% confidence level).  
Again, we re-estimated this result, this time treating the true order of integration of employ as 
one (assuming an error as a result of the interpolation).  These results confirm that there is no 
evidence for any significant causal relationships between the variables of interest.  Table 5.6 
below summarises the findings of the two main five-variable tests for Tunisia.  
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Table 5.6  Five-variable ELG Tests for Tunisia:  1966-2008 
Transformation Order of integration VAR order Model Granger-causality result 
Logged 
GDP:  1   Employ:  0 
Exports:  1 Educ:  2 
GFCF:  1 
1 AL NC 
Unlogged 
GDP:  1   Employ:  2 
Exports:  1 Educ:  1 
GFCF:  1 
2 AL NC 
 
Overall, the five variable tests provide support for the smaller-order tests.  There is evidence for 
ELG in Mauritius, and no evidence for any causal relationships between exports and GDP in 
Tunisia. 
 
5.1.4  Disaggregate Tests for Tunisia 
Given the overwhelming lack of evidence for any causal relationships between aggregate 
exports and GDP in Tunisia, we explore this deeper by undertaking an examination of the 
impacts of disaggregated export sectors on GDP.  This is in an effort to identify whether there 
are specific sectors that may have had an impact on growth, but whose effects are concealed 
by the aggregate data.  In order to do this, we utilise the five disaggregated export sectors 
introduced in the previous chapter:  international tourism receipts (tourism), manufactured 
goods (manuf), food products (food), petroleum products (petrol) and other exports (other; 
including both goods and services).  We include these alongside GFCF and GDP but not employ 
or educ as the latter two series are not of comparable quality and put considerable 
identification restrictions on our model.  This covers the period 1968-2008.   
 
As always, we start with the test containing natural-logged variables.  The ADF test indicates 
that GDP, GFCF, manuf and petrol are all I(1), while tourism, food and other are all stationary.  
The order of the VAR is determined to be one, so we fit a seven-equation model with two lags 
of each variable (105 coefficients in total).   In this case, there are no significant Granger-
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causality results between GDP and any of the five disaggregated export sectors.  Nor are there 
any significant causality results between GFCF and any of the variables. 
 
We then move on to the un-logged regression.  In this case, we find that GDP, GFCF, food, 
petrol and other are all I(1), manuf is I(2) and tourism is stationary.  The true order of the VAR is 
estimated to be one, so the likely inclusion of an I(2) variable requires the estimation of a 
seven-equation model containing three lags of each variable.  This would mean estimation of an 
enormous 154-coefficient model, but unfortunately because the highest order of integration 
exceeds the order of the VAR (i.e. q > p) we cannot proceed.  The Phillips-Perron test with a 
quadratic trend term suggests that the true order of manuf is actually one, so we assume that 
this is the case and estimate our seven-equation model with just two lags of each variable.  
Confirming the logged result, we find no evidence of Granger-causality between exports and 
GDP.  The only significant causality result is from other to GFCF (95% level).    Table 5.7 below 
summarises the findings of the two main five-variable tests for Tunisia.   
 
Table 5.7  Seven-variable ELG Tests for Tunisia:  1968-2008 
Transformation Order of integration VAR order Model Granger-causality result 
Logged 
GDP:  1  Food:  0 
GFCF:  1  Petrol:  1 
Tourism:  0 Other:  0 
Manuf:  1 
1 AL NC 
Unlogged 
GDP:  1  Food:  1 
GFCF:  1  Petrol:  1 
Tourism:  0 Other:  1 
Manuf:  1 (2) 
1 AL NC 
 
So a more in-depth examination of the interaction between GDP and various export sectors in 
Tunisia indicates that the absence of any causal relationship holds even at the sectoral level.  
This can only be taken as indicative, given that we were unable to support this with evidence 
from a VEC framework, or to include the two additional control variables. 
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5.2  General Interpretation and Cross-Country Comparison 
Here we provide an overview of the general results of these 22 empirical tests.  Overall, the 
results for each country show remarkable consistency, indicating that the outcomes we have 
obtained demonstrate a good degree of robustness.  It is interesting to note that since a 
minority of tests provide results that conflict with the rest, it is clearly possible to manufacture 
a different outcome based on alterations to the number of variables, transformation or model 
structure.  This demonstrates the importance of the presenting a broad array of results – as we 
have done here – in order to get a more robust sense of the underlying relationships.  We 
present each country in turn but keep discussion to a basic interpretation of the empirics only; 
an economic interpretation is saved for the final chapter. 
 
5.2.1  Mauritius 
Table 5.8 below provides an overview of the ten tests we conducted for Mauritius (as discussed 
in detail above). 
 
Table 5.8  Summary of ELG results for Mauritius 
Number of 
variables 
Included variables Period Transformation Model 
Granger-causality 
result 




VEC ELG (95%) 
AL BDC (99%) 
Unlogged 
VEC ELG (99.99%) 
AL ELG (99.9%) 





AL BDC (90%) 
Unlogged 
VEC NC 
AL ELG (99%) 
5 




Natural logged AL ELG (95%) 
Unlogged AL BDC (95%) 
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Overall, the ten tests provide clear evidence for the export-led growth hypothesis in Mauritius.  
Exactly half of the tests find Granger-causality from exports to GDP without any reciprocal 
causality, and these are all at least reasonably strong – ranging from 95% to 99.99% 
significance.  Of the five remaining tests, only two of them find no evidence for causality from 
exports to growth – the two trivariate VEC tests (logged and unlogged).  The other three tests 
all find a significant Granger-causal relationship both ways between GDP and exports.  Of these, 
however, the two and three variable tests find much stronger evidence for causality from 
exports to GDP (99.99% and 99%, respectively), than from GDP to exports (99% and 90%, 
respectively), and the robustness check of the final result is very close to finding ELG at the 90% 
level.  So overall, seven or eight of the ten tests find evidence in support of the ELG hypothesis 
in Mauritius. 
 
There does not appear to be any strong tendency for the unlogged tests to find ELG more often 
than the natural-logged tests, although the augmented-lag models appear to find ELG more 
often than the VECMs.  As we cannot judge the different tests according to which we deem to 
be most accurate (there are tradeoffs around the number of included variables versus the 
number of observations and quality of the data, for example) we are unable to improve our 
understanding by giving greater credence to any of the tests.  Overall, therefore, there is only a 
very weak or non-existent case for no causality, bi-directional causality or GLE in these results, 
but we find very strong evidence for ELG in Mauritius from 1961-2009.  This in line with 
Durbarry (2004), who finds a long-run relationship between exports and growth through a 
significant cointegrating vector.  It is not strongly aligned with Mukungu (2008), who applies the 
augmented-VAR methodology and finds evidence that there is a bi-directional relationship. 
 
5.2.2  Tunisia 
Table 5.9 below provides an overview of the twelve tests we conducted for Tunisia (as detailed 
in the previous section). 
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Table 5.9  Summary of ELG results for Tunisia 
Number of 
variables 
Included variables Period Transformation Model 
Granger-causality 
result 







VEC BDC (90%) 
AL BDC (90%) 














Natural logged AL NC 
Unlogged AL NC 
7 
GDP, GFCF, exports 




Natural logged AL NC 
Unlogged AL NC 
 
In terms of robustness, the results for Tunisia are even more congruous than those for 
Mauritius.  The result they come to, however, couldn’t be more different.  Nine of the eleven 
complete tests find no evidence for any Granger-causality between exports and GDP, and both 
of the remaining two find only weak causality between them.  The weak significance of the two 
isolated bi-directional causality results does not provide any considerable challenge to the 
overwhelming conclusion that there appears to have been no observable causal relationship 
between exports and GDP in Tunisia over the period 1961-2008.  This is in line with Ghali’s 
(2000) short-term Granger-causality findings but not with his long-run findings, which 
estimated a bi-directional relationship.  Nor is it in line with Hachicha’s (2003) conclusion that 
ELG was taking place from 1963-1993.  This may be due to methodological or time-period 
differences, but because these papers provide no sensitivity analysis the true reason for the 
disagreement is unclear.  Our results are partly in line with Cortés-Jiménez et al. (2011), in that 
we find no significant impact of the tourism sector on growth.  Unlike them, however, we do 
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not find evidence for GLT.  We have not tested their finding of a significant short-run TKIG 
dynamic. 
 
Overall then, our broad range of testing methods and assumptions have found evidence for ELG 
in Mauritius but no significant causal relationship between exports and GDP in Tunisia over the 
same period.  We will discuss the possible reasons for this finding and the applications that 
arise from it in the next – and final – chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Applications 
In chapter 2 we explored the current literature relating to the economic growth and 
development of Mauritius and Tunisia, consolidating the various arguments to see whether any 
key messages were apparent.  In chapter 3 we then examined the two countries in more detail, 
presenting a timeline of relevant economic, social and political happenings since independence, 
examining some of the key characteristics of each country in more detail, and then making a 
direct comparison of the two.  Chapters 4 and 5 then presented the empirical contribution of 
this paper: a comprehensive econometric examination of the causal relationships between 
exports and GDP.  In this chapter we will bring together the key findings of these three pieces of 
analysis and then make some applications, concluding with a short discussion of possible 
avenues for future research. 
 
6.1  What Can We Conclude? 
6.1.1  Mauritius 
We begin with a discussion of Mauritius.  The literature review revealed a strong consensus 
that exports were a (if not the) key driver of growth in the Mauritian economy, and this notion 
certainly seemed to have some weight as we looked in more detail at the growth strategies 
pursued by successive Mauritian governments.  It was not surprising, therefore, that our 
statistical analysis provided overwhelming evidence for the presence of a one-way (Granger) 
causal relationship leading from exports to GDP.  Both of the bivariate VEC models found 
evidence for a significant long-run relationship between exports and GDP, and variations in 
export performance seem to provide a good explanation for subsequent variations in GDP in 
the significant majority of our models.  Given that the volume of Mauritius’ exports over the 
years was relatively small compared to many of the East-Asian tiger economies, this 
phenomenon cannot be explained by export volume alone.  We looked at a number of ways in 
which exports might contribute to GDP beyond their own direct (accounting) contribution, and 
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in the case of Mauritius we found that two particular explanations stood out.  The first is the 
notion of idea gaps and positive externalities attributable to foreign investment.  The unique 
combination of generous quotas under the MFA and the establishment of a heavily textile-
focussed EPZ meant that FDI for textile manufacturing had a particularly knowledge- and 
technology-imparting quality.  The second is that through a transformation of the export sector 
the government was able to bring about an economy-wide structural transformation, 
positioning Mauritius to have a comparative advantage in a series of high value-added sectors:  
from sugar to manufacturing, tourism, offshore banking and ICT.  Mauritius was also in a 
position for increased export production to soak up a large pool of surplus labour, and there is 
some evidence that increased capacity to import capital goods was another mechanism by 
which exports contributed to growth, but we have not tested this notion here.  Other factors 
such as enhanced competition and economies of scale may also have contributed to the effect 
of exports on output growth, but these mechanisms do not receive much attention in the 
literature.  Sawkut et al. (2009) may have calculated that the costs of the EPZ experiment 
outweighed the benefits, but this is certainly not the conclusion we come to here. 
 
Although it is not possible to determine from the econometric analysis, the discussion also 
highlighted the importance of social policies in the growth process.  High rents earned in the 
sugar sector were channelled into a strong social welfare system – including free healthcare 
and education – which improved equity among the population, strengthened social cohesion 
and provided the skilled workforce necessitated by the economic transition.  While it was not 
the focus of our empirical analysis, we did find some peripheral evidence in one model that 
education caused both GDP and exports in the Granger sense.  We don't know that these 
findings were robust, but it may still be indicative of the importance of educational reforms.  
Most evidence suggests, however, that overall this social development took less of a central 
role in the economic growth process – supporting, rather than leading.  Another vital 
supporting role was played by the strong institutional environment, which promoted 
consistency in development despite continual changes to the ruling government.  There is 
certainly reason to believe that Mauritius ‘got lucky’ in many ways, but the government was 
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able to take advantage of the opportunities presented to it in such a way as to bring about a 
strongly export-led growth, the gains from which were protected by this strong institutional 
framework.  The conclusion must be, therefore, that exports were central to growth in 
Mauritius over the period.  However they cannot be credited with all the success: export 
strategies carried Mauritius to success, but they themselves were propped up and supported by 
these other important factors.  There is some evidence to support the idea that GDP growth 
also led to increases in the export sector – a notion which seems to have some merit – but the 
overall relationship was certainly dominated by exports leading growth. 
 
6.1.2  Tunisia 
In the case of Tunisia, a review of the literature revealed less emphasis on exports than it did 
for Mauritius.  Exports were certainly not disregarded, but overall they were presented as one 
important aspect in an array of different factors that contributed to the country’s rapid income 
growth.  This made it less obvious what to expect from our econometric analysis.  The fact that 
we found almost negligible evidence for any causal relationships was in many ways in-line with 
the idea that exports were part of a package of growth-contributors and in themselves may not 
have led growth in the Granger-causal sense.  This is strengthened by the fact that there was no 
significant evidence that GDP was leading exports, which is not out of line with the notion that 
exports were just a product of greater output and a constant marginal propensity to export.  
Even though our examination of the different periods of Tunisian development highlighted the 
importance of exports in the government’s development strategy only after the end of the 
socialist period, our tests of this narrower range of years still found no evidence for export-led 
growth.  Nor did we find evidence in any of the disaggregated export sectors we examined, 
which suggests that our findings are reasonably robust.  The literature and our own qualitative 
analysis reveals that exports were still important, however.  It appears that spillovers from 
international investment contributed to growth, imports of capital goods helped to transplant 
improved production techniques from abroad and the government seemed to promote certain 
export industries as part of a wider strategy to diversify the economy away from more 
traditional industries and in to new high value-added sectors.    
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Other factors that had important direct effects on economic growth seem to have found their 
origins in Tunisia’s consistently high public expenditure.  Government infrastructure 
investments facilitated productivity and efficiency improvements in the economy – as well as 
promoting priority sectors – and nurtured a particularly attractive business environment.  
Moreover, high government expenditure into social policy – including health, welfare and 
education – deepened the pool of skilled labour, enlarged the domestic market and brought a 
largely economically-dormant female population into productive employment.  We find 
anecdotal evidence in one of our models that education was causing both GDP and 
employment in the Granger sense.  These findings are not robust – and the country’s 
experience undoubtedly calls the education-employment relationship into question – but they 
certainly point to the importance of improvements to the educational system.   
 
As in Mauritius, the institutional environment seems to have played a key supporting role in all 
this.  The strong political will to modernise and develop has received a lot of attention and is 
held in higher esteem even than the country’s institutional framework.  The popular notion that 
authoritarianism was necessary for driving forward such an ambitious growth strategy may 
have been overplayed, however, given that the detrimental effects of this dictatorship are only 
recently coming to light.  Tunisia benefitted from high oil production during some periods in 
particular, and its textile exports were bolstered by the MFA, but exogenous factors did not do 
enough to claim responsibility for such remarkable growth.  Overall, these non-export factors 
seem to have been crucial, although we were unable to properly test this claim in our 
econometric analysis.  The conclusion seems to be, therefore, that exports were an important 
part of the rapid economic growth of Tunisia over the period, but only as one aspect of a wider 
strategy pursued by the government in which other factors were at least equally as important 
as exports.  The team of factors we have highlighted together drove forward consistently strong 
growth in the economy and made sure that this growth was widely distributed to all Tunisians. 
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6.1.3  A comparison 
Despite very similar growth rates since their respective independencies, it has become 
apparent that there were quite different underlying growth processes taking place in these two 
countries.  Exports were important in both, but took a central and leading role in Mauritius, 
while in Tunisia they were part of a wider package of reforms aimed at stimulating growth and 
development.  This is reflected in the EPZ policies of the two countries:  Tunisia has some 
country-wide export-endorsing policies but only two dedicated export zones – one in Bizerte 
and one in Zarzis – while Mauritius has effectively turned its entire island into an EPZ.  It seems 
that both countries attained significant benefits from the transplantation of foreign 
technologies, skills and knowledge brought about by increased foreign influence as a result of 
these trade policies.  Moreover, the governments of both nations promoted priority export 
sectors in order to lead the country through a structural transformation, moving from a reliance 
on agriculture to drive growth in the manufacturing sector and then move into services (both 
fortunate enough to be attractive tourist destinations).  According to authors such as Herman 
and Montroll (1972), this dynamic structural transformation is a common occurrence as 
countries develop, but the way in which Mauritius and Tunisia pushed this forward by use of 
export strategies is somewhat less common.   
 
Both countries invested significant resources into social policies, and the subsequent rise in 
human development undoubtedly played a role in their successes.  In Tunisia this was more 
central to the development strategy, which may well have been due to a greater potential for 
marginal gains in Tunisia.  Lower initial levels of life expectancy, education, general health and 
participation of women meant that investments in this area had greater opportunity to drive 
growth.  Thus, social expenditure played more of a central role in Tunisian growth and 
development, but more of a supporting role in Mauritius’.  Infrastructure investment was also 
important in both countries, although again arguably played a more central role in Tunisian 
development.  Investment by the Mauritian government was perhaps more strategic – aimed at 
promoting the government’s priorities – while Tunisian investment was overly expansive and 
unrestrained for many years.  Accompanied by much lower private savings rates, this made 
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Tunisian public investment key in providing a strong capital base for economic expansion.   The 
institutional environment played a fundamental supporting role in both countries, which is 
intriguing given that the governments stood as polar opposites.  That Tunisia was able to 
achieve as rapid and consistent economic growth as Mauritius has been deemed evidence that 
democracy and political freedom are not necessary in order for such success to occur.   The 
recent country-wide protests that led to the overthrow of Ben Ali’s government challenge this 
assumption and raise a number of other questions.  Real per capita GDP growth was roughly 
the same in both countries, but did this translate to equal growth in living standards?  Drawing 
on the distinction we noted in chapter four, did this rise in incomes actually equate to higher 
growth in living standards in Mauritius, where freedoms – rather than authoritarian controls – 
were promoted?  Given the narrower scope of this thesis, however, the answer to this is best 
left for another study. 
 
Overall, it seems that if export-led growth is the desired method for achieving growth, 
Mauritius stands as a better model than Tunisia.  Exports certainly seem to have Granger-
caused GDP in Mauritius, and this empirical evidence complements the qualitative evidence we 
have also presented here.  Mauritius is a prime example of export-led growth, but even then 
we have demonstrated the importance of the wider context.  If, however, the goal is not 
export-led growth but growth in general, the answer is less clear.  Tunisia demonstrates that 
exports can be an important part of the growth process even when they are not found to have 
led growth.  Other factors can play a more or less central role, depending on the prevailing 
conditions in the countries themselves, but it seems that strong political will and a good 
institutional environment are important in either case. 
 
 
6.2  Applications 
What can this tell us about the replicability of the growth strategies of these two countries – 
particularly their export strategies?  The first thing we would make clear is that this study 
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provides evidence that there is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all method of achieving sustained 
growth.  The promotion of exports in itself cannot be credited with all the success of these 
countries, because the wider economic environment played a deciding role in whether or not 
export policies were successful at bringing about growth.  Exports took a more central role in 
Mauritius – hence our finding that they caused GDP growth in the Granger sense – but this was 
supported by public promotion of health, education and welfare.  The Tunisian government’s 
efforts acknowledged that exports could be useful, but that they also needed to prioritise social 
development on a similar (or even larger) scale.   The underlying conditions seem to have been 
what determined the level of prominence given to the export strategies in each country.  
Moreover, the literature review highlighted the questionable replicability of the EPZ policy 
pursued by Mauritius in particular.  So the replicability of similar export policies is restricted by 
the prevailing environment. 
 
Similarly, the ability to repeat the approaches of Mauritius and Tunisia may be limited by 
timing.  Mauritius was able to kick-start rapid export growth through enormous sugar rents 
brought about by the high sugar prices it secured.   Both the Mauritian and Tunisian textile 
export sectors were bolstered by their generous quotas under the MFA.  With such generous 
trading agreements being scaled back globally, this particular ship may have sailed, as it were.  
Various developing country-centred trading agreements (such as AGOA) have been established 
in recent years, but it is unclear whether these will provide a favourable enough trading 
environment for other countries to so successfully follow the agriculture-manufacturing-
services route that Mauritius and Tunisia did.   
 
One thing that these two African success stories do highlight is that countries with poor initial 
conditions need not experience a “poverty trap”.  Neither Mauritius nor Tunisia had particularly 
favourable conditions for growth upon independence, yet both were able to spark economic 
growth and channel newfound gains into further productive endeavours.  The difference may 
be, of course, that both countries did have strong political will and visionary leadership upon 
independence and worked hard to develop a culture of strong institutions.  Although we cannot 
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observe the alternate environment in these countries without this strong institutional 
framework, qualitative evidence certainly suggests that in its absence macroeconomic 
instability, corruption, or a poor business environment would have limited the opportunities for 
export success.  Strong institutions, a trusted government and a stable economic environment 
may be key prerequisites for the success of export-focussed strategies and, more crucially, 
economic growth.  Unfortunately, these foundations are missing from many of the poorest 
countries in Africa (and elsewhere) and in such cases the establishment of these foundational 
elements is likely to be a far more imperative initial focus. 
 
Overall, therefore, this study presents an important contribution to the literature on African 
economic growth and development and on export-led growth.  This constitutes the first in-
depth comparison of these two very different countries and demonstrates that their 
remarkably similar economic growth experiences actually reflect quite different underlying 
growth processes.  Our econometric analysis comprises the first such comprehensive and 
comparable test of these two countries, and suggests that in fact exports played a far more 
central role in Mauritius than they did in Tunisia. 
 
 
6.3  Future Research 
Before concluding, it is worthwhile drawing attention to some promising avenues for further 
research.  Although making a solid contribution to our understanding of this specific area, this 
study naturally could not cover all that we would have liked it to.   Nowhere was this more 
evident than in the econometric analysis.  The methodology chapter made it strikingly apparent 
that to test for export-led growth by including every possible permutation would comprise an 
unwieldy number of regressions.  However, there are some particular additions that we would 
suggest are worth undertaking.  If the data can be found, it would be worth replicating some of 
these tests using quarterly or monthly data, rather than the annual data we have used here.  To 
our knowledge, these datasets are not available for either country over the period we are 
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interested in, but if one is satisfied to look at a smaller (more recent) time period then this 
could provide an interesting robustness check to our results.  As noted earlier, however, this 
would raise a number of new issues around seasonality.  Low observation counts prevented us 
from examining separate time periods in this study, but given the discussion on how the 
importance of exports varied across different periods in both countries, this could be a valuable 
upshot from the use of quarterly or monthly data. 
 
Moreover, it would be interesting to undertake an examination of the effects of disaggregated 
export sectors in Mauritius, as we did for Tunisia.  Having found a strong Granger-causal 
relationship between aggregate exports and GDP we found it unnecessary to devote time to a 
disaggregated study here, but to do so would shed light on the relative impact that different 
export sectors had on growth.  This would help us to better understand which export sectors 
were worth promoting, and could even be combined with a study of different periods to see if 
this impact was dynamic – i.e. whether the impact of manufacturing was eventually surpassed 
by that of tourism, and so on.  This would also provide a meaningful comparison to existing 
disaggregate studies such as Durbarry (2004). 
 
A further promising approach would be to make a comparison of both of these countries with 
another – still impoverished – country.  Focussing on the current conditions in that country, one 
could compare them with the conditions in Mauritius and Tunisia at their respective 
independencies and explore the ability of the still impoverished country to replicate their 
development experiences and achieve substantial economic growth.  This would be a good 
complement to the current study.  Moving away from a focus on export-policies and into 
supporting policies, another complementary approach would be to delve further into the 
underlying reasons why these two countries developed such strong institutional environments.  
We touched on this earlier, but the importance of institutions in both countries and the stark 
contrasts between their political experiences mean that an understanding of how this came 
about would be valuable.  It could provide a significant insight for countries whose institutional 
environments may currently be detrimental (or outright prohibitive) to economic growth. 
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Finally, given the currently tumultuous political environment in Tunisia it would be interesting 
to undertake a retrospective study of the underlying causes of economic growth of Tunisia in, 
say, ten to fifteen years time.  Once the ‘dust has settled’ and a better understanding of the 
true political and social environment in Tunisia under the Ben Ali (and even Bourguiba) regimes 
has come to light, we may be have a better understanding of the true impacts of the country’s 
institutions and the true role played by authoritarianism.  Coupled with further examination of 
the importance of exports to the growth process in future years, this would build on the story 
we have told here. 
 
Overall, this study has shown that Mauritius and Tunisia provide an interesting and insightful 
comparison.  These two very different countries demonstrate that perpetual poverty and 
stagnation of incomes need not be the status quo for the countries of Africa, but that sustained 
and equitable economic growth is in fact attainable.  Whether it be through a central focus on 
export policies as in Mauritius, or a developmental strategy including export policies as part of a 
package involving other social policies as in Tunisia, growth is possible.  The wider context is 
certainly a crucial determining factor in the success of such policies, but the poor initial 
conditions in both of these countries demonstrate that strong visionary leadership has the 
potential to bring about great social and economic advancements – even in a continent as 
afflicted by poverty as Africa. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I:  List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ADB  African Development Bank 
ADF  Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Test; for stationarity in data series) 
AGOA  African Growth and Opportunity Act (between US and SSA, from 2000) 
AIC  Akaike Information Criterion (for selecting lag length in VARs) 
BCT  Banque Centrale De Tunisie (The Central Bank of Tunisia) 
BDC  Bi-directional Causality 
BoI  Board of Investment (Mauritius) 
BOM  Bank of Mauritius (central) 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
EAP  Eradication of Absolute Poverty (programme, Mauritius) 
ECM  Error Correction Model (Johansen, 1991; see also VECM) 
EEC  European Economic Community (became the EU in 1992) 
ELG  Export-Led Growth 
ELGH  Export-Led Growth Hypothesis 
EPZ  Export Processing Zone 
EU  European Union (formerly the EEC) 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA  Free Trade Area/Free Trade Agreement 
GFCF  Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
GLE  Growth-Led Exports (hypothesis) 
IFS  International Financial Statistics (database, of the IMF) 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INS  National Institute of Statistics (Tunisia) 
LDCs  Least Developed Countries 
MDG  Millennium Development Goal 
MEDIA  Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority (now MIDA) 
MENA  Middle East and North Africa 
MFA  Multi-Fibre Agreement (or Multi-Fibre Arrangement, ended 1 January 2005) 
MIDA  Mauritius Industrial Development Authority (MEDIA pre-2000) 
NC  No Causality (used here in the Granger sense) 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OIC  Indian Ocean Commission 
PPP  Purchasing Power Parity 
SADC  Southern African Development Community (established 1992, FTA since 2008) 
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme (of the IMF) 
TFP  Total Factor Productivity 
UNU-WIDER United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research 
VAR  Vector Autoregression 
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VARD  Vector Autoregression with Differencing 
VAT  Value-Added Tax 
VEC  Vector Error Correction 
VECM  Vector Error Correction Model (Johansen, 1991; see also ECM) 
WEF  World Economic Forum 
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